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Accretion Taxation
Much of the modern tax policy debate has centered on two paradig-
matic tax treatments: cash flow taxation and accretion taxation.' For an
investment, cash flow taxation calls for deducting investment costs when
they are paid and taking cash receipts into income when they are received.
In contrast, accretion taxation calls for taxing changes in the value of the
investment even if the investor is simply holding the investment and
neither paying out nor receiving any cash flows. In tax terminology, ac-
cretion taxation subjects losses and gains to taxation even though they are
"unrealized." In contrast, the cash flow method taxes gains and losses
only if they are "realized" by sale of the investment or by the receipt or
payment of cash flows.
Theorists have debated the merits of cash flow taxation and accretion
taxation under the assumption that there are no problems in implement-
ing either tax.2 However, implementing the two taxes raises some difficult
issues, and these issues have spawned an extensive literature.3 One set of
implementation problems is particularly serious for accretion taxation:
how to tax unrealized changes in wealth.4 These changes are not accom-
panied by a sale or other event that creates a record of the magnitude of
the changes. As a result, policymakers must address the question of "peri-
odicity," how often changes in value should be assessed and taxed. Advo-
cates of accretion taxation usually assume that annual assessment is ideal
and then struggle with the problem of estimating the annual wealth
changes associated with various assets.'
There are several problems with this approach. The most serious is
that policy proposals for implementing accretion taxation are not linked
clearly or carefully to the norms that motivate choice of the accretion ap-
proach in the first place. Unless reference is made to these norms, it is
1. The accretion taxation treatment has been identified with "the income tax" while the cash flow
treatment has been identified with "the consumption tax." The literature is massive. See, e.g., Balcer,
The Taxation of Capital Gains: Samuelson's Fundamental Principle, 38 PUB. FIN. 1, 1-2 (1983)
(citing sources).
The argument for identifying cash flow taxation with a consumption tax is straightforward. Income
is either invested or consumed. The cash flow tax allows a deduction for investment. This deduction
exempts investment from the tax base so that only consumption is taxed.
2. See, e.g., Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor tarren, 88
HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649
(1983); Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Tpe or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 931 (1975) [hereinafter Warren 1975]; Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than
an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980) [hereinafter Warren 1980].
3. See, e.g., Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1113 (1974); Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED, INCOME OR
EXPENDITURE? 161 (J. Pechman ed. 1980).
4. One prominent critic of accretion taxation has termed the problems associated with the realiza-
tion requirement "the Achilles heel" of that method of taxation. See Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of
the Comprehensive Income Tax, in RESTRUCTURING THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 278, 280 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J.
506 (1986); Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 1111 (1986); Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock,
76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967); Note, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital
Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1982).
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unclear how much is lost when various approximations to accretion treat-
ment are used. One must know, for example, how much worse it is to tax
certain assets every five years or only at death rather than annually. With
that knowledge, a policymaker can compare the benefits of frequent as-
sessment with the costs to the government and to taxpayers. The costs of
assessment will be termed "administrative costs" while the losses that re-
sult from falling short of a norm because of less frequent assessment will
be termed "normative costs."
There is a second basic problem: Why is annual assessment presumed
to be ideal? In a medieval agricultural economy, tax compliance might
have required collection at the time of the annual harvest. But today there
is no obvious reason to assess taxes annually.' Indeed, some parts of the
tax system do not operate on an annual basis. For example, estimated tax
payments are made every three months. Choice of an annual assessment
period as ideal should be justified rather than presumed.
One intriguing possibility is that assessment might be made at periods
much longer than the ideal period without losing much of the benefit of
taxing at ideal intervals. This would be accomplished by altering the tax
imposed for the longer period to approximate the tax that would have
been due if taxation had been imposed repeatedly at the end of each ideal
interval. Such a tax would replicate an ideal accretion tax closely even
though assessment is made only once every several years or even once in a
lifetime. Thus administrative costs could be reduced without an offsetting
increase in normative costs.
In addressing these issues, this Article begins by considering four norms
that have motivated scholars and policymakers to favor accretion taxation.
The first norm is that intangible benefits from holding wealth should be
taxed. The second norm is that the tax system should address disparities
in wealth as well as disparities in consumption. For many, the ability of
accretion taxation to satisfy these two "wealth-related" norms is what
makes it fairer than cash flow taxation. The third norm is tax neutrality
based on the "Samuelson principle." This norm is satisfied if the value of
each investment is the same in the hands of investors who ire taxed at
6. One argument for assessing taxes annually is that business accounting is often done on an
annual basis. Allowing the tax accounts to be annualized might save administrative resources for
businesses and thus lower tax compliance costs. The businesses would be able to cumulate both their
tax and financial accounts at the same time and thus avoid some duplication of effort. The problem
with this argument is that corporate profits, the financial accounting analog of taxable income, are
typically reported quarterly to the shareholders. Presumably, the same administrative advantages of
cumulating both tax and financial accounts simultaneously at year end would exist if there were
quarterly tax assessments coinciding with the quarterly profit reports to shareholders.
Of course, if there are strong normative reasons for assessing taxes over a period that does not
coincide with any business accounting period, these reasons may override any saving in administrative
costs that might accrue from matching the tax assessment period to the financial accounting period. In




different rates. This means that there is no scope for tax motivated deals
between taxpayers in different brackets. Tax motivated deals tend to dis-
tort the allocation of investment between different projects and may have
adverse distributional consequences. The fourth norm is the "Haig-
Simons ideal." Under this norm, tax should be levied on consumption plus
the change in wealth over each accounting period.7
Although the results in this Article reflect on the usefulness and coher-
ence of these norms, the Article will not discuss which of the norms, or
what mixture of them, is most desirable as a foundation for accretion tax-
ation. I have chosen these norms because they are the main justifications
that scholars and policymakers have put forward in advocating accretion
taxation. The focus here will be on two other tasks.
The first task is to determine the most basic implications of each norm
for periodicity issues. To accomplish this task two questions need answers.
First, what is the ideal periodicity under each norm? Second, how costly is
any particular deviation from that ideal under the norm? If the answers to
these two questions are clear, then the policymaker or scholar can mea-
sure the normative costs of choosing a particular periodicity.
The second task involves tax implementation. Given a structure of nor-
mative costs, what can one say about the choice of accounting period
under the tax laws? This task needs to be distinguished from a comple-
mentary effort that has been the focus of much of the literature: the impli-
cations of administrative costs for implementation of an accretion tax.8
This Article focuses almost exclusively on the normative cost side of the
inquiry. A few polar cases of very high and very low administrative cost
are examined to illustrate the policy implications of the normative cost
results, but no attempt is made to make fine distinctions based on admin-
istrative costs.
Part II sets out the major results on the implications of the norms. Only
the two wealth-related norms speak to the ideal periodicity for accretion
taxation. Both of these norms suggest that continuous taxation of wealth
changes is ideal. That is, the accounting period should be infinitesimally
short, and wealth changes should be taxed the instant they occur. Unfor-
tunately, it is not easy under either of the wealth-related norms to quan-
tify the comparative loss due to different deviations from continuous taxa-
tion. This makes it difficult to compare normative costs to the
administrative cost of implementation under these norms.
Tax neutrality based on the Samuelson principle does not support any
7. These four norms can be characterized at least roughly in terms of the traditional categories of
equity and efficiency. The wealth-related theories and the Haig-Simons ideal are motivated primarily
by equity considerations, while tax neutrality involves efficiency. See R. TREScH, PUBLc FINANCE: A
NORMATIVE THEORY 265-71 (1981) (discussing equity rationale for Haig-Simons ideal); infra text
accompanying note 106 (connecting tax neutrality goal to efficiency objective).
8. See Shakow, supra note 5; Note, supra note 5.
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particular frequency of taxation, but it does imply that the frequency that
is chosen should be applied to all assets. The Samuelson principle is a
consistency requirement; it does not determine the choice of the basic ac-
counting period for the tax system. In fact, the Samuelson principle sup-
ports a consistently applied cash flow tax as well as an accretion tax of
any given periodicity.
The Haig-Simons ideal does not help in determining the proper period
for accretion taxation. If one fixes the periodicity of an accretion tax, the
tax will fail to meet the Haig-Simons ideal for any other accounting pe-
riod. Attempts to define a tax that will satisfy the doctrine independent of
the accounting period suggest the use of cash flow taxation rather than an
accretion tax of any periodicity.
The wealth distribution and tax neutrality norms suggest that continu-
ous taxation is ideal and that it is important to apply this ideal consist-
ently across different assets. Using these guidelines, Parts III and IV
study implementation and policy issues.9 Part III examines the normative
costs of choosing periodic rather than continuous taxation. Two major
conclusions emerge. First, the normative costs of taxing wealth changes
periodically increase with the volatility of the assets. This suggests that
the greatest effort at frequent assessment under an accretion tax should be
aimed at the most volatile assets.10
Second, the degree to which volatility makes frequent assessment im-
portant depends on how costly it is to trade the asset and on the treatment
of tax losses. If investors can obtain the tax benefits associated with taking
losses early by trading at low cost, then the normative cost of having a
long accounting period for risky assets is substantially higher. This is true
for both of the wealth-related norms and also for the norm based on the
Samuelson principle. Allowing early loss taking dilutes the wealth tax as-
pects of accretion taxation. It also allows some assets to be taxed with
different periodicity than others at the option of the taxpayer. This incon-
sistent treatment across assets leads to violations of the Samuelson
principle.
Part IV explores the tax policy implications of the results in Parts II
and III using two main lines of inquiry. One line of inquiry explores the
possibility of controlling the problem of early loss taking by using existing
techniques in U.S. law. In particular, one might use either the capital
asset versus ordinary asset distinction already in the code or the wash sale
provisions of the code that prevent loss taking followed by repurchase of
9. Some readers may not be interested in Part II's extended demonstration that a continuous tax is
optimal and that consistency is important. These readers may proceed directly to Parts III and IV,
which can be read independently of Part II.
10. In contrast, the current system permits long delays in assessment for many classes of risky
assets while expending great effort to assess some low volatility assets frequently. See infra text ac-
companying notes 223-26.
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the same asset. Part IV shows that these two approaches have serious
weaknesses.
With this result in hand, Part IV takes up the second main line of
inquiry: the implications of the results in Parts II and III for the general
question of how to design an accretion tax. There are two easy cases.
Where transaction costs are low and market data is readily available, fre-
quent assessment seems the best tax treatment. Frequent assessment mini-
mizes the potential gains from early loss taking and similar trading strate-
gies that are viable when transaction costs are low. Frequent assessment
also provides a good approximation of continuous taxation. Where trans-
actions costs are high, early loss taking and other trading strategies are not
profitable for taxpayers. In this case, it is possible to approximate contin-
uous taxation well by tax rules that are based only on the purchase price,
final value and holding period of the asset.
Cases that do not fall into these two categories are more difficult. There
are technical problems involved in approximating continuous taxation.
Furthermore, the wealth distribution norms that underlie the choice of
continuous taxation as an ideal do not provide a clear picture of how seri-
ous a given deviation from continuous taxation is. As a result, it is diffi-
cult to know how to strike a balance between the administrative costs of
frequent assessment and the normative costs that will result from deviat-
ing from continuous taxation.
Since the length of the accounting period is an important conceptual
issue for an income tax system, resolving these problems would be valu-
able even if the deviations from continuous taxation under current law
were modest. But Part IV also indicates that these deviations are often
large and distributed unevenly across different types of assets. This raises
serious equity and efficiency concerns about the current system.
To get a feeling for the magnitudes involved, it is necessary to isolate
phenomena associated with asset riskiness from more conventional phe-
nomena. Two aspects of the current tax treatment of risky investments are
troubling. First, the current system allows the taxpayer to delay taxation
of any gain over the purchase price of an asset by holding rather than
selling the asset. This is the "conventional" concern about deferral. Sec-
ond, there are potential gains for taxpayers from strategic trading. The
taxpayer can take losses when they occur and defer the matching gains
that occur if the asset moves back up to the original purchase price. This
second aspect is peculiar to risky assets and is the focus of considerable
attention in Parts III and IV.
For many investments, this second aspect is significant as well as the
first aspect. Consider a twenty-five year investment in a typical common
stock by an individual in the 30% bracket. Allowing taxes on gains over
the purchase price to be delayed until sale instead of being taxed continu-
ously for this investment is equivalent to granting a 7.1% investment tax
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credit when the stock is purchased." The ability to trade strategically is
equivalent to allowing an additional investment tax credit of 3.5% when
the stock is purchased."2 This second advantage does not exist for low risk
assets since these assets are unlikely to move below their purchase price in
value. Thus, strategic trading effects potentially bias investment signifi-
cantly toward riskier assets.
The results in Part IV are important for addressing many detailed pol-
icy problems as well as for the overall design of an accretion tax. When-
ever the taxpayer can delay realization, the approach taken in the law
needs to be sensitive to asset riskiness, transaction costs and the possibili-
ties for strategic trading. Part IV discusses potential ex post solutions,
such as attributing cumulated income to past periods, in terms of these
three important factors. This discussion should be valuable for scholars
and policymakers faced with tax policy problems that arise from the abil-
ity of the taxpayer to delay realization.' 3
Prior to the derivation and discussion of the results in Parts II, III and
IV, Part I introduces key concepts through an example. Part V summa-
rizes the major conclusions reached in the Article. Finally, an Appendix
describes the derivation and computation of many of the numerical exam-
ples presented throughout the Article. 4
11. The method for arriving at the 7.1% figure is as follows. The average stock market asset has
earned an average return of 11.4% annually over the years from 1926-1981 compared to an average
nominal riskless rate of 3.1% over the same period. See infra note 148. An investment of $100 for 25
years at an annual rate of 11.4% would be worth $1486.38 at the end of the 25 years. The net gain is
$1386.38. Applying a 30% tax rate to this net gain yields a tax of $415.91. This is the tax that would
be applied under current law when the asset is sold at the end of the 25 year period.
With a nominal riskless rate of 3.1%, the after-tax interest rate for the 30% bracket taxpayer is
70% of the 3.1%. Using this after-tax interest rate, the continuous tax on the average path of the asset
translated into a tax at the end of the 25 years would be $492.15. The method for computing a
continuous tax as an equivalent tax at a point in time is discussed infra at text accompanying notes
21-22 and in Part IV of Appendix A.
To translate the $76.24 difference between the $492.15 and the $415.91 into tax credit terms, note
that each $1 of investment will yield $14.86 after 25 years. A 30% tax will reduce the $13.86 gain to
$9.70 so that a $1 investment will produce $10.70 after tax. Thus, about $7.1 of additional investment
is needed to cover the $76.24 additional tax.
This 7.1% result is an approximation. For example, the average of the taxes over all possible asset
price paths is not exactly equal to the tax on the average path computed here. But an exact computa-
tion probably would not change the result very much.
12. See infra note 191; text accompanying notes 190-92. The 3.5% benefit from strategic trading
is independent of the 7.1% benefit from deferral. The strategic trading gain does not include any of
the benefit due to deferring gains over the initial purchase price. See infra note 191. Thus the 7.1%
and 3.5% benefits sum to a total benefit of 10.6%.
13. A reader who is primarily interested in applying the results of Part IV to detailed policy
issues may skip the extended normative discussion in Part II and proceed directly to Parts III and IV.
14. The Appendix relies mostly on algebra and a tiny bit of elementary calculus. This Appendix
suffices to explain the computations that generate Figures 1 and 3, Tables I-IV, Tables X-XI, part
of Table XIII, and Table XIV.
Much more sophisticated mathematics is required to generate Figure 2, Tables VII-IX and the
remainder of Table XIII. This mathematics is described in Appendix B of the working paper version
of this Article. See J. Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation
182-210 (California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper No. 721, 1990) (Appen-
dix B). The derivation of Table XII is not described in the Appendix or in the working paper because
the numbers in that Table follow directly from the work of others.
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I. ACCRETION TAXATION AND PERIODICITY:
INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS
Before discussing either the four norms supporting accretion taxation or
tax implementation using those norms, I first introduce some concepts and
definitions and illustrate the key role of the norms in the choice of a pe-
riod for taxation. Section A of this Part describes continuous taxation,
defines the period and frequency of a tax, and shows how periodicity af-
fects the wealth position of an investor. This is done through a simple
example that serves as a reference point throughout the Article. Section B
then motivates the normative discussion that follows in Part II by illus-
trating the central role of normative analysis in deciding periodicity issues.
A. Tax Periodicity and Continuous Taxation: An Example
Consider an investment consisting of two riskless cash flows: a cost of
$100 at the beginning of year one and revenue of $144 at the end of year
two. 5 For convenience, "time 0" is the point in time when the investment
begins, "time 1" is the end of the first year and "time 2" is the end of the
second year. Suppose that the instantaneous pre-tax riskless interest rate
will be constant and certain during the two years in the life of the invest-
15. There are two different senses in which an investment can be "riskless." First, the cash flows
from the investment and their timing may be known with certainty. Second, the time path of the value
of the asset may be known with certainty.
These two conditions are not equivalent. To see this, suppose that cash flows are certain. The asset
value path may still be uncertain. The reason for this is that asset value depends on the behavior of
other investment opportunities in the economy. These opportunities may vary over time in a way that
affects the value of the asset. If interest rates increase, for example, this would diminish the value of a
positive riskless cash flow to be received in the future. See infra note 137 (example). The risk of
interest rate changes makes the asset value path uncertain.
The term "riskless interest rate" means the rate of return available in the economy for an invest-
ment that has fixed, and therefore riskless, cash flows. A period must be specified for this rate. For
example, a one year riskless interest rate is the rate one can earn by investing now in exchange for a
riskless cash flow payout one year from now. This rate may vary over time, but it represents the rate
on an investment that is riskless in the first sense: riskless cash flows. This investment may fluctuate
in value and therefore is not riskless in the second sense.
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ment."' This implies that the path of the pre-tax value of the investment
during the two years is certain."'
Suppose the constant instantaneous pre-tax riskless rate is 10% on an
annual basis. Then the investment is "profitable" in the sense that it
earns 20% pre-tax over two years while the pre-tax market rate of return
is 10%. An investment of $100 at time 0 that earns 10% would yield $121
at time 2 instead of $144.8 Assuming that the investor could costlessly
convince others that the cash flow at time 2 will be $144 and will be
riskless, the market value of the investment would be almost exactly
$119."9 This is because $119 growing at 10% per year for two years will
yield $144. Since the right to the $144 cash flow at time 2 is riskless,
owning that right must yield the same rate of return as similar riskless
investments.
It is easy to represent the pre-tax path of the value of the investment
graphically. The value jumps $19 at time 0 from the cost of $100 and
then increases exponentially from $119 to $144 over the two years in the
time interval. This jump in value and subsequent exponential increase is
portrayed as the line connecting boxes in Figure 1.
16. Part I of the Appendix infra explains what an instantaneous interest rate is. Suppose that the
constant instantaneous rate is r. Assuming that this instantaneous rate is certain over the two periods
eliminates any uncertainty that might arise from potential changes in interest rates during the two
periods. This makes the value path of an investment consisting entirely of riskless cash flows certain
over the two periods. See supra note 15 (not only riskless cash flow but also constant interest rates
required for path to be certain).
It also fixes the term structure of interest rates for riskless borrowing and lending contracts that
will commence and terminate during the two periods. A loan of $X for time t during the period will
require a repayment of $Xe rt at the end of the loan. The per period rate on the loan will be er - 1.
This will be true independent of the loan period. As a result, a two-period loan made at the beginning
of the first period will be equivalent to a loan for the first period followed by a loan for the second
period made at the end of the first period.
This property is called the "expectation hypothesis" in the literature on the term structure of inter-
est rates. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 476-77 (2d ed. 1984).
Economic theory does not imply this property, and the actual term structure of interest rates usually
does not exhibit the property. Typically, long-term loans require higher interest rates than an
equivalent series of short term loans. See id. at 473-80. The text uses an example that obeys the
expectation hypothesis only for simplicity.
17. Since interest rates for intraperiod investments are certain, there is no risk that the opportu-
nity cost of the investment will change. Combined with the fact that the investment has riskless cash
flows, this yields an investment value path that is certain. See supra notes 15-16.
The after-tax value that an investor perceives may differ from the pre-tax value. Furthermore, even
if the pre-tax value path is certain, the after-tax value path may be uncertain for taxpayers facing
uncertainty as to what tax rate or tax rules will be applied to the realized and unrealized returns from
the asset. In the example, it is assumed that each investor faces a constant and certain marginal tax
rate during the two year interval. As a result, each investor will perceive the path of the after-tax
value of the investment to be certain.
18. It grows 10% (from $100 to $110) in the first time period and grows 10% (from $110 to
$121) in the second time period.
19. More precisely, the market value would be 144/(1.1)2 = $119.0083.
The assumption that the investor can convince potential buyers that the $144 will be received
risklessly at time 2 is nontrivial. There is an extensive literature on the costs of conveying such infor-
mation to the market. For a discussion of recent work in the area, see Ambarish, John & Williams,
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The "spike" increase of $19 at time 0 is a profit in excess of the market
rate of return. This type of profit is called "pure profit" or "economic
profit." In contrast, the exponential increase from $119 to $144 represents
receipt of the market rate of return. This is just the required rate of re-
turn on capital and can be called the "normal profit." If the investor had
earned only the normal profit on the investment of $100, the return at
time 2 would have been $121 instead of $144. The path for this invest-
ment is represented by the line connecting plus signs in Figure 1.
Before carrying this example further, it is necessary to establish termi-
nology describing the periodicity of an accretion tax. A natural approach
is to say that an accretion tax has "a period of n" if the tax is assessed at
the end of every n time units. Here we use a year as the unit time inter-
val, so that a tax with "a period of n" is simply a tax assessed at the end
of every n years. An annual accretion tax therefore would be an accretion
tax with a period of one. A tax assessed and collected each quarter, as is
the case for some estimated tax payments under current U.S. tax law, is a
tax with a period of one-quarter.20
The inverse of period is frequency. A tax with a period of n has a
frequency of 1/n. The frequency is simply the number of times per year
that taxes are assessed and collected. For example, quarterly assessment
and collection of taxes has a frequency of 4 and a period of one-quarter.
20. The estimated tax system does not always require the assessment and collection of the total
tax accrued each quarter. The taxpayer can operate under various safe-harbor conventions. For exam-
ple, if the sum of four equal estimated tax payments for a year equals or exceeds the previous year's
tax liability, the taxpayer will not be subject to any penalty even if these estimated tax payments fall
far short of the actual tax liability accrued during each quarter. See I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1989).
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Suppose that we assess and collect a tax with period n and that we
allow n to become extremely small. The frequency of the assessment and
collection of taxes will then become extremely large. In the limit, the pe-
riod will be zero and the frequency will be infinite. This limit is "continu-
ous taxation." At every instant of time the government assesses and col-
lects taxes.
Now consider three accretion taxes: an accretion tax with period one
(the annual accretion tax), an accretion tax with period two, and the con-
tinuous accretion tax. An accretion tax with period one would tax the
accumulated gain at the end of each year and increase basis an amount
equal to the gain that is taxed. In order to apply this tax to the investment
here, one needs to know the market value of the investment at the end of
one year. This is approximately $131.21 The gain in the first year is
therefore $31 and this would be taxed at the end of the first year. During
the second year the investment increases approximately $13 in value, from
$131 to $144. This increase of $13 would be taxed at the end of the
second year. Accretion taxation with period two would simply tax the en-
tire gain of $44 at the end of the second year.
Accretion taxation applied continuously is more complicated. Gains are
taxed at every instant they occur. A continuous stream of taxes emerges
from the continuous stream of increase in value. Basis increases by the
amount of gain that is taxed. As a result, adjusted basis is always equal to
market value. The taxpayer can sell the asset at any time without paying
any additional taxes.
The three taxes require assessment and collection of taxes at different
times during the life of the asset. The accretion tax with period two re-
quires assessment and collection only at time 2. The accretion tax with
period one requires assessment and collection both at time 1 and at time 2.
The continuous accretion tax requires assessment and collection at every
moment during the life of the investment.
"Tax assessment" consists of computing taxable income and the tax lia-
bility due on that taxable income while "tax collection" consists of actu-
ally collecting the taxes. In order to compare the three taxes, we need to
translate tax collection to one common time while leaving the pattern of
tax assessment under each tax treatment unchanged. One way to do this is
to assume that all taxes will be paid at time 2 when the investment comes
to an end. Tax liabilities or tax benefits assessed before time 2 are paid or
credited with interest at time 2. Where all taxpayers face the same con-
stant marginal tax rate over the life of the investment, the appropriate
interest rate is the common after-tax interest rate. This is the rate at
which both the government and taxpayers can borrow and lend.2" Given a
21. The actual value at the end of one period is $144/(1.1) = $130.9091.
22. The taxpayer as lender will receive the after-tax rate of return. If interest is deductible, the
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fixed pre-tax interest rate, the after-tax interest rate will depend on the
periodicity of the accretion tax.23
The following table lists the annualized after-tax interest rate and the
tax, collected entirely at time 2, for the three different accretion taxes.24
The tax rate is 40%.
Table I
assessment period equivalent tax annualized after-tax
at time 2 interest rate
two years (biannual) 17.60 6.11%
one year (annual) 18.34 6.00%
continuous 19.10 5.89%
The biannual tax is easy to calculate. It consists of adding up the revenues
and subtracting the costs that occur during the two years and multiplying
by 40%.2 This is the treatment that would occur under current law.
There is no tax and no allowance for cost recovery until realization which
occurs here when the cash payout of $144 is made at the end of the
investment.
Annual assessment and continuous assessment would tax unrealized
gains in this case since realization does not occur until the end of the
second year. These assessment periods result in a higher total tax, because
gains are taxed earlier under these two methods. The pure profit of $19
that occurs when the investment is made is taxed immediately under con-
tinuous assessment, at the end of one year under annual assessment, and
at the end of two years under biannual assessment.26 The normal profits
taxpayer will borrow at the after-tax rate of interest. Taxes are reduced by the marginal tax rate
times each interest payment.
When the government borrows money, it pays out interest but gets back the taxes on the interest
paid. When the government lends money, it receives interest but must reduce tax receipts by the
marginal tax rate times the amount of the receipts. This reduction is necessary because taxpayers can
deduct the interest paid to the government. Thus, the government borrows and lends at the after-tax
rate of interest.
23. This dependence is derived mathematically infra Part III of the Appendix. The dependence is
also illustrated in Table I, infra text accompanying notes 24-25.
24. The annualized after-tax interest rate is the annual after-tax interest rate achieved by
purchasing a zero coupon bond at the beginning of the tax assessment period that pays all principal
and interest at the end of that period. For a continuous tax this after-tax interest rate is calculated by
computing the pre-tax increase in value over the year and subtracting the accumulated value, with
interest, of the taxes due on that increase. The Appendix, infra, describes in detail the derivation of
the results in this Table as well as the results in Tables II-VI, Tables X-XI, part of Table XIII, and
Table XIV. A separate working paper details the derivation of other numerical results in this Article.
See supra note 14 (separate roles of Appendix and working paper in supporting various numerical
results).
25. Total revenues are $144 and total cost is $100 so that the tax is 0.40 x $44 = $17.60.
26. If the investment begins precisely at time 0, then the gain at time 0 occurs exactly at the end
of the assessment period ending at time 0. The results in the text apply strictly only in the case where
the investment is made an infinitesimal amount of time after time 0. Thus, the pure profit of $19
occurs infinitesimally close to time 0, but this profit is not taxable income in the assessment period
that ends at time 0.
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earned on the $119 in value that exists right after time 0 are taxed at the
time they are earned under continuous assessment, are cumulated, without
interest, and taxed at one-year intervals under annual assessment and are
cumulated, without interest, and taxed at the end of the two years under
biannual assessment. In this example, taxes are about 8% lower under
biannual assessment and about 4% lower under annual assessment than
under continuous assessment.17 Because after-tax interest rates have been
used to bring taxes forward to a common time, these differences represent
the different impacts of the different assessment periods on the taxpayer's
time 2 wealth position.28
B. The Need for Normative Analysis
This Section considers a simple "reductionist" argument in favor of
continuous taxation, that is, a tax accounting period of zero, over an ac-
cretion tax based on any non-zero period. This argument is not conclu-
sive, but demonstrates the need for the deeper normative analysis provided
in Part II. The argument is reductionist because it extends conventional
reasoning in support of annual taxation to a claim that a continuous tax is
ideal. The conventional reasoning is that an annual tax is desirable be-
cause the annual tax is better than a tax with a longer period at reflecting
This infinitesimal delay corresponds to the expected behavior of taxpayers. The delay shifts the tax
on the gain of $19 one assessment period later.
If the investment occurred exactly at time 0 so that the gain of $19 was assessed at time 0 under all
three taxes, then the "equivalent tax at time 2" column in the table would read 18.56, 18.83 and
19.10 from top to bottom instead of 17.60, 18.43, and 19.10. The qualitative result of a higher tax
corresponding to more frequent assessment would still be true, but the intuitive discussion in the text
would be more complicated.
27. The result here is approximately linear in the assessment period: The deviation of an annual
assessment system from continuous taxation is about half that of a biannual system. This linearity
property is peculiar to this example and does not generalize. In most cases, doubling the assessment
frequency does not halve the deviation from continuous taxation. This can be seen for exponentially
increasing riskless assets from Table XIV, infra text accompanying notes 247-48.
The 4% and 8% deviations from continuous taxation may seem rather small. The example is not
meant to illustrate typical deviations under current law. These are often much larger. See supra notes
11-12 and accompanying text (deviation of greater than 20% in absolute size of tax translates into
deviation of greater than 10% in tax credit terms).
28. The example treats the pre-tax world as constant. Regardless of the assessment period, the
pre-tax interest rate is 10% annually, and the investment costs $100 at time 0 and yields $144 at time
2. The implicit assumption here is that there are "no general equilibrium effects" of the tax regime.
Varying the assessment period does not change any market price: the price of borrowing money, the
price of purchasing the equipment necessary to undertake the investment, or the price of the goods
produced by the investment.
This is a strong assumption. In general one would expect that changing the assessment period
would have some effect on pre-tax prices. For example, shortening the assessment period causes a
decrease in the after-tax interest rate as can be seen from the second column of Table I, supra text
accompanying notes 24-25. This might lead individuals to lower their savings while firms attempt to
increase investment based on a lower after-tax cost of borrowing. To equate supply with demand, the
pre-tax interest rate would have to increase. Such an increase would decrease investment demand and
simultaneously increase the supply of savings. The increase in the pre-tax interest rate might par-
tially, or wholly, offset the increased tax rate inherent in more frequent assessment.
The potential impact of general equilibrium effects is considered carefully in the discussion of the
norms in the next Part. See infra notes 111 & 128; text accompanying notes 91-94, 110-11.
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the pattern of wealth changes that occur during the longer period. One
can use the same argument to claim that a six month accounting period is
superior to a year, that a one month accounting period is superior to six
months, and so on. The chain of arguments ends in continuous taxation.
Only a continuous tax avoids the pitfall common to all taxes that use a
nonzero accounting period: These taxes focus only on the net wealth
change during the accounting period while ignoring the pattern of wealth
changes that occur within that accounting period.
An example illustrates this reasoning. Suppose that on January 1 of a
particular year an asset is purchased for $100. It increases in value stead-
ily, reaching $200 in value on July 1, at exactly mid-year. Then the asset
declines steadily until it is again worth $100 at the end of the year. Under
the traditional idea that one year should be the accounting period, no tax
should be levied since there is no net change in value over the accounting
period. However, if the same pattern of asset value occurred over two
years, it would be a different matter. In that case, the peak of $200 would
be reached after one year, and then a loss of $100 would occur in the
second year. Failure to tax the $100 gain at the end of the first year and
to allow a $100 deduction at the end of the second year would result in an
unjustified interest free loan for the taxpayer.29 It is unclear, however,
why the same conclusion would not apply if the same pattern of wealth
changes occurred during a single year or any shorter period.
Only the tax accounting period of zero length inherent in a continuous
tax eliminates the need to neglect the pattern of gains and losses during
some time period. Under this tax, gains and losses that occur at different
times do not offset each other. For an asset that increases in value and
then decreases an equal amount, the tax on the increase will precede the
tax on the decrease. Taking into account the time value of money, there
will be a net tax altogether even though the wealth position of the tax-
payer is the same at the end of the period as it was at the beginning.a
The strict respect for the temporal pattern of gains and losses under a
continuous tax may seem like an attractive feature. But to justify choosing
that tax in the face of potentially high administrative costs requires more
work. It is important to know why strict respect for the temporal pattern
of gains and losses is desirable, and what the social costs of deviating from
29. The logic here is that biannual assessment is flawed because it does not tax net annual gains
at the end of each year. This allows an unjustified deferral of tax for one year. But the failure to
consider the pattern of gains within any given year is not criticized. Indeed, taxing net gains over each
year is implicitly assumed to be correct. This assumption is found even in some of the most excellent
work on accretion taxation. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 5, at 509-10 (annual tax comports with
"economic substance," biannual tax does not); infra note 92 (praising Professor Halperin's article for
its sophisticated analysis). But see Halperin, Commentary, in LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY TAXATION:
THE MUTUAL VERSUS STOCK DIFFERENIAL 5-2 (1986) (suggesting in insurance taxation context
that daily taxation might be superior to annual taxation).
30. A continuous tax cumulated and collected with interest at the end of the period on this asset
value path would be positive.
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that strict respect are. The choice of period under an accretion tax needs
to be decided on the basis of the norms that motivate choice of accretion
taxation in the first place. The next Part addresses that task.
II. ACCRETION TAXATION NORMS
There are four primary norms that are cited in support of accretion
taxation: that disparities in wealth should be reduced, that intangible ben-
efits from holding wealth should be taxed, that the tax system should be
"neutral," and that the system should conform to the Haig-Simons ideal.
The first two norms lead to two "wealth-related" theories of accretion
taxation. Section A discusses these two norms together. Sections B and C
discuss the last two norms in turn.
The goal of this Part is to answer two major questions for each norm.
First, what frequency of taxation is optimal under each norm? Second,
what are the social costs of deviating from the optimal frequency under
each norm?31
A. Wealth-Related Norms
Two wealth-related justifications for accretion taxation emerge from the
literature. The first identifies certain intangible benefits from holding
wealth and suggests that these benefits should be included in the tax base.
The second focuses on a concern for the distribution of wealth. The core
of this justification is the claim that accretion taxation is more effective
than its rival, cash flow taxation, at reducing disparities in wealth. If po-
litical or administrative constraints mean that these two taxes are the only
available alternatives, one might choose an accretion tax based on its im-
pact on wealth distribution. In effect, under this second justification an
accretion tax is favored as a "second best" alternative to a wealth tax.
Both supporters and critics of accretion taxation have claimed that these
wealth-based justifications are the strongest arguments for using accretion
taxation instead of a cash flow tax.12 This Section discusses each of the
two justifications and their implications for periodicity. Subsection 1 dis-
cusses the intangible benefits justification and shows that under this justi-
fication a continuous tax is ideal. Subsection 2 shows that a continuous
31. Answering both of these questions will require extending somewhat the previous scholarly
analysis of the norms, particularly the wealth-related norms. Although the central task in this Part is
to discover the connection between the norms brought forward in the literature to justify an accretion
tax and the optimal periodicity of that tax, it is hoped that the discussion of the norms themselves will
be of independent interest.
It is also important to note that I do not intend to advocate any particular norm or the tax policy
results that follow from it. Effective advocacy would require a much different and much more exten-
sive article. The goal here is the more modest one of developing the mapping between accretion taxa-
tion norms and periodicity.
32. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 3, at 1169; Andrews, supra note 2, at 957; Warren 1975,
supra note 2, at 943, 946; Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1122, 1124.
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tax is also ideal under the second best justification, but the case is much
less clear than under the intangible benefits justification. Subsection 3 dis-
cusses the problem of assessing the seriousness of departures from contin-
uous taxation under each of the justifications.
1. Taxing Intangible Benefits from Holding Wealth
a. Introduction
There are two different kinds of benefits that flow from wealth. First,
wealth represents potential future tangible consumption. Second, there are
intangible benefits that flow from holding wealth such as security, pres-
tige, and power. 3 Both supporters and critics of accretion taxation have
noted that one important argument for using accretion taxation instead of
a cash flow tax is that these intangible benefits should be in the tax
base. 4
The reasoning for this position is as follows. A cash flow tax reaches
the future tangible consumption aspect of wealth. It does this by taxing
the tangible consumption that occurs when the wealth is liquidated and
spent. The fact that this future tangible consumption will be taxed reduces
the value of wealth accumulation at present. Under a regime of constant
tax rates, taxing all future tangible consumption and bequests lowers the
present value of all current wealth accumulation by exactly the tax rate.35
But this may not be sufficient if one believes that the added economic
well-being from increases in wealth stems from intangible benefits as well
as from the prospect of additional future tangible consumption.
Prominent commentators who take this position seem to assume that
taxing wealth directly would be the best way to tax these intangible bene-
fits.36 They point out several defects in using an accretion tax as a proxy
for a wealth tax.37 First, an accretion tax simply taxes accumulation. It
33. See C. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 352 (1969); Andrews, supra note 3, at 1169-70.
34. See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 96-97 (1938); Andrews, supra note 2, at
956; Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1097.
35. Suppose, for example, that the taxpayer unexpectedly receives an award of $1100 to be paid
one year from now. Assume a 10% riskless interest rate. The present value of the award is $1000 =
$1100 / (I + .10). This is how much the taxpayer's wealth has increased now. Consider a cash flow
tax at a rate of 40%. The award will be only $660 after tax. Since a cash flow tax preserves the pre-
tax interest rate, see infra text accompanying notes 72-73, the after-tax present value of the award is
now $600 - S660 / (1 + .10). The taxpayer's current increase in wealth, the present value of the
award, has been reduced from $1000 to $600. The rate of reduction is exactly equal to the tax rate of
40%.
'I his idea generalizes: If general equilibrium effects are ignored and tax rates are constant, the cash
flow tax will reduce wealth increases over any given accounting period by exactly the tax rate. See
Strnad, The Bankrupty of Conventional Tax Timing Wisdon Is Deeper than Semantics: A Rejoin-
der to Professors Kaplow and Warren, 39 STAN. L. REV. 389, 397-99 (1987).
36. The word "seem" is used here because the critique of accretion taxation as a wealth tax proxy
occurs in the context of discussing both wealth-related justifications at the same time. The critique
may be aimed primarily at the second justification, reducing disparities in wealth, rather than the one
discussed here, taxing the intangible returns to wealth.
37. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 956-58; Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1123.
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does not tax wealth as an independent base. Taxpayers who have similar
wealth gains during an accounting period are taxed similarly under an
accretion tax even though they may have very different total wealth hold-
ings. Second, if marginal rates under an ideal wealth tax increase with the
amount of wealth held by the taxpayer, an accretion tax is flawed because
it applies rates based on the amount of wealth accumulation over the
accounting period and not based on the stock of wealth held by the tax-
payer. Third, an accretion tax does not reach wealth accumulation that
has occurred before the tax was imposed.
These are all good points. They are especially potent when aimed at
use of accretion taxation under the second wealth-related justification: re-
ducing disparities in wealth. However, the case for using an accretion tax
to reach the intangible benefits from wealth is stronger than the previous
literature suggests. The next two Subsections discuss that case and show
that the logic behind it implies continuous taxation as an ideal.
b. The Intangible Benefits Justification Implies Continuous Accretion
Taxation
It is convenient to begin with a very simple economic and tax environ-
ment.38 All real and financial assets are riskless and earn a zero rate of
return. There is no inflation. Consumption and bequests are taxed at a
40% rate, and there is no separate tax on accumulated wealth.
In this environment there are two motives to accumulate wealth. One
motive is to transfer tangible consumption into the future. This transfer
happens at a one-to-one rate since the riskless interest rate is zero. For
each dollar's worth of tangible consumption given up presently, a person
gains a dollar of tangible consumption in the future. A second motive is to
enjoy the intangible benefits, such as prestige, power, and security, that
flow from holding wealth. 9 Suppose that for all individuals these intangi-
ble benefits consist of a proportional flow that is valued at $w per $1 of
wealth per year.40
38. Later Subsections explore the ramifications of relaxing the drastic assumptions that delineate
this simple environment. See infra text accompanying notes 56-71 and notes 56 & 61.
39. Some of these benefits are "priced," that is, the market value of each unit of wealth is larger
because of the increased demand due to people who want the intangible benefits.
The degree to which the benefits are priced will be determined by market forces just as market
forces in a real economy determine the riskless rate of return and the various premia for holding risky
assets. If a society places a high value on the prestige benefits attached to material possessions, one
would expect a significant price effect. Prestige-heightened demand for a limited supply of wealth will
drive up the prices of the real assets that are a store of value.
To the extent that the supply of wealth is elastic, this effect will be diminished. But one would
expect prestige and power to attach most easily to assets that are in inelastic supply. The very scarcity
of these assets makes them impressive from the prestige standpoint and controlling them confers
power.
40. After developing the argument for accretion taxation, the Article explores the consequences of
modifying this proportionality assumption. See infra notes 56 and 61.
Note also that no assumption is made concerning whether the proportional component is "priced."
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The amount w is very much like imputed income. No cash flow corre-
sponds to it.41 Unlike some varieties of imputed income, such as the im-
puted rental value of owner-occupied housing, w may be very hard to
observe or estimate. The imputed rental value of housing can be estimated
by observing the market rental amounts paid on comparable housing. No
such straightforward method applies for the intangible return to wealth.42
Under consumption tax theory,43 there is a familiar theoretical solution
for taxing proportional imputed returns. In particular, yield exemption
treatment is often put forward as a method of taxation when an asset
produces a flow of benefits that are not observable as cash flows."' Under
this method, no deduction is allowed for the initial investment and no tax
See supra note 39. For most tangible consumption items, the price of the item corresponds exactly to a
common proportional benefit experienced by each individual. But this may not be true for the intangi-
ble benefits from wealth. See infra note 61.
For the prestige element of the intangible benefits from wealth, there is an argument that propor-
tionality may not be a bad assumption. The argument is based on the claim that perceived prestige
rests primarily on local status as opposed to absolute status. Individuals care how they compare to a
local group (defined by occupation, physical location, or similar factors) much more than to others
with whom they have little contact. There is economic and even biological evidence for this position.
See R. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS
(1985) (evidence from neurochemical studies of primates and from studies of internal wage structure
of U.S. firms).
If prestige is a function of local status, then wealth increments may be as productive in generating
an increase in prestige and power among low wealth individuals as among high wealth individuals. In
Beverly Hills, a Ferrari costing $100,000 sets one apart from the masses who own BMW's and
Volvos. But, for low income individuals, a $1000, five-year-old, American model may be the car that
wins dates and impresses friends. The $1000 in wealth required for the used American car may be as
or more productive per dollar in generating prestige benefits as the $100,000 required to buy the
Ferrari.
41. It is important to note, however, that the flow w is assumed to arise independent of theform
that the wealth takes. Cash, bonds, diamonds, houses, art, and businesses all have a common propor-
tional flow of intangible benefits.
In addition to this proportional flow that is common to all wealth, some forms of wealth produce an
additional flow of imputed income. Owner-occupied housing, for example, produces a flow of physi-
cal shelter services. It is important not to confuse the special imputed income properties of some assets
with the general intangible benefits from each dollar of wealth that are posited here. It is this general
intangible benefit stream that drives the arguments in the text. Of course, asset-specific imputed in-
come streams are also relevant for tax policy. See infra note 45.
42. The increase in asset prices due to demand for the intangible benefits that flow from wealth
may result in a lower tangible return for financial assets. In the simple economy here, that means a
lower riskless interest rate. However, the connection between the drop in that interest rate and the
size of w may be very complicated so that clear inferences about w may be hard to come by.
At the very least, the relationship will depend on the supply conditions for real assets. If supply is
inelastic, one might guess that the interest rate falls by exactly w. But even if this is the case, measur-
ing w by the drop in the riskless rate requires a knowledge of what the interest rate would have been
in a world without demand for the intangible benefits from wealth.
43. The reader might wonder why consumption tax theory is being considered here when the goal
is to ascertain the optimal frequency of accretion taxation. The rationale for this approach rests both
on the results that flow from the approach and on history. When faced with the need to tax intangible
benefits from wealth, the consumption tax theory implies a classical accretion tax. Furthermore,
Henry Simons, the father of modern income tax theory, relied on related arguments to defend accre-
tion taxation against consumption tax alternatives. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
44. Andrews, supra note 3, at 1150, 1155-59; Graetz, supra note 3, at 184-87. The yield exemp-
tion method often goes by another name, "the prepayment approach." See, e.g., Fullerton, Shoven &
Whalley, Replacing the U.S. Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 20 J. PUB. ECON. 3,
6 (1983); Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1102.
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is levied on any of the returns from the investment including the return of
capital at the end. Considering only w, the proportional component of the
intangible benefits of wealth, yield exemption treatment is equivalent to
applying the cash flow method itself directly to the intangible flows.45 The
cash flow method consists of allowing a deduction for the amount of in-
vestment, taxing 40% of the flow, w, each year, and taxing the return of
capital when the investment is liquidated.46
Applying the yield exemption approach to a common proportional com-
ponent of the intangible benefits from holding wealth yields precisely ac-
cretion taxation.4" To see this intuitively, consider the following example.
Ms. Y has earned $500,000 that she wants to save by investing in a small
business.48 Because the riskless rate is zero and there are no risky assets,
businesses will produce no net tangible return in the form of positive net
cash flow. Instead, the total cash returns plus the terminal value at the
time of sale will be equal to the purchase price of the business. For sim-
plicity, assume that the terminal value of each business under considera-
tion is equal to its purchase price. In other words, these businesses do not
pay out cash dividends. Operating them merely transfers a dollar from the
present to the future. Nevertheless, owning a business will produce the
intangible benefits of holding wealth.
45. The yield exemption approach was designed with assets that produce imputed income streams
in mind. See supra note 44 (citing sources). Under a consumption tax, this class of assets can be
singled out for yield exemption treatment while all other assets receive cash flow treatment.
The theory presented here rests on the assumption that all forms of wealth produce a significant
proportional intangible return. This return is not asset-specific but flows from all assets. This re-
quires that all assets and, as discussed in the next Subsection, all tangible returns from assets be
treated under the yield exemption approach. The result is accretion taxation.
46. If an investment earns returns at a higher rate than the market rate, then yield exemption will
result in a failure to tax the added value that results from the excess rate of return above the market
rate. Cash flow taxation would reach this added value at exactly the tax rate if tax rates are held
constant over time. See Strnad, Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1023, 1069-71 (1985); Strnad, supra note 35, at 397-99. In this context where the
return is in the form of intangible benefits, the excess of the actual rate of return over the "market"
rate of return would be consumer surplus. The tax policy implications of this consumer surplus are
discussed infra note 56.
47. The reasoning here puts the intangible benefits from wealth on the same footing as tangible
consumption. See infra notes 56 & 86. It might seem that income tax theory is being subsumed by
consumption tax theory. However, this view is similar to that taken by Henry Simons himself in his
seminal work on income tax theory. Simons believed that the conventional accretion method is supe-
rior to the cash flow approach because the accretion method taxes the priced portion of the intangible
benefits from wealth. He argued that this priced portion is equivalent to spending on tangible con-
sumption and therefore should be taxed. See H. SIMONS, supra note 34, at 97.
What differentiates the theory in this Article from Simons' view is that the argument for accretion
taxation here does not depend on whether or not the intangible benefits from wealth are priced. See
supra note 40 (no assumption made that intangible benefits are priced). In fact, a cash flow tax may
do a good job of taxing the priced portion. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
48. Whether this $500,000 is earned as wages, profits, or is simply a windfall does not affect the
analysis. The reader is free to imagine that the earnings come from any one of those sources. The
economic environment in this Section has no risky assets and the riskless rate is zero. No profits and
windfalls should exist in such an environment. Nonetheless, the fact that the analysis is independent
of the source of the $500,000 means that the analysis carries over without modification to the next
Subsection where the economy includes risky assets and a nonzero riskless rate. See infra text accom-
panying notes 56-57.
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Suppose these intangible benefits are in the form of prestige. The larger
the business, the more prestige that flows from owning and running it. If
the tax system ignores intangible benefits, then only tangible forms of con-
sumption and bequests will be taxed. In that case, Ms. Y can buy a
$500,000 business. She will not be taxed on the $500,000 until she sells
the business and consumes the proceeds or until she dies and the business
passes by bequest to her heirs. In contrast, under the yield exemption
approach, Ms. Y will have to pay $200,000 in taxes on the $500,000 at
the time she buys the business. She will only be able to afford a $300,000
business. Owning and operating this business will be less prestigious. In
particular, the proportional component of Ms. I's prestige flow will be cut
by exactly the tax rate of 40% each year. This follows because this compo-
nent is a constant flow of $w per $1 of wealth.49
Several important points emerge from this example. First, it is worth
repeating that the derived tax treatment is accretion taxation.50 A portion
of wealth gains are impounded when they occur. In contrast, a cash flow
approach based only on tangible returns would delay taxation until the
wealth is used for future consumption or bequests.
Second, the yield exemption approach works independent of the actual
value of w, the proportional component of the intangible benefits that flow
from holding wealth."' The government does not have to know or estimate
the magnitude of w. In the example, 40% of Ms. I's wealth is being im-
pounded by the government between the time she earns it and the time
49. There is one possible complication that arises when prestige is the intangible benefit under
consideration. Prestige benefits from wealth may depend on the history of a person's wealth position
as well as the level of wealth held at present. For example, suppose that becoming very wealthy
results in a flow of w in prestige per dollar of wealth but that subsequently losing that amount of
wealth more than eradicates w. One is not only as poor as before but also has been disgraced by losing
a great accumulation of wealth. This disgrace might result in an ongoing negative flow of prestige.
Although there may be a significant systematic dependence of prestige benefits on wealth history,
this dependence must be specified before studying the consequences for tax policy. It is not obvious to
the author what form the dependence might take or even if it exists.
50. The claim that the treatment here is identical to accretion taxation is based on the conven-
tional definition of an accretion tax. It is possible to construct a "meta-accretion" tax that would
impound wealth gains when they occur and then also add a periodic wealth tax as a surcharge levied
on the intangible benefits that flow from the portion of wealth that was not impounded. This meta-
accretion tax therefore would consist of the conventional accretion tax combined with a wealth tax.
There is an analogy between the meta-accretion tax and the conventional accretion tax. Just as the
conventional accretion tax is levied on wealth increments and on the subsequent tangible returns to
the remaining wealth, the meta-accretion tax is levied on wealth increments and on the subsequent
intangible returns to the remaining wealth.
Despite this analogy, the previous work that raises the intangible benefits from wealth as a justifi-
cation for accretion taxation does not advocate a meta-accretion tax. See H. SIMONS, supra note 34, at
95-97; Andrews, supra note 2, at 956; Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1097. Working within this
tradition, it seems sufficient to consider justifications for the conventional accretion tax.
51. Professor Andrews has noted that one of the big advantages of consumption taxation is that
the yield exemption approach can be used to tax a flow of imputed income from particular assets such
as owner-occupied housing or consumer durables without knowing or observing the magnitude of the
flow. See Andrews, supra note 3, at 1150, 1155-59. Here the approach is being applied to all
changes in wealth in order to tax the unobservable intangible benefits that flow from all forms of
wealth.
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she consumes it. This denies her 40% of the value of the flow w because
this flow is proportional to the amount of wealth that she holds. 2
Third, the theory here depends critically on the assumption that hold-
ing wealth confers a proportional intangible return independent of the net
present value of the individual's tangible future returns. In the example, if
a cash flow tax on tangible consumption and bequests is applied, Ms. F's
$500,000 will have a net present value of only $300,000. The reason for
this is that there will be $200,000 of tax at some future time. This will
occur when she dies and the $500,000 passes by bequest or when she
withdraws it from saving and spends it on consumption. The present
value of this $200,000 tax is $200,000 since the riskless interest rate is
zero.
If the proportional component of the intangible benefits from wealth
flows only from the net present value of future tangible returns, then this
component is reduced proportionately by the tax rate under a cash flow
tax on tangible consumption and bequests. There is no need for an accre-
tion tax. That need arises only if intangible benefits flow from having
control in the interim over the $200,000 that will be paid in future tax. 3
The example suggests the possibility that interim control would confer
such benefits by pointing out that Ms. Y could own a larger and therefore
more prestigious business.5 4
52. Note that with a zero riskless interest rate, the $200,000 that is impounded is exactly the
amount of tax that Ms. Y would have paid under a cash flow tax when tangible consumption or a
bequest occurred in the future. Cash flow taxation that ignores the intangible benefits from wealth
would allow Ms. Y to consume $300,000 in tangible benefits at any time or to leave $300,000 as a
bequest. This is also true under yield exemption. The added feature under the yield exemption ap-
proach is that Ms. Y cannot hold the full $500,000 until the time of tangible consumption or bequest.
This cuts off the intangible benefits that would have flowed from the $200,000 that is taxed immedi-
ately under the yield exemption approach. The intangible benefits that are eliminated include 40% of
the flow w that would have accrued from holding the full $500,000.
53. If this phenomenon occurs, special problems will arise for the tax treatment of liabilities.
When the taxpayer borrows and invests the proceeds, the taxpayer can enjoy the benefits of holding
wealth without an increase in net worth. One million dollars of borrowed funds that are invested will
produce intangible benefits of the same magnitude as one million dollars of wages or profits received
and saved.
The conventional wisdom concerning borrowing is that because it does not represent an increase in
net worth, no tax should be due based on receiving the proceeds of a loan. See Andrews, supra note 3,
at 1137. This treatment clearly will allow intangible benefits to be earned tax free. For example, in
the riskless world presented in the text, the taxpayer can borrow $1000 and invest the proceeds. The
proceeds will not be taxed upon receipt and no deduction will be allowed on repayment. But in the
meantime the taxpayer enjoys the ongoing stream of intangible benefits from holding $1000 in wealth.
Applying cash flow treatment to loans provides only a partial cure. Under this treatment proceeds
are taxed and there is a deduction on repayment. This reduces the amount of the borrowing by the
tax rate and reduces the proportional stream of intangible benefits by the same amount. But in the
riskless world of the text, the taxpayer could simply increase the amount of borrowing (securing it by
the investments made with the proceeds) to offset any tax.
The intangible benefits theory may require even harsher treatment of borrowing than under a cash
flow tax. It certainly seems clear that the conventional approach under income taxation is much too
lenient.
I do not explore the tax treatment of borrowing further here. Determining the best treatment for
borrowing is an important task but would require an extensive discussion.
54. It is important to note that the argument here depends on there being a proportional intangi-
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A fourth point implicit in the example is that the case for accretion
taxation does not depend on there being a time value of money. In this
simple example, the accretion approach emerges as superior to cash flow
taxation based on tangible returns even though the riskless interest rate is
zero. That cash flow approach fails to tax the intangible benefits from
wealth while the accretion tax reaches these benefits.
Under traditional theory accretion taxation is equivalent to cash flow
taxation when the riskless rate is zero." The different result here arises
from the goal of taxing intangible as well as tangible benefits from
wealth. The traditional view is true if only tangible returns are consid-
ered. Consider Ms. I's $500,000 in earnings. The cash flow tax delays the
tax of $200,000 until consumption or bequest occurs while the accretion
approach levies the $200,000 tax immediately. But the delay under the
cash flow tax does not confer any tangible financial benefit on Ms. Y.
Since interest rates are zero, she cannot profit by investing the $200,000
and having more tangible wealth at the time of consumption or bequest.
Finally, and most important for the purposes of this Article, the exam-
ple shows that a continuous tax is ideal. If the government delays im-
pounding 40% of Ms. F's wealth increase beyond the time she earns it,
she will be able to realize intangible benefits tax free during the period of
delay. Thus, if the government waits a year to tax away $200,000 of the
$500,000, then Ms. Y will receive the full intangible benefit from holding
the $500,000 during that year."6
ble benefit from holding all wealth. The amount of this benefit would be independent of thefornn of
wealth held. Holding $200,000 in cash, diamonds, or a business would result in the same proportional
level of benefits.
It might seem that diamonds and the business would be more prestigious assets. But the prices of
these assets in equilibrium should reflect this extra prestige value. In equilibrium, intangible benefits
such as prestige will be the same for bare financial assets like cash as for glittery assets such as
diamonds because people will know that $200,000 in cash could be turned into $200,000 in diamonds
if the owner so wished.
In the simple economic environment set out in the text, prestige price premiums can coexist with a
zero tangible rate of return on all assets. Suppose that tastes concerning what is prestigious remain
fixed and that assets do not physically deteriorate. A single diamond with no industrial utility may be
worth $200,000 because of its special prestige value. If that prestige value will be the same in the
future as at present, the $200,000 value will persist and the diamond will be equivalent to bonds
(earning a 0% rate in the economy in the text) or cash as a store of value.
55. See Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1102-07 (different treatment of riskless rate is key differ-
ence between consumption tax and income tax).
56. In this Subsection we have relied on the assumption that every individual experiences the
same proportional flow of intangible benefits from wealth. See supra text accompanying note 40. An
important question is whether relaxing this assumption will affect the result that an accretion tax
should be continuous rather than periodic.
At first glance, considering nonproportionality for the intangible benefits from wealth raises no new
issues. The problem of nonproportional benefits also exists for tangible consumption. A person buys
tangible goods because the person finds them at least as valuable as the market price. The market
price represents a common proportional benefit experienced by all consumers. But a consumer may
value the first few units purchased at greater than the market price. The excess value on these units is
"consumer surplus." Consumer surplus is a nonproportional component of the benefits from tangible
consumption.
It is also possible that the first few units are valued at less than their market price. Later units,
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c. Adding Risk, Inflation, and a Positive Riskless Rate of Return
Suppose that the example is made richer by adding inflation, by adding
a non-zero riskless rate and by allowing some assets to be risky. These
new conditions imply that the value of assets plus their tangible returns
will no longer be constant. This Subsection demonstrates that the main
results from the previous Section still will apply: accretion taxation will
tax the proportional component of the intangible benefits that flow from
wealth at the applicable tax rate, and a continuous tax is ideal. One ca-
veat to this conclusion does arise, however. A non-zero riskless rate im-
plies that there will be an efficiency cost to the use of an accretion tax.
This trade-off may prompt choice of a periodic rather than a continuous
accretion tax.
Consider adding risky assets while holding both the riskless rate and
the inflation rate at zero. This means that asset values will fluctuate. Re-
turning to the example, suppose that Ms. Y buys her business for the
$300,000 in after-tax proceeds that remains from her $500,000 but that
one year later the value of the business jumps to $400,000 from $300,000.
This increase in wealth begins producing intangible benefits. The propor-
tional component of the benefits amounts to w per dollar of wealth per
year. In order to tax this component, the same yield exemption approach
suffices: tax the increase in wealth up front to compensate for the fact that
the stream w is not observable and thus must go untaxed. Once again, a
continuous tax is best. If taxation is delayed, the proportional component
of the intangible benefits will go untaxed in the interim.
Continuing with the assumption of no inflation, a similar analysis
would apply to interest payments under a non-zero riskless rate. These
payments increase wealth and the intangible benefits that flow from it.
Adding inflation does not change the conclusion that a continuous tax is
however, are valued at so much more than the market price that the individual buys the first few units
in order to tap the high surplus that results from high consumption. This individual will still have
consumer surplus if the value to the individual of the aggregate consumption exceeds the aggregate
purchase price.
The traditional tax policy approach toward consumer surplus is to ignore it. Consumer surplus is
not included in the tax base. See Strnad, supra note 46, at 1092-98; Kelman, supra note 2, at 657
n.23, 679-80; Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1095-97. If one believes the same policy should apply
when "surplus" intangible benefits from wealth are considered, the analysis in the text which focuses
on the proportional component of the intangible benefits is complete.
But even if one believes that "surplus" intangible benefits from wealth should be taxed, the result
in the text in favor of continuous taxation still stands. An accretion tax that is continuous rather than
periodic is better at taxing both the proportional element and the surplus element of intangible bene-
fits from wealth. A periodic accretion tax delays taxing wealth increases until the end of the assess-
ment period. During the period of the delay, the taxpayer receives both the proportional component of
the intangible benefits from wealth and any surplus component tax free. Under a continuous accre-
tion tax, there is no delay. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
It appears, then, that the proportionality assumption is innocuous. If we also drop the assumption
of a zero riskless interest rate, however, this conclusion becomes less certain. See infra note 61 (viola-
tion of proportionality assumption may lead to favoring periodic accretion tax over continuous accre-
tion tax if riskless interest rate is positive).
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best. Intangible benefits are almost certainly a function of real rather than
-nominal wealth. 57 Assuming that is the case, the intangible benefits justifi-
cation calls for indexation of basis for all assets. Intangible benefits change
only in response to real gains and losses, and only real gains and losses
should be taxed to reach the intangible benefits that flow from them. But
these gains and losses should be taxed when they occur to avoid tax free
enjoyment of the intangible benefit stream.
Introducing a positive riskless rate does add another policy aspect for
consideration. Under accretion taxation, the tax portion of a person's
wealth is impounded before the person consumes or bequeaths the after-
tax proceeds. This tax portion would have earned the riskless rate of in-
terest. As a result, the person's potential future consumption and bequests
will fall by more than the tax rate. Since present consumption is reduced
by the tax rate, there will be a bias against future consumption and be-
quests. The following example illustrates this bias and the inefficiency
that follows from it.
Consider Ms. Y once again. Upon receiving the $500,000 in earnings,
she could immediately consume $300,000 after tax, given a 40% tax rate.
Suppose instead that she invests the $500,000 in a riskless business that
would appreciate at a rate of 10% in one year. At the end of the year she
will consume the after-tax proceeds. Under a 40% cash flow tax focused
on tangible benefits only, she will have $550,000 times 60% or $330,000
in consumption. Giving up $300,000 in consumption at the beginning of
the year yields $330,000 in consumption at the end. Her potential after-
tax consumption increases by the pre-tax interest rate of 10%. This pre-
tax interest rate is exactly the rate at which the economy can transform
present consumption goods into future consumption goods.
Under accretion taxation, Ms. Y starts with $300,000 and earns
$18,000 in interest after tax to yield $318,000. She loses the $12,000 in
after-tax interest that she would have earned on the $200,000 that is
taxed up front under accretion taxation. Giving up $300,000 in consump-
tion yields only $318,000 after one year, a 6% increase. There is a gap
between the pre-tax rate of interest, 10%, and the after-tax rate of 6%.
The economy can transform present consumption goods into future con-
sumption goods at that pre-tax 10% rate, but Ms. Y can only transfer
present consumption to future consumption at the 6% after-tax rate. For
the economy's productive resources to be used efficiently, Ms. Y should
base her decision between future and present consumption on the ability
of the economy to transform one into the other. Instead she bases her
57. Consider paper money, that has high nominal value but very little real value. This money is
not a source of security because it will not provide either physical goods such as food and shelter or a
leisurely lifestyle in the future. Since most people will not be impressed by large holdings of a worth-
less paper asset, the money also is not a source of prestige.
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decision on a tax-distorted price that values future goods too low relative
to current goods.5"
In a world with a positive riskless rate, an accretion tax reaches the
intangible returns from wealth at the cost of distorting the price at which
individuals choose between present and future consumption. 9 As a result,
the argument that a continuous accretion tax is superior to a periodic one
of any period might fail. Increasing the period of taxation tends to de-
crease the gap between the pre-tax and after-tax riskless rate.60 One
might choose to deviate from continuous taxation in favor of some fixed
period in order to balance the goal of taxing intangible benefits from
wealth against the goal of not distorting the cost of future consumption
relative to present consumption. 6'
58. It might appear that one can construct a similar argument for risky assets based on distortion-
ary effects on the expected rate of return. If investors are risk averse, this expected rate of return
should exceed the riskless rate to compensate for risk. However, there is an argument that taxing
risky assets does not create efficiency problems. When the government taxes a risky asset and allows
full loss offsets, the government shares in the upside and downside of the asset at equal rates. The
reduction in expected return caused by taxation is compensated for by a reduction in the riskiness of
the returns. If the riskless rate is zero, then this compensation is exact. Otherwise, it is exact only up
to a second order term. See Gordon, Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues Versus
Tax Distortions, 100 Q.J. ECON. 1, 4-5 (1985) (raising and discussing basic phenomenon); J. Strnad,
The Taxation of Risky Investments: An Asset Pricing Approach 33 (California Institute of Technol-
ogy Social Science Working Paper No. 546, 1984) (discussing second order term); see also Warren
1980, supra note 2, at 1102-07 (exempting riskless return under accretion taxation makes accretion
tax treatment of risky returns same as cash flow tax).
59. This is a classic trade-off: The focus of much of the legal literature has been on the conflict
between wealth-related justifications for accretion taxation and the efficiency cost that it causes by
distorting the relative price of present and future consumption. See supra note 2 (citing sources).
60. See Table I, supra text accompanying notes 24-25. This effect may be partially or wholly
offset by general equilibrium effects that alter the pre-tax riskless rate. See supra note 28.
61. Distorting the cost of future consumption relative to present consumption raises equity con-
cerns as well as the efficiency concerns just discussed. For tangible consumption, the market price is
the common proportional benefit experienced by everyone who buys the goods. See supra note 56;
infra note 86. But there is no guarantee that a person who accumulates wealth experiences any
intangible benefits from the wealth. Holding wealth produces two distinct services simultaneously. It
transfers consumption to the future and provides intangible benefits such as prestige and power. But
some individuals may be interested only in transferring consumption to the future.
If the riskless rate is positive, an accretion tax tends to harm these individuals by increasing the cost
of future consumption in terms of present consumption. This phenomenon raises an equity problem.
Individuals interested only in transferring consumption to the future are harmed as innocent bystand-
ers in an attempt to tax the intangible benefits that flow from wealth.
One way to address this equity problem is the same way that was suggested for addressing the
corresponding efficiency problem: use an accretion tax that is periodic rather than continuous. This
will tend to reduce the harm to those who accumulate wealth for future consumption. At the same
time, however, it will allow others who value the intangible benefits from wealth to receive some of
these benefits tax free.
If the equity problem arises from wealth differences rather than differences in preferences, then
there are some viable approaches that may be superior to making accretion taxation periodic instead
of continuous. Suppose, for example, that preferences are the same in the sense that each individual
saves the first $500,000 with future consumption in mind while any additional saving is motivated by
a desire for prestige. A way to alleviate the equity problem in this world would be to allow tax free
accumulation of $500,000 while subjecting accumulation in excess of that amount to an accretion tax.
The low-wealth individual who experiences no prestige benefits would be free from the tax penalty
inherent in the accretion tax. This exemption scheme and its equity rationale have been suggested by
Professor Andrews. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 958.
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d. Increasing Marginal Tax Rates
The case for continuous taxation may be weaker when tax rates are not
proportional but vary substantially with income. If wealth is held for a
long period of time, the stream of intangible benefits from that wealth will
extend over many years. Accretion taxation reaches this stream by taxing
each wealth increase when it first accrues instead of directly taxing the
stream of benefits. This cuts off a proportion of all future intangible bene-
fits. This proportion is equal to the tax rate that applies at the time of
accrual. This tax rate may be a poor proxy for the future tax rates that
would have applied to the flow of benefits.62 In particular, since the accre-
tion method bunches the taxation of the stream of intangible benefits into
an early year, the benefits may be taxed at too high a rate under a rate
structure with increasing marginal rates. 3
Despite this intuition, the exact interaction of accretion taxation and
nonproportional tax rates is more complicated. The intuition is likely to
be correct if the taxpayer earns most of his or her wealth in a few years
early in life. In that case, rates will tend to be higher in the early, high-
earning years than they should be to serve as a proxy for the intangible
benefits that flow during later years when taxable income will be much
lower. However, this particular pattern of wealth accumulation may not
be the most common one.64 A taxpayer may accumulate wealth steadily.
In that case, using accretion taxation instead of a cash flow tax on intan-
gible benefits may have very little impact on the tax rates that apply.
If accretion taxation does exacerbate the negative impact of nonpropor-
tional rates, one response is to use a long accounting period. A long ac-
counting period reduces the probability that high accumulation episodes
will be isolated into separate periods with very high rates applying. Thus,
it will be less likely that wealth accumulation will be taxed at rates that
are too high to provide a good proxy for the rates that would have applied
to the intangible benefits from the wealth if they were taxed directly.
62. Consumption tax commentators have been careful to point out that yield exemption and cash
flow taxation are not equivalent when marginal rates change over time. See Graetz, supra note 3, at
172-73; Warren 1980, supra note 2, at 1108. This makes "bunching" of income due to the yield
exemption treatment of intangible benefits a potential problem.
63. With a tax rate structure consisting of increasing marginal rates, bunching of income creates a
higher overall tax burden. A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose that the first $50,000 of
income is untaxed and that all income above $50,000 is subject to a 50% rate. Assume that the riskless
interest rate is zero so that there is no need to take into account the time value of money. Taxpayer A
makes $50,000 in year one and $50,000 in year two. This taxpayer will pay a total tax of zero.
Taxpayer B makes $100,000 in year one and $0 in year two. Despite having the same average income
as taxpayer A, taxpayer B pays a total tax of $25,000, 25% of total income, while taxpayer A pays
nothing. The taxpayer with more volatile income is taxed more heavily.
This example generalizes. More volatile incomes are taxed more heavily under any rate structure
with increasing marginal rates. See Moffitt & Rothschild, Variable Earnings and Nonlinear Taxa-
tion, 22 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 405, 407 (1987).
64. For a discussion of evidence about the typical pattern of wealth accumulation, see infra note
71.
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The problem with using a long accounting period is that it delays the
tax on increases in wealth. This allows the taxpayer to reap tax-free in-
tangible benefits from these wealth increments during the delay. The
longer the period used for taxation, the greater the tax-free benefits will
be. On the other hand, a longer period will result in more averaging of
consumption and wealth accumulation episodes.6 5 This approach results
in an unresolved trade-off, but it suggests that departures from continuous
taxation may be desirable.
There are ways to address nonproportional rate problems without de-
parting from frequent taxation. Perhaps the most well-known method is
Professor Vickrey's cumulative averaging approach."6 During each ac-
counting period the taxpayer is taxed on cumulative taxable income over
all accounting periods. Past tax payments are credited with interest. A
separate tax table is used for each period of cumulation.6" As a result,
rates may be adjusted so that the marginal rate that applies to the tax-
payer is the marginal rate that would have applied on average under the
current system of taxing period by period.68 This approach combined with
a short assessment period would preserve the advantages of the yield ex-
emption approach for taxing the intangible benefits from wealth. Wealth
increments would be taxed when they occur.
The rate adjustment in the Vickrey scheme is not a perfect solution to
the problems that might arise under the accretion taxation approach. Sup-
pose, for example, that Mr. Z makes large amounts of wage income as a
young man. He accumulates a large stock of wealth and then retires. As-
sume that marginal tax rates increase between the level of Mr. Z's aver-
age income and the high levels of income in the early years. Then Mr. Z
will pay taxes at too high a rate on the early income. As time goes on, he
will receive the excess taxes back with interest. However, he will never
receive back the excess intangible benefits of wealth that were taken away.
Too large a proportion of his wealth was impounded early in life. Gradu-
ally, the proportion impounded is reduced as he receives taxes paid previ-
65. It might appear that this problem could be avoided by relying on the distinction raised earlier
between the time of assessment and the time of collection. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
It is only at the time of collection that tax rates need to be applied. The government could collect
infrequently and thus assure that there is significant averaging. At the same time, the government
would assess changes in wealth continuously.
This method has a critical weakness. Since taxes on wealth changes would not be collected immedi-
ately, the government would have to add to the tax base a percentage return representing the intangi-
ble benefits that accrue to holding the wealth. This percentage may be very different from the market
interest rate and may be hard to observe. This observability problem motivates use of an accretion tax
in the first place. See supra note 51; text accompanying notes 44 & 51.
66. See Vickrey, Tax Simplification Through Cumulative Averaging, 34 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 736 (1969).
67. The cumulation period might begin at a certain age, for example, 18. If a taxpayer reached
18 in 1970, then for the tax year 1988 the taxpayer would use a cumulation table for 19 years of
income. For a clear example of this approach, see id. at 738.
68. The cumulation tables would have to be specifically designed to achieve this result. See id. at
739.
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ously back with interest. But only in the final accounting period does the
proportion become correct. In all the early periods, Mr. Z lost more intan-
gible benefits to the tax system than was warranted.69 The only way to
correct this discrepancy would be to estimate the excess intangible benefits
that were taken away from Mr. Z in the early periods and to compensate
him in later periods. But this solution involves estimating the level of the
intangible benefits. The strength of the accretion taxation approach is that
it avoids the need to observe or estimate the level of intangible benefits. 0
Despite the imperfect nature of the Vickrey system, it is doubtful that
using long accounting periods would be superior. The Vickrey system can
average over very long time intervals, including the lifetime of the tax-
payer. At the same time, the Vickrey system permits use of a short ac-
counting period. A short accounting period avoids the tax free consump-
tion of intangible benefits from wealth due to delays in taxing increases in
wealth. Thus, compared to using a long accounting period, the Vickrey
system performs at least as well as an averaging device but without al-
lowing tax free consumption of intangible benefits. However, much more
analysis would be required to make a strong claim for the overall superi-
ority of the Vickrey scheme.
7 1
69. If the rate structure is fixed over time, Mr. Z will know in advance that he will receive excess
taxes back with interest. Future tax relief has a present value. It might seem that this present value
would offset the excess taxes in the early years. However, the argument that the intangible benefits
theory supports accretion taxation rests on a presumption that those benefits come from holding
wealth, not from the net present value of the individual's wealth position. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 52-54. Under that presumption, excess taxation in early years combined with a return of
the taxes with interest will deprive the taxpayer of intangible benefits in the interim.
70. See supra note 51; text accompanying notes 44 & 51.
71. The need for further analysis arises because the conclusion that the Vickery scheme performs
at least as well as an averaging device is only true when intangible benefits are left out of the picture.
Applying the Vickery scheme or a long accounting period may result in the same smoothing of tax
rates during that accounting period, but the two methods will treat intangible benefits quite differ-
ently. The Vickery scheme smooths tax rates gradually over time while the use of a long accounting
period accomplishes smoothing by applying a single rate at the end of the period. As indicated by the
text example, the gradual correction inherent in the Vickery scheme may result in overtaxation of the
intangible benefits from wealth if most wealth gains occur early in life. On the other hand, regardless
of the exact pattern of saving, using a long accounting period would allow tax-free consumption of the
intangible benefits during the delay between the time the wealth gains occur and the time of taxation
at the end of the period. In the case of a concentration of wealth gains early in life, it is possible that
the undertaxation due to this delay under a long accounting period is less serious than the overtaxa-
tion that would flow from the gradual adjustment of tax rates inherent in the Vickery scheme.
Suppose that this possibility represents reality so that a long accounting period is a superior ap-
proach in cases of high accumulation of wealth early in life. It still may be true that the Vickery
scheme is superior as a general approach because it is superior for the typical pattern of saving. For
example, under life cycle theories of saving, most accumulation will occur in high earning years in the
middle of life. This accumulation provides resources for the low earning years during retirement.
Vickrey's approach would work quite well for this saving pattern. Taxes on the high middle year
incomes would be buffered by averaging with the low income levels in early years. If excessive taxa-
tion occurred at all, it would tend not to be as extreme as in the text example where almost all wealth
accumulation occurred very early in life. This suggests that the Vickery scheme would be superior if
most people are life cycle savers.
The Vickery scheme also will compare favorably to using long accounting periods if theoretical or
empirical doubts about whether life cycle saving is typical turn out to be well-founded. In particular,
it appears that saving for bequests (and concurrently for insurance in the face of an imperfect annuity
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In conclusion, it is doubtful that overtaxation from using an increasing
marginal rate structure implies that a long accounting period should be
used under accretion taxation. That rate structure overtaxes only if the
accumulation of wealth is concentrated in a few periods of the taxpayer's
lifetime rather than spread out more evenly. Furthermore, even if wealth
accumulation does tend to be bunched, using the Vickrey scheme com-
bined with a short accounting period may well be a solution that is supe-
rior to lengthening the accounting period.
2. Accretion Taxation as a Second Best Wealth Tax
The second wealth-related justification for accretion taxation is that it is
a way of reducing disparities in wealth in the absence of a wealth tax.
The idea is that, compared to a cash flow tax, accretion taxation reduces
the rate at which an individual can accumulate wealth and therefore
should dynamically reduce disparities in wealth. This theory is "second
best" in nature. A wealth tax would provide a more satisfactory solution,
but the choice is constrained to be between cash flow taxation and accre-
tion taxation.
This justification extends fairly easily into an argument for continuous
taxation. To see this, consider an example. Suppose the pre-tax riskless
interest rate is 10% for a one-year riskless bond. A cash flow tax will
leave the after-tax rate of return at 10%. A person with a marginal rate of
40% buys a $1000 bond and immediately receives a tax deduction worth
$400.72 The net investment is therefore $600. The bond returns $1100 at
the end of the year and 40% of this is taxed away, leaving $660. The
investor has earned 10% after tax.73
In contrast, an accretion tax with a one-year period cuts the after-tax
rate of return to 6% for this individual. The net investment is the full
$1000, and the individual earns $60 in interest after tax. Using a shorter
period than one year results in an even lower after-tax rate of return.74 At
market) is a saving motive that is at least as important as saving for retirement. See, e.g., Kotlikoff &
Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL.
ECON. 706 (1981) (intergenerational transfers dwarf life-cycle savings in importance; saving occurs
during all of life so that hump of saving predicted by life-cycle theory is absent); Kotlikoff, In-
tergenerational Transfers and Savings, in WHAT DETERMINFS SAVINGS? 69-81 (L. Kotlikoff ed.
1989). This motive would tend to clump wealth accumulation and high wealth levels more toward the
end of life. As a result, averaging using either the Vickrey scheme or a long accounting period would
not result in applying rates that are too high. The taxpayer would average his or her earnings using
many early years of low income. If averaging resulted in using the wrong tax rate, the error would be
in the direction of undertaxation. In this case, the Vickrey scheme would be superior to using account-
ing periods equal in length to the averaging length used in the scheme. The delay in taxing intangible
benefits when the accounting period is long would exacerbate any undertaxation due to averaging.
72. See supra note 1 (deduction for investment allowed under cash flow tax).
73. This result is independent of the tax rate. With a 70% marginal tax rate instead of 40%, for
example, the net investment would be $300 and the after-tax return would be $330. Thus, the after-
tax rate of return would still be 10%.
74. See supra note 28; text accompanying notes 24-25 (after-tax interest rates lower for shorter
assessment period).
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the extreme of continuous taxation the rate is reduced to 5.89%." Since
-the goal is to lower the after-tax rate of accumulation, a continuous tax
will be superior to a tax of any finite period.76
This reasoning implicitly assumes that divergence of the wealth distri-
bution from optimality will be reduced by any marginal reduction in the
rate of accumulation. That assumption itself has some interesting tax pol-
icy implications. For example, the assumption may justify taxing nominal
rather than real return if the nominal rate of return is higher than the
real rate. Consider U.S. Treasury bills as an example. Over the past fifty-
five years, U.S. Treasury bills (short-term notes) have averaged a 3.5%
nominal return but only a 0.4% real return.7 Taxing the nominal returns
may have resulted in a better substitute for an absent wealth tax than
taxing the real returns.78
An important point follows from this discussion of nominal versus real
returns. It is not the cause of the level of nominal return but the actual
level that is important in using the accretion tax as a proxy.79 If inflation
were high enough, taxing nominal returns might even result in a much
greater impact on accumulation than would be desirable under an ideal
wealth tax.80
75. See Table I, supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
76. This argument is subject to a strong caveat based on potential general equilibrium effects.
Those effects are eliminated in the text example by taking the pre-tax rate of return to be 10%
independent of the tax system. The pre-tax rate of return may differ under different tax systems and
the ensuing effects may result in a very different picture under a wealth-related norm. See infra note
92; text accompanying notes 91-94.
77. There is a great deal of variance in the ex post real rate of return. During the 1940's and
1970's, Treasury bills had a significant negative ex post real rate of return. During the 1926-34
period and during the 1980's, bills had a large positive ex post real rate of return. See R. BREALEY &
S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 546 (chart) (3d ed. 1988).
78. For risky assets the magnitude of the rate of return is less meaningful in determining the
effectiveness of accretion taxation as a wealth tax proxy. When the government taxes the fluctuating
portion of the return, it reduces the risk that the investor faces. If the riskless rate of return is zero
and full loss offsets are available, then the risk reduction exactly compensates for the reduction in
expected return ex ante on the asset. Even if the riskless rate is not zero, the reduction in risk largely
offsets the reduction in return, and, to a large extent, the tax system does not reach the risky part of
the return. See supra note 58.
Treasury bills may seem like a riskless asset. The United States government is unlikely to default,
and the asset is so short-lived that capital losses from shifts in interest rates are likely to be minimal.
For domestic investors, however, there is inflation risk in investing in Treasury bills. The current
inflation rate is not observed. It takes time for data to be gathered and for inflation to be summarized
in an index. If inflation rises faster than expected over a period of time, Treasury bills will tend to
have too low a rate of return. This return compensates for expected inflation but not for actual
inflation. The text discussion ignores this risk and treats Treasury bills as if they earned a very small
real return plus the rate of inflation.
79. Some fairly complex economic phenomena may have a significant impact on the rate of re-
turn. During the 1980's, Treasury bills have had a significant positive ex post real return. One prom-
inent international economist explains this on the basis of foreign capital flows. Foreigners who in-
vested in the U.S. interest-bearing securities demanded a premium return to compensate for an
anticipated decline in the dollar. This decline was expected to be more than would be justified simply
by the U.S. domestic inflation rate. See McKinnon, Sound Dollar Tells Business: Think Long, Wall
St. J., June 15, 1989, at A12, col. 4.
80. For example, under hyperinflation of say 9999% per year almost the entire real value of
wealth would be received as "interest" on Treasury bills earning a zero rate of return. A chain of
The Yale Law Journal
There is another complication that can be seen from the Treasury bill
example. The inflation rate fluctuates, and the nominal rate on Treasury
bills fluctuates with it."' Thus, the degree to which an accretion tax oper-
ates as a good proxy for a wealth tax may vary sharply with economic
conditions. Even if the tax system is indexed for inflation, the riskless rate
of return may vary significantly over time.82
To make discussion straightforward, Parts III and IV of the Article
assume that under current and currently foreseeable economic conditions,
the reasoning behind the wealth taxation proxy justification holds up.
That is, given those economic conditions, a marginal reduction in the af-
ter-tax rate of accumulation leads to a superior distribution of wealth.
The additional reduction available from more frequent taxation is there-
fore desirable, and this makes continuous taxation ideal as a periodicity
policy.
3. The Cost of Deviations from the Ideal Under Wealth-Related
Norms
Under both of the wealth-related norms, the ideal assessment period for
an accretion tax is the zero length accounting period typical of continuous
taxation. In some cases, however, it will be difficult and costly to imple-
ment a continuous tax.8" Part IV studies a series of tax approaches that
are less costly than an actual continuous tax but that fall short of an exact
approximation of that tax.8 4
There is a normative question that must be addressed before beginning
such a study. How serious are departures from exact continuous taxation?
Unfortunately, there is no indication in the theoretical literature as to how
to compare deviations of different sizes.85 Subsections a and b of this Sec-
Treasury bill investments starting with $1 at the beginning of a year would have to earn $9999 in
interest to keep even with inflation. Of the terminal value of $10,000, $9999 would be in the tax base
if basis were not indexed for inflation. This $9999 might be taxed at a much higher rate than the
ideal wealth tax rate on $10,000.
81. The correlation between the inflation rate and the rate on Treasury bills is far from perfect.
For example, although the Treasury bill rate has on average been equal to the rate of inflation, there
have been long periods of time where the ex post real return on Treasury bills has been negative. See
supra note 77.
82. The most recent evidence suggests that the ex ante real riskless rate is not stable. It displays a
unit root which implies that the time series for the ex ante real riskless rate is nonstationary. This
behavior seems robust to the time period and to many other variables used in the statistical analysis.
See Rose, Is the Real Interest Rate Stable?, 43 J. FIN. 1095 (1988).
A nonstationary variable does not tend to return to any particular average value but wanders
around more or less at random. Thus, long runs of negative or positive real rates are to be expected if
past is prologue. Qualitatively, these runs seem to characterize real ex post returns on U.S. Treasury
bills. See supra note 77. Furthermore, there is no reason for the average real rate over a long time
period to be any particular value.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 230-45.
85. The literature that attempts to justify accretion taxation on the basis of wealth-related justifi-
cations does not have much to say about the cost of deviations. There is an historical reason for this
phenomenon. The wealth distribution justifications for accretion taxation originated in the debate
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tion examine possible methods of determining the costs of deviations under
each of the two wealth-related norms in turn. No easily applied method
emerges for either norm. In light of this negative result, Subsection c dis-
cusses the strategy that will be used for studying implementation in Parts
III and IV.
a. The Cost of Deviations Under the Intangible Benefits Justification
It is easy to construct a theory that specifies the cost of deviations under
the intangible benefits justification. The accretion tax includes the propor-
tional component of the intangible benefits in the tax base without requir-
ing that the tax authorities observe the level of this component. A continu-
ous accretion tax impounds a percentage of each wealth increment when
the increment occurs. This eliminates that percentage of the proportional
component of the intangible benefits from the investor's future stream of
benefits. The percentage is equal to the tax rate.
If there is a delay in taxing wealth increments under an accretion ap-
proach, the taxpayer will consume the proportional component of the in-
tangible benefits tax free during the period of delay. This deviation from
continuous taxation is equivalent to allowing the taxpayer to receive tan-
gible consumption on a tax free basis.86
The equivalence between the proportional component of intangible ben-
efits from wealth and other consumption suggests that policymakers can
use the existing normative framework of optimal income tax theory to
evaluate deviations from continuous taxation. 7 This theory specifies the
about the choice between accretion taxation and cash flow taxation. See, e.g., supra note 2 (citing
sources). It served as a qualitative argument in favor of accretion taxation over its cash flow rival. No
attempt was made to quantify the wealth-related justification advantages inherent in accretion
taxation.
Some commentators point out that accretion taxation will necessarily remain an ideal rather than
an actuality since implementation is difficult. See Andrews, supra note 3, at 1115-18, 1128-65; An-
drews, supra note 2, at 947. One of the most serious implementation problems is that it is hard to tax
unrealized gains. See supra text accompanying note 4. But there is no attempt in the literature to
specify the costs of deviating from accretion taxation by assessing infrequently. There is only a sense
that infrequent assessment does have some normative cost in terms of the wealth-related norms.
86. The equivalence is exact because taxing the market value of tangible consumption" taxes only
the proportional component of the benefit from that consumption. Consider oranges. Part of the bene-
fits of buying and eating oranges is proportional and is "priced." In particular, oranges have a market
price, and anyone who buys them anticipates benefits at least equal to the market price. The market
price represents a proportional component that is common to all individuals. This proportional com-
ponent goes into the tax base as consumption and is reduced by a percentage that is equal to the tax
rate. No tax is levied on the benefit that the taxpayer experiences in excess of the market price. See
supra note 56.
87. For an accessible discussion of optimal income tax theory see A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLrrz,
LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 394-423 (1980); Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare and the
Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1945-65 (1987).
Under that approach one chooses the income tax rate structure that maximizes a social welfare func-
tion. The form of the social welfare function captures social equity norms. For example, this function
might be utilitarian, consisting of the sum of all person's utilities, or Rawlsian, consisting of the utility
of the person with lowest utility. The approach takes into account the effect of tax rates on behavior
such as how long or hard the person works. The central idea is to pick out the best attainable after-
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cost in terms of distributional goals of failing to tax a dollar of consump-
tion for each taxpayer 8  Generally, this cost will be higher for taxpayers
in a higher bracket."' In effect, optimal income tax theory provides a
"weight" for each taxpayer that represents the distributional cost of fail-
ing to pay a dollar of tax. If a particular form of consumption is untaxed,
the policymaker can compute a social cost for this policy by multiplying
each taxpayer's weight times the unpaid taxes on the taxpayer's consump-
tion and adding up the products for all taxpayers. Armed with this social
cost, it is possible to evaluate changes in the policy by comparing the total
improvement in social cost to the added administrative cost of implement-
ing the policy.
Unfortunately, this approach is unlikely to be successful at evaluating
deviations from continuous taxation. The approach does provide weights
that allow policymakers to evaluate the distributional cost of failing to tax
intangible benefits for each taxpayer. The problem is that applying the
approach requires that the policymaker know the size of the proportional
component of intangible benefits that flow from wealth. Then the weight
for each taxpayer could be multiplied by the tax reduction from failing to
tax the benefits received by the taxpayer. But the difficulties inherent in
measuring the proportional component of the intangible benefits from
wealth is the major motivation for using an accretion tax in the first place.
tax state given the social welfare norm. That norm permits precise evaluation of the relative serious-
ness of deviations from an ideal distribution of income.
The social welfare function depends on individual utilities. The best tax base under the optimal
income tax approach will be the one that most closely approximates individual utility. See R. TRESCH,
supra note 7, at 267-69. The argument for including the proportional component of intangible bene-
fits along with the market value of tangible consumption in the tax base is that this approach makes
taxable income a more accurate estimate of utility.
88. Existing optimal income taxation models study a wage tax. The focus is on the trade-off
between distributional goals and the distorting impact on labor supply and the labor-leisure choice.
See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 87, at 1945-55. In studying an accretion tax, a different
distortion is relevant: An accretion tax increases the cost of future consumption relative to present
consumption.
The disincentive effect on saving arising from this distortion was raised earlier as a reason to depart
from continuous taxation and use a longer assessment period. Using a longer assessment period
reduces the impact of taxation on the riskless rate. See supra note 28; text accompanying notes 24-25.
Presumably, that would reduce the impact of accretion taxation on savings incentives. See infra note
92. To know how long to make the period, it is necessary to compare the benefits of less distortion of
savings incentives against the costs of not taxing some intangible benefits.
89. Intuition might suggest that at the optimum, the welfare cost of not taxing an additional
dollar of income to any given individual should be the same. At an optimum it should be true that an
extra dollar given to any particular individual creates the same gain in social welfare. Otherwise a
different and superior pattern of distribution is attainable by shifting income among individuals.
This intuition is logically correct but is only part of the story. In particular, it-only speaks to a
distributional optimum. Taxes also create inefficiencies, and these result in social welfare costs. Gen-
erally, the higher the marginal rate the greater the inefficiencies and ensuing social welfare costs. See
Fullerton, Shoven & Whalley, supra note 44, at 17 (efficiency cost of tax tends to rise as square of
tax rate). Optimal tax rates therefore stop short of the point of a distributional optimum. They tend to
trade off distributional gains and efficiency losses most sharply at high marginal rates because that is
where the marginal efficiency loss is highest. As a result, untaxed dollars for high bracket taxpayers
tend to have a higher cost in terms of distributional goals.
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The accretion approach allows that component to be taxed effectively
without having to measure how large it is. 9'
b. The Cost of Deviations Under the Second Best Justification
The second best justification for an accretion tax rests on the assump-
tion that lowering the after-tax rate of return on investment is desirable at
the margin because of its effects on wealth distribution. This assumption
implies continuous taxation because it creates the greatest reduction in the
after-tax rate of return.
Two steps are necessary to determine the cost of deviations under the
second best justification. First, it is important to know how different tax
approaches affect the distribution of wealth. Second, it is necessary to
know the desirability of various wealth distributions. A measure of desira-
bility is needed that can be used to compare distributional gains to the
administrative costs of various periodicities or to the welfare losses that
may result from distorting the price of future consumption relative to pre-
sent consumption.
The first step involves a potentially difficult economic assessment.
"General equilibrium effects," the effects of taxes on prices,"1 may have a
substantial impact on the distribution of wealth. 2 No one appears to have
studied the general equilibrium effect of various periodicities under accre-
tion taxation. But studies in other areas of tax policy indicate that general
90. See supra note 51; text accompanying notes 44 & 51.
There is another empirical problem facing the policymaker who wishes to estimate the normative
cost of deviations from continuous taxation. Departures from continuous taxation may change the
distribution of wealth in a non-obvious way due to complicated effects of the tax on prices in the
economy. See znfra note 94; text accompanying notes 91-94. This shift in the distribution of wealth
shifts the distribution of the intangible benefits that flow from wealth. Thus, the indirect changes in
wealth distribution caused by the price effects of deviating from continuous taxation should be consid-
ered in estimating the costs of the deviations. See infra note 94 (empirical example where price effects
of taxation may reverse intuitive judgments about best tax for reaching intangible benefits).
91. The impact of taxing a good on the price of that good considered in isolation is generally
referred to as a "partial equilibrium effect." When the good is not considered in isolation, the impact
of the tax on its price becomes a "general equilibrium effect." See Strnad, supra note 35, at 407. In
this Article, I use the term "general equilibrium effects" to indicate the impact of taxes on prices.
There may be some situations when analysis can be restricted to partial equilibrium effects, but I
wish to convey that the price effects of taxes often are very complex.
92. The examples in this Article study periodicity with a pre-tax interest rate that is independent
of the periodicity embodied in the law. See, e.g., supra note 28. However, it is likely that the choice
between periodicities will affect the pre-tax rate of return. For example, more frequent assessment
lowers the after-tax rate of return. See supra note 28; text accompanying notes 24-25. This may
decrease the supply of savings and cause the pre-tax rate to be bid up as businesses compete for a
smaller pool of funds available for investment in tangible projects. See Strnad, supra note 46, at
1056-59.
Most of the work on detailed tax timing rules assumes that an accretion tax based on pre-tax values
is the ideal tax. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 5; Note, supra note 5. This approach may be motivated
by the fact that the pre-tax world that emerges after all actors take into account the impact of the tax
code is the data that must be used to administer the tax laws. An exception to the implicit or explicit
reference to a fixed pre-tax world can be found in an excellent article by Professor Halperin. See
Halperin, supra note 5. In this article, Professor Halperin considers how the parties would alter the
pre-tax terms of transactions based on the overall impact of the tax rules. See, e.g., id. at 509-11.
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equilibrium effects can be very large and can modify or even reverse com-
mon sense conclusions about various taxes. For example, the second best
justification itself rests on the presumption that accretion taxation will
bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth than a cash flow in-
come tax.93 But, based on general equilibrium studies, a strong argument
can be made for precisely the opposite position.94
The second step calls for a deeper normative theory than exists at pre-
sent concerning wealth distribution. Even if the economic effects of taxes
on the distribution of wealth are known, a policymaker must be able to
rank different wealth distributions and must know how much better one is
than another. An evaluative tool such as the social welfare function in
optimal tax theory is needed.95 This function ranks income distributions
in terms of a normative distributive ideal. The function can be varied to
accommodate the particular ideal that the policymaker finds desirable. No
similar approach with respect to wealth distribution seems to exist at
present.96
Without taking these two steps, it will not be possible to assess exactly
how much is gained at the margin by more frequent taxation. But that
assessment is necessary for policymakers to weigh the gains from coming
closer to continuous taxation against the corresponding administrative and
economic efficiency costs.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82.
94. Consider three results that emerge from one prominent general equilibrium study that com-
pares cash flow taxation to accretion taxation. Fullerton, Shoven & Whalley, supra note 44, at 16-20.
First, a cash flow tax leads to a higher level of total wealth than an accretion tax. Second, the extra
wealth can be distributed to low-wealth groups. Third, the redistribution can be accomplished in a
way that leaves no wealth group worse off than it was under an accretion tax. If wealth distribution is
of primary concern as it is under the second best justification, these results may lead to the conclusion
that the best approach is to use cash flow taxation combined with redistribution of the society-wide
wealth gains to low-wealth individuals.
If this scenario is true, the cash flow tax combined with redistribution may be attractive under the
intangible benefits theory as well as under the second best justification. The redistribution of wealth
might "even up" the distribution of intangible benefits so that there is less need to tax them.
Studies differ in the size of the efficiency gains found to result from a shift to cash flow taxation.
See, e.g., Ballard & Goulder, Consumption Taxes, Foresight, and Welfare: A Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUm ANALYSIS 253,
274-75 (J. Piggott & J. Whalley eds. 1985). Determining which study is more likely to represent
reality is an important and interesting question but is beyond the scope of this Article. The point here
is that general equilibrium analysis may derail the intuitive arguments under either or both wealth-
related justifications for an accretion tax.
95. See supra note 87; text accompanying notes 87-89.
96. This lack of a normative approach seems clear from an examination of the many studies that
focus on the choice between consumption and income taxes. These studies cannot use well-being at a
particular time to evaluate alternative tax policies. A tax policy may lower a group's well-being at
present but greatly increase it in the future. As a result, these studies often look at the impact of
various policies on the present value of various groups' future consumption or at the "wealth
equivalent" of that impact. See, e.g., A. AUERBACH & L. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY
74-77 (1987); Fullerton, Shoven & Whalley, supra note 44, at 16. This is the first step described in
the text. The economic impact of a tax on the distribution of wealth is estimated. But these studies
leave it up to the reader to take the second step of evaluating the normative significance of different




No easy method for evaluating deviations from continuous taxation
emerges from either wealth-related norm. In the case of the intangible
benefits justification, the inability to observe the magnitudes of the intan-
gible benefits is a significant roadblock. In the case of the second best
justification, there appears to be no well-developed theory for evaluating
the desirability of various wealth distributions. In addition, it may be im-
portant to consider general equilibrium effects when studying the cost of
deviations under either norm.
These problems constrain the discussion of implementation in Parts III
and IV. A precise social cost cannot be assigned to the imperfect replica-
tion of continuous taxation under alternative tax rules. Nonetheless, it is
possible to estimate the size of the deviation from continuous taxation
under various policies in terms of ex post wealth differences with no ad-
justment for general equilibrium effects.9 7 Parts III and IV take that ap-
proach except that possible general equilibrium effects are considered in a
few places. 8 A fuller analysis of implementation awaits further develop-
ment of the ability to assess the normative costs of deviations.
B. Tax Neutrality
Another set of justifications for accretion taxation fall under the general
rubric of "tax neutrality."99 These ideas have their genesis in a result
obtained by Professor Samuelson.
Subsection 1 describes this result using numerical examples. Subsection
2 shows that the result does not imply an ideal periodicity for accretion
taxation. Instead, it requires consistent treatment for different assets. All
assets must be taxed with the same frequency, or tax neutrality, as defined
by Samuelson's principle, will be absent.
1. The Samuelson Result
Samuelson proved that the after-tax present value of market invest-
ments will be independent of the tax rate for a continuously applied accre-
97. The examples presented previously in this Article take exactly this approach. For instance, in
the example discussed supra text accompanying notes 15-28, each tax treatment is reduced to an
equivalent tax as of a certain time. By comparing the equivalent tax under tax treatment "A" to the
equivalent tax for continuous taxation, one has a measure of the deviation of treatment A from contin-
uous taxation. This measure is in ex post wealth terms since it consists of the difference in wealth that
would be experienced as of a particular time after the application of the different tax treatments.
Furthermore, since the example assumes that the pre-tax world is invariant to the tax system that
applies, general equilibrium effects of alternative tax systems are ignored. See supra note 28.
98. See, e.g., infra note 213; text accompanying note 192 (considering the possible "capitaliza-
tion" of tax benefits into prices).
99. The rubric itself is somewhat vague. Neutrality concepts often stand in for other unstated
normative assumptions. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 948-50. This Section links tax neutrality con-
cepts to the norm of economic efficiency. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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tion tax."'0 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Although
taxes reduce the after-tax present value of investments, the after-tax dis-
count rate also is reduced by taxes. These two effects exactly offset each
other so that the after-tax present value of each investment is the same for
a person who faces some positive marginal tax rate, T, as it is for the
person who is not taxed on investment income.
Crucial to this result is the assumption that the after-tax discount rate
is reduced the "right" amount. Samuelson assumes that the reduction is
exactly that which would arise if continuous taxation were the usual tax
treatment in the economy. Before discussing the implications of this as-
sumption, it is important to strengthen the intuitions just set forth with an
example.
Suppose there are three taxpayers. One is taxed at a 40% rate, one at
20% and one at 0%. Suppose that, as in the example in Part I, the pre-tax
interest rate in the economy is constant over time and amounts to 10% on
an annual basis. If borrowing and lending transactions are taxed continu-
ously, the three taxpayers will have after-tax discount rates on an annual
basis as set out in column two of Table H1.1"1
100. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations, 72
J. POL. ECON. 604 (1964).
The fact that an accretion tax will produce Samuelson's result is often cited by leading commenta-
tors as an important and valued quality of that tax. See, e.g., M. GRAm, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 347 n.2 (1985); Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAx
LAW. 549, 550 n.8 (1985); Warren & Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of
Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1753 & n.5 (1982).
These commentators do not claim that this tax neutrality quality is an argument for choosing accre-
tion taxation over cash flow taxation. In fact, as demonstrated in this Section, both taxes produce the
Samuelson result if applied in pure form. Nonetheless, the importance of the Samuelson result makes
it worth determining the implications of the result for periodicity under an accretion tax. If using a
particular periodicity approach means that the result will not hold true, this counts heavily against the
approach. Furthermore, if such an approach is required to implement an accretion tax for administra-
tive or other reasons, a pure cash flow tax begins to look more attractive in comparison since it will
preserve tax neutrality in the Samuelson sense. Of course, that may be an inappropriate comparison
since administrative and other constraints may mean that a pure cash flow tax is not obtainable. See
Andrews, supra note 2, at 947 (comparison of two tax systems must take into account difficulties in
implementing each tax); Graetz, supra note 3, at 275-76 (implementation problems for cash flow
taxation must be considered in comparing that tax to the existing impure accretion tax).
101. The second half of Part III of the Appendix infra details the derivation of the rates in the
table. That Part of the Appendix indicates that if borrowing and lending transactions are taxed con-
tinuously and the instantaneous rate of interest is r, then the after-tax borrowing and lending rate
over a time period t for a taxpayer with tax rate T is er( 1')t - 1. The after-tax rate at which the
taxpayer can lend and borrow is the after-tax discount rate. See supra note 22; infra Appendix (Part
III).
Samuelson uses precisely this after-tax discount rate in his paper. See Samuelson, supra note 100,
at 604. This rate is appropriate only in an economy where almost all borrowing and lending transac-




taxpayer's taxpayer's equivalent after-tax
marginal after-tax time 2 receipt
tax rate discount rate tax at time 2
0% .10 0.00 144.00
20% .0792 5.39 138.61
40% .0589 10.57 133.43
Now consider the example from Part 1.102 In the example, the invest-
ment yields $144 at the end of two years. As discussed above, the market
value of this investment at time 0 is $119.103 Under Samuelson's result,
purchase of the investment for $119 should have zero net present value at
time 0 independent of the taxpayer's bracket.104
For the investor in the 0% bracket the result is transparent. The pres-
ent value of $144 to be received in two years under a 10% discount rate is
$144/(1.1)2 = $119. The time 2 taxes that are equivalent to continuous
taxation for the other two investors are set out in column three of the
table." 5 Column four of the table reduces the $144 return at time 2 by
these equivalent taxes.
At time 2, the investor in the 20% bracket will receive $144 minus a tax
of $5.39. This must be discounted by the factor (1.0792)2 to present value
at time 0. The result is $119. Similarly, for the investor in the 40%
bracket, the time 0 present value is ($144 - 10.57)/(1.0589)2 = $119. In
each case the increase in taxes for the higher-rate taxpayers are exactly
offset by the decrease in their after-tax discount rates.
This result has considerable meaning in terms of neutrality. All inves-
tors, independent of tax status, will pay the same price of up to $119 in
pre-tax dollars to secure the $144 return in two years. This means that a
particular investment will be undertaken by the parties who are most effi-
cient at carrying it out rather than by the parties who have the strongest
tax motivations. 10 6
An apparent difference between investors will arise if they are able to
invest less than the $119 at time 0 to own the investment. Suppos6 that, as
in the original example in Part I, the three investors can secure the $144
102. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
104. Samuelson's result stated in terms of after-tax value applies only to purchase of the asset at
market value. If we consider purchase at $100, a continuous tax will treat the spike increase of $19 at
time 0 differently for taxpayers in different brackets. But the essence of the Samuelson result is that
all taxpayers perceive the same market value of $119 for the asset. There is no tax motive to trade
among themsehes. See infra text accompanying notes 105-09.
105. Part IV of the Appendix describes the techniques used to compute equivalent taxes. See
infra Appendix.
106. Thus, the tax neutrality idea behind the Samuelson result is grounded in a concern for
efficiency.
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return in two years by paying only $100 at time 0. Now the net returns
are as follows:
Table III
taxpayer's taxpayer's equivalent after-tax percent of
marginal after-tax time 2 net value after-tax net
tax rate discount rate tax at time 0 for 0% taxpayer
0% .10 0.00 19.01 100%
20% .0792 9.81 15.21 80%
40% .0589 19.10 11.40 60%
The pure profit of $19 at time 0 is taxed away at the taxpayer's marginal
tax rate. At time 0 the three taxpayers have different after-tax net present
values for the project. But as long as all tax rates are less than 100%, all
three taxpayers will undertake the same projects. Pure profits are like a
windfall. Taxing part of them or even almost all of them away will not
dissuade the taxpayer from making the investment.
The example in Table III is a particular instance of a more general
phenomenon. When taxes are not collected continuously, different taxpay-
ers will have different accumulated tax liabilities on any given asset.107 In
these cases where after-tax value differs among taxpayers, there is a sim-
ple test for neutrality: Does the market price at which these taxpayers
would be willing to buy or sell an investment differ? The market price at
which any of the three taxpayers would sell the investment in Table III is
$119. For example, if the 40% investor sells at this price, the after-tax
return is $11.40.o8 This is equal to the $11.40 after-tax net value in the
table. The fact that each taxpayer perceives the same market value indi-
cates that there is no motivation for any taxpayer to trade the asset to
another taxpayer based on a tax-induced difference in value. This is the
core idea that Samuelson wished to capture.'
It is important to note that the Samuelson result is based on pre-tax
values. No claim is made that investment incentives will be the same as in
the no-tax world. 10 The Samuelson result simply implies that the distor-
107. For example, column three of Table III shows the accumulated tax liability if collection of
the continuous tax is delayed until the end of the two-year period.
108. The basis is the cost of $100.00 and the amount realized is $119.00. Sixty percent of $19.00
is $11.40. This is what remains of the $19.00 gain after application of a 40% tax.
109. Samuelson explicitly linked his result to the absence of tax-motivated trading. Taxpayers in
different brackets cannot deal with each other at the expense of the government since the desirability
of investment is independent of the individual's tax bracket. See Samuelson, supra note 100, at 606;
Fane, Neutral Taxation Under Uncertainty, 33 J. PuB. Eco. 95, 96 (1987).
110. The desirability of investment in general may be affected by the general equilibrium impact
of the tax system. Others who have studied Samuelson's work are aware of the fact that his analysis
does not take general equilibrium effects into account but merely takes pre-tax prices as given. See
Fane, supra note 109, at 95-96. The general equilibrium impact of the tax system may affect the
relative desirability of investment in different assets as well as the desirability of investment in
general.
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tions contained in pre-tax prices will be experienced equally by all tax-
payers. The market value of $119 in the example for a return of $144 in
two years may be distorted by general equilibrium effects from the situa-
tion in the no-tax world, but the $119 valuation holds independent of an
investor's tax rate."'1
2. Periodicity Implications of the Samuelson Result
The previous Subsection indicated the driving force behind the Samuel-
son result: The decrease in after-tax discount rates offsets the loss in re-
turns due to taxes so that investors with different tax rates value each
investment the same. An important issue is whether this effect is limited
to the continuous tax studied by Samuelson. It is not. Cash flow taxation
and accretion taxation that is periodic rather than continuous both sup-
port the Samuelson result.
Consider cash flow taxation first using the example of a $144 return to
be received in two years. Assume that this cash flow tax is perfect in the
sense that deductions take effect immediately upon cash outflows and
taxes are levied at the moment of cash inflows."1 2 Under a cash flow tax,
the after-tax discount rate will be equal to the pre-tax interest rate for all
taxpayers. 1 3 This rate is 10% in the example. For a 0% bracket taxpayer,
the $144 return will be valued at $119 = $144/(1.1)2. Suppose the inves-
tor instead is subject to a tax rate, T. Then the after-tax return at the end
of two years will be $144 multiplied by (1 - T). What is the highest
111. Consider a simple example. Suppose that lowering the after-tax rate of return reduces saving
and increases investment demand. As can be seen from Tables II and III, a continuous tax will tend
to lower after-tax rates of return. Suppose that the no-tax world rate of return was 8%. If this rate
did not increase in response to the tax, most people would face an after-tax rate of return of less than
8% and would save less. Firms faced with a reduced after-tax borrowing rate (due to the greater value
of the deduction for interest costs) would demand more investment funds. The pre-tax rate of return
would have to increase above 8% to restore equilibrium.
Suppose that the pre-tax rate of return ends up at 10%. The 2% increase over the no-tax world rate
of return will mean that some investments that were viable in the no-tax world will not be viable in
the tax world. Consider the investment that returns $144 in two years. With a 10% pre-tax rate of
return, investors would make this investment only if the cost is $119 or less. But in the no-tax world
the required rate of return was 8%, and investors were willing to pay up to $123.46 = $144/(1.08)2
to receive the return. Projects yielding $144 in two years with costs between $119 and $123.46 were
viable in the no-tax world but are no longer viable in the tax world. Investment has been distorted by
the tax. But all investors still value the $144 return with a common pre-tax price. That common price
has changed from $123.46 to $119 due to the general equilibrium impact of the tax.
112. Alternatively, the government could collect taxes periodically, and taxpayers would pay or
receive interest at their after-tax interest rate on taxes due or on refunds due at earlier times. Interest
would begin to accrue at the moment of the actual cash inflows and outflows that generate the taxes
or refunds. This scheme is similar to the approach in the example in Part I where all taxes were
collected at the end of two years by applying the appropriate interest charge to taxes that were due
earlier. See upra text accompanying notes 21-22.
For a cash flow tax, the pre-tax and after-tax riskless interest rates are equal. See supra text
accompanying notes 57-58. Even if cash flows are risky, applying this riskless interest rate will result
in periodic taxes that are equivalent to taxation at the time of the cash flows, unless there is a possi-
bility that the firm can default on the future tax payments. See Fane, supra note 109, at 97-101.
113. See %upra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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amount that this individual will be willing to pay for the investment? The
after-tax value of the investment viewed from the beginning of the two
years will be $144 x (1 - T) / (1.1)2 = $119 x (1 - T). So the investor
would be willing to pay $119 x (1 - T) after-tax for the investment. This
corresponds to $119 before tax since the tax deduction of $119 reduces the
cost by T x $119. Regardless of their tax bracket, investors will pay up to
$119 for this investment.
Now consider an accretion tax assessed annually. For the 0% bracket
taxpayer a $144 return to be received in two years is worth $119.01 =
$144/(1.1)2 given a pre-tax market interest rate of 10% annually.11 4 Now
consider whether $119.01 would be the market price that a 40% bracket
taxpayer would be willing to pay. With annual assessment, the after-tax
discount rate that applies to investments that begin and end at the begin-
ning of an assessment period is simply 10% x (1 - T). 1 5 For the 40%
bracket taxpayer this amounts to 6%. The following table records the cash
flows, including tax payments and details their contribution to the invest-
ment's time 0 market value to a 40% bracket taxpayer.
Table IV
time amount of type of residual value contribution
cash flow cash flow after of cash flow
cash flow to value
0.0 -119.01 cost 119.01 -119.01
1.0 -4.76 tax 130.91 -4.49
2.0 -5.24 tax 144.00 -4.66
2.0 144.00 revenue 0.00 128.16
The last column discounts the cash flows from the second column to
time 0 present value using the 6% after-tax discount rate. The figures in
the last column add to zero. This indicates that $119.01 is indeed the most
that the 40% taxpayer would pay for the right to earn $144.00 two years
later. At this 'price, the investment earns exactly the after-tax market rate
of return, which is 6% for this taxpayer. Adding a penny to the $119.01
cost would make this investment unprofitable. Lowering the cost from
$119.01 would yield pure profit for the taxpayer. Once again the Samuel-
son result appears. The value of the $144 cash flow is the same for all
investors regardless of their tax brackets.
The Samuelson result breaks down, however, if not all investments are
114. Previously, the rounded value of $119 was used in the example instead of $119.01. See supra
text accompanying notes 102-13. The unrounded figure is used here because the analysis surrounding
Table IV infra requires a greater degree of precision.
115. Consider a bond that yields the market rate of 10%. For a cost of $100, the return one year
later is $110. The $10 in taxable income is taxed at that time, reducing the after-tax return to $10 x
(1 - T). Dividing this by $100 yields .10 x (1 - T) as the after-tax rate of return. In percentage
terms, this is just 10% x (1 - T).
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taxed with the same frequency. Suppose, for example, that all assets but
one are taxed under a regime of continuous taxation. The one asset is the
investment that yields $144 in two years. It will be taxed under an accre-
tion tax with assessment every two years.
In this case, taxpayers will borrow and lend using assets that are taxed
continuously. As a result, after-tax discount rates will be the same as they
would be under continuous taxation. The Samuelson result worked be-
cause the reduction in after-tax discount rates exactly offsets the added tax
burden on revenues.116 The $144 investment will be taxed more leniently
than it would be under continuous taxation, but taxpayers will assess it
using the after-tax discount rates generated by continuous taxation. One
might expect that higher bracket taxpayers will value this investment
more highly than lower bracket taxpayers. This is true, as the third col-
umn of the following table indicates:11
Table V
taxpayer's taxpayer's highest amount
marginal after-tax taxpayer would




In sum, obtaining the Samuelson property of the invariance of invest-
ment value across different individual tax rates only requires consistent
taxation. Regardless of the length of the assessment period for accretion
taxation, as long as the same period is applied to all assets, the Samuelson
result will apply. Furthermore, a consistently applied cash flow tax will
also make investment value independent of individual tax rates. Thus, the
Samuelson property does not support an accretion tax over cash flow tax-
ation, and the property does not help in choosing the frequency of assess-
ment under accretion taxation. 18
116. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
117. The calculations in the table are straightforward. At time 2 the taxpayer receives $144 and is
taxed at rate T on $144 minus the purchase price SX of the asset. If the taxpayer's after-tax discount
rate is d, then the highest market value the taxpayer would be willing to pay is given by solving the
following equation for SX: [144 - ((144 - $X) x T)]/(1 + d) 2 = SX.
This equation says that the discounted present value of the $144 in revenue minus the tax of (144 -
SX) x T must be equal to $X, the cost of the asset. If this is true, then the investment will earn
exactly the market rate of return. A higher $X will turn it into a loser, and a lower $X will result in
the investment being more profitable than others available in the market. The solution to the equation
is: $X = [144 x (1 - T)]/(1 + d)2 - T].
118. A result related to the Samuelson theorem can be used to argue that accretion taxation has
neutrality properties superior to cash flow taxation. A pure system of accretion taxation will coincide
with investment neutrality even if tax rates change over time, but cash flow taxation will not. See
Sandmo, A Note on the Neutrality of the Cash Flow Corporation Tax, 4 EcoN. LTERS 173 (1979).
Professor Sandmo considers only a continuous accretion tax, but the result also holds for a periodic
accretion tax if tax rates are constant within periods but can change between periods. The result is
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C. The Haig-Simons Ideal
The legal literature often posits the Haig-Simons ideal as the normative
benchmark for studying tax timing and then proceeds immediately to the
level of detailed policy applications. I"9 Unfortunately, the Haig-Simons
ideal by itself provides little guidance in choosing a period for accretion
taxation. In Simons' words, "Personal income may be defined as the alge-
braic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and the end of the period in question."12 And according to
Haig, "Income is the money value of the net accretion to one's economic
power between two points in time." 2' These definitions leave the issue of
periodicity entirely unaddressed. What should be "the period in question"
or the "two points in time" to be used in applying the ideal? 22
The Haig-Simons ideal can be taken to be a definition of a type of tax
easy to explain. If tax rates change, then discount rates will change under accretion taxation. This
change will offset the changes in tax paid. Under cash flow taxation, discount rates are unaffected by
the tax so that these rates cannot adjust to offset the changes in taxes paid.
Invariance under tax rate changes is an important characteristic because tax rates do change fre-
quently, and in many cases the changes can be anticipated by taxpayers. These taxpayers may accel-
erate or defer investments and other transactions to exploit the anticipated changes.
As Sandmo notes, however, nonneutrality under tax rate changes may be desirable. See id. Under a
cash flow tax, announcing at the beginning of year one that tax rates will be lower for years two
forward will cause investors to accelerate investment into year one. This yields a more valuable deduc-
tion (against income at the higher, year-one rate) combined with low rates on revenues in later years.
This nonneutrality may be exactly what the government wants to accomplish. For example, the in-
crease in year-one economic activity due to accelerating investment into that year may ameliorate a
recession forecast for that year. A nonneutral tax may serve as a useful macroeconomic tool.
Suppose, nonetheless, that the goal is to maintain neutrality in the face of tax rate changes. Then
the Sandmo result constrains rather than defines the optimal assessment period for accretion taxation:
The period should be short enough that no tax rate changes occur within the period.
119. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 5, at 508-09; Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of a "Reverse
Investment": An Analysis of the Time Value of Money and the Appropriate Tax Treatment of Fu-
ture Costs, 26 TAx NOTES 925, 925-32 (1985); Note, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplification
and the Future Viability of Accrual Taxation, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 779, 785-86 (1987).
120. H. SIMONS, supra note 34, at 50.
121. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 1, 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921) (emphasis in original).
122. The author was unable to find any extensive discussion by Henry Simons concerning the
appropriate period. In his major work on personal income taxation, he merely argues that the realiza-
tion requirement is a practical necessity. He was aware that this policy allows deferral of gains and
strategic loss taking, but, perhaps because interest rates were low at the time, he did not regard these
consequences as serious. See H. SIMONS, supra note 34, at 99-100, 153, 157, 168-69, 207-08.
However, Simons expressed considerable ambivalence toward strict adherence to an annual period.
For example, in his 1950 book on income tax reform he states:
[Good income tax accounting or procedure must not require or presuppose sharp allocations
of income among short accounting periods. . . . [T]ax legislation calling for definitive annual
determinations means awful complexity, difficult administration, expensive compliance, endless
litigation, and bad taxpayer and Bureau morale. Like it or not, we must recognize that good
income taxation is not merely a succession of events in or respecting discrete, water-tight ac-
counting periods but is essentially process through time. Its objectives must be defined and
pursued with respect to long periods, often the taxpayer's whole lifetime ...
• . . Income taxation has simply never faced squarely the axiom that annual-income ac-
counting is and should be tentative and provisional.
H. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 59-60 (1950).
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treatment rather than a norm to be used in deciding what tax treatment to
apply. Traditionally, many scholars have considered the Haig-Simons
ideal to be just another name for accretion taxation.123
Even if one takes this view, the problem of failure to specify a period
remains. As the examples in Part I indicate, accretion taxes with different
assessment periods are different taxes. They have different impacts on the
taxpayer's wealth position. In the transaction connected with Table I, for
instance, a continuous accretion tax was 4% higher than an accretion tax
assessed annually, and an accretion tax assessed annually was 4% higher
than an accretion tax assessed biannually. 24
There is one result that emerges as a general principle: An accretion
tax treatment with assessment period X will meet the Haig-Simons ideal
only if that ideal is defined in terms of a period of length X."2 5 Thus, a
continuous accretion tax will be considered excessive if the period ex-
amined is one year, two years, or indeed any noninfinitesimal period.
Similarly, a one year accretion tax will appear too lenient if the Haig-
Simons test is applied at half-year intervals.
Consider as an example an investment that costs $100 at the beginning
of year one and yields $110 at the end of that year. At the end of year one
the taxes under different assessment periods for an individual in the 40%
tax bracket will be as follows:
Table VI
assessment period equivalent tax
at time 1
two years (biannual) 3.77
one year (annual) 4.00
continuous 4.11
Applying the Haig-Simons ideal based on a one year accounting period,
wealth has increased by $10 during the year so that the individual should
pay $4.00 in tax. Biannual assessment and continuous assessment result in
taxes that are too low and too high respectively.
123. The ideal is called a "norm" in much of this Article because many tax scholars use it as the
explicit starting point for work on tax timing. See supra note 119 (citing sources). These scholars may
have deeper norms in mind, but they do not state them. In any event, it is hard to separate "norms"
from the "definitions" that they spawn. One can always challenge a norm by asking for a deeper
justification. This reduces the "norm" to an operational rule on the level of a definition.
Regardless of whether one calls the Haig-Simons ideal a norm or a definition, it is clear that the
ideal plays an important role in the study of accretion taxation. One leading scholar puts it this way:
"The intellectual basis for accrual taxation is the Haig-Simons definition of income. . . . Commenta-
tors often use this definition in analyzing and evaluating proposals under an income tax." Shakow,
supra note 5, at 1114 (footnotes omitted).
124. See Table I, supra text accompanying notes 24-25; text accompanying note 27.
125. I have made this point in earlier work. See Strnad, supra note 35, at 400 n.34 (periodic
accretion tax); Strnad, Tax Timing and the Haig-Simons Ideal: A Rejoinder to Professor Popkin, 62
IND. L.J. 73, 81 (1986) (continuous accretion tax).
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For the Haig-Simons ideal to specify the choice of tax treatment, either
a particular period must be chosen and incorporated into the definition, or
a tax treatment must be identified that taxes consumption plus net wealth
over any accounting period. The first method simply emphasizes that the
Haig-Simons ideal alone does not say anything about the choice of pe-
riod.'26 That choice is a normative task, and the Haig-Simons ideal does
not indicate which norms should dictate the choice.'27
The second route leads away from accretion taxation entirely. For any
fixed set of transactions, cash flow taxation will result in Haig-Simons
treatment regardless of accounting period if the impact of future taxes on
present value is properly accounted for and general equilibrium effects are
ignored.' In contrast, each variant of accretion taxation meets the Haig-
Simons ideal only for an accounting period equal to the period of assess-
ment under that variant.'2
126. One view is that the taxpayer's lifetime is the appropriate period. The Haig-Simons ideal
aims at measuring and taxing the economic power accumulated or exercised by the taxpayer. The
lifetime period aggregates power exercised as consumption at all of the time periods of life with the
power that remains in the form of wealth passed on to heirs. But many proponents of this view do not
advocate an accretion tax with a lifetime period. Instead, they argue that a cash flow income tax
combined with taxing bequests implements the Haig-Simons ideal. See, e.g., R. TRESCH, supra note
7, at 267-68; Aaron & Galper, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts and Bequests and other Strategiesfor
Reform, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 106, 112 (U. Pechman ed. 1984).
It is important to emphasize that a cash flow income tax combined with a tax on bequests is very
different from an accretion tax with a lifetime period. A cash flow income tax tallies all receipts that
are not reinvested and includes them in taxable income at the time of receipt. An accretion tax with a
lifetime period would add up all receipts and delay taxation -until the time of death. Thus, the cash
flow income tax is not the "limit" of a series of accretion taxes as the period is extended to the
taxpayer's lifetime.
127. It is possible to identify the Haig-Simons ideal with wealth-related norms. See supra text
accompanying notes 31-82. There are two problems with making this identification. First, either of
the wealth-related norms may imply that a tax treatment other than accretion taxation is best. For
example, if intangible benefits flow from the present value of wealth, then cash flow taxation may be
a superior approach. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54. Second, when an author cites the
Haig-Simons ideal as a normative starting point, it is not clear which version of the wealth-related
norms is in the author's mind. Different versions may lead to different tax policy recommendations.
For example, the second best wealth tax justification may imply that taxing nominal gains is desirable
while the intangible benefits justification implies indexing for inflation. See supra text accompanying
notes 57 & 76-78.
In short, if the Haig-Simons ideal really "stands for" another norm, citing the ideal instead of
explicitly discussing the norm can easily lead to confusion. This confusion is especially likely when
considering the issue of periodicity because the Haig-Simons ideal by itself says nothing about this
issue.
128. See Strnad, supra note 35, at 396-99; Strnad, supra note 125, at 75-81; Strnad, supra note
46, at 1084-89. This result has precedents extending back at least half a century. See Strnad, supra
note 35, at 403. Unfortunately, the result probably does not hold if general equilibrium effects are
taken into account. See Strnad, supra note 125, at 87-88; Strnad, supra note 46, at 1102-03. For a
numerical example illustrating the result, see supra note 35.
The result is closely linked with the Aaron-Galper argument that cash flow taxation combined with
a tax on bequests at death meets the Haig-Simons ideal if the period chosen for taxation is the lifetime
of the taxpayer. See supra note 126. The length of the taxpayer's lifetime is unknown in advance. For
cash flow taxation to meet the Haig-Simons ideal for a lifetime of any possible length, it must meet
the ideal for any accounting period.
129. Accounting period independence is a desirable trait, and requiring it is an attractive way to
resolve the failure of the Haig-Simons ideal to speak to periodicity. But accounting period indepen-
dence certainly is not the end of the inquiry. Many who support an accretion tax and invoke the
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In sum, whether considered as a norm or as merely a definition, the
Haig-Simons ideal is not helpful in determining the proper periodicity of
an accretion tax. The ideal either offers no guidance at all on the proper
period or it points toward choosing cash flow taxation over accretion taxa-
tion of any periodicity.
III. THE NORMATIVE COSTS OF THE ACCOUNTING PERIOD CHOICE
Only two of the four main norms cited in favor of accretion taxation
specify a desired periodicity. The two wealth-related norms suggest that
continuous taxation is the most desirable frequency of taxation. The Sam-
uelson principle merely argues for consistent treatment of all transactions.
The Haig-Simons doctrine adds nothing to the periodicity debate.
This normative discussion suggests that a continuous tax applied con-
sistently across all assets would be ideal. This Part studies the normative
costs of deviating from continuous taxation and the factors that affect
these costs. Section A shows that constructing a continuous tax is not easy.
Most assets are risky and, as a result, the proper continuous tax depends
on knowledge of the exact time path of asset value. The Section also indi-
cates that, at least for some assets, this knowledge can be gained only at
significant cost. Sections B and C show that the degree of deviation from
continuous taxation depends substantially on three factors in addition to
the length of the assessment period: asset riskiness, transaction costs of
trading and the existence of strategic trading opportunities. Section D
demonstrates that the normative costs that would result if the law left
strategic trading for typical risky assets totally uncontrolled would be very
large.
A. Asset Path Information and Administrative Costs
1. Asset Path Information
The example in Part I makes continuous assessment seem simple.130 In
that example, continuous assessment was reduced to a tax at a single
point. The only input data were the cash flows and the riskless interest
rate. The asset cost $100 at the beginning of the first year. It produced
$144 in revenue risklessly at the end of the second year. The riskless in-
terest rate was constant at a 10% annual rate during the two years.
Knowing these three pieces of information alone permitted the conclusion
that a tax of $19.10 at the end of the two-year period would be exactly
equivalent to a continuous tax applied moment by moment during the two
Haig-Simons ideal may have other goals in mind such as implementing the wealth-related norms. If
so, these norms, rather than a mere invocation of the Haig-Simons standard, should be the explicit
starting point for analysis. See supra note 127.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 15-28.
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years. The mathematical computations are in fact quite straightforward,
and it is possible to construct a simple computer program that will provide
periodic taxes equivalent to continuous taxation for any anticipated cash
flow."' 1 This simplicity suggests that a continuous assessment system
could be administered easily even if taxes were collected periodically
rather than continuously.
Unfortunately, this suggestion is mistaken. The ability to compute a
continuously assessed tax on a periodic basis using only cash flow and
riskless interest rate data depends crucially on the assumption that both
riskless interest rates and cash flows are certain and known in advance.
This assumption implies that interest rate and cash flow data will be suf-
ficient to determine the path of asset values.1 2 The tax authorities do not
have to observe that path. In tax policy terms, the realization requirement
does no harm. The tax authorities can wait until the end of an investment
and then assess a tax that is equivalent to a continuous tax.
This pleasant state of affairs vanishes if either interest rates or cash
flows are uncertain. In that instance, prior to realization of the rates or
flows, the value of the investment will fluctuate based on investor expecta-
tions about the future value of the rates and flows. Even knowing the ex
post realizations of the cash flows and interest rates at each point in time
will not allow one to reconstruct the path of asset value. That path de-
pends on expected cash flows and not on the actual values that occur.
For an actual risky asset, risk resolution and the creation of new risk
will happen frequently during the life of the asset. There will be many
possible paths, and, in general, asset value will move in the "jerky" way
portrayed in charts of stock prices in the newspaper. 3 Knowing the ini-
tial value and final value will not determine the time path of values in
between.'3 The only way to specify that path exactly will be to observe it
directly.' 35 Since the value of most assets fluctuates almost continuously,
131. The author's program consists of about 100 lines of FORTRAN code including code setting
up input and output. This program could be extended easily to accommodate time varying interest
rates as long as the temporal pattern of interest rates is known in advance.
132. In the example in Part I, this path consisted of the asset jumping in value from $100 to S119
at the start and then increasing exponentially from $119 to $144 over its two year life. See supra text
accompanying notes 18-20.
133. In fact, the leading paradigm for the motion of asset rates of return is Brownian motion: the
jerky movement of small particles suspended in a liquid. See infra note 149.
134. For a simple example of a risky asset with more than one possible path between a fixed
initial value and a fixed final value, see infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
135. It may be possible to make educated guesses about the path of a particular asset. One of the
great contributions of modern finance is the observation that asset pricing may depend largely on a
few uncertain factors in the economy. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 77, at 140-58; Roll
& Ross, An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, 35 J. FIN. 1073 (1980).
For a particular asset one might estimate its asset value path in two steps. First, one would estimate
how its price depends on the various market risk factors. Second, one would observe how those risk
factors changed over time. In theory, the tax authorities could use this approach to estimate asset
paths.
This technique would be especially valuable for assets like works of art or closely held stock where
there is no series of market prices available for the particular asset. For these assets, however, the first
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almost continuous observation of asset values will be required to specify
the asset value path over time.' 36
Unfortunately, the class of risky assets is not small. Most assets are
subject to fluctuations in capital value that are not known in advance. 137
These assets present the tax authorities with the problem just identified:
the value path cannot be determined by simply observing the initial and
final value. Nonetheless, knowing the initial and final value does make
some paths more likely than others.'38 Furthermore, assuming that the
variance of potential asset values grows with time, more frequent observa-
tion of asset value will yield a better approximation of the actual path.'39
Given continuous taxation as an ideal, choosing a period for assessment
amounts to deciding how often to observe the value of each taxpayer's
step of c timating the dependence of asset price on the risk factors would be guesswork. There would
be no price data available to do a statistical estimate. See R. BRFALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 77, at
187-191 (difficulties of estimating dependence of asset value on general risk factors without using
asset price data).
136. For publicly traded securities, transactions that change prices are separated by very short
time intervals, often less than one minute. This has prompted finance economists to use models with
prices that change continuously. See Merton, On the Mathematics and Economics Assumptions of
Continuous-Time Models, in FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 19, 20
(W. Sharpe & C. Cootner eds. 1982).
137. Extremely short-term borrowing and lending at fixed rates where default can be ruled out
may appear to be nearly riskless. In this case, cash flows are certain and the holding period is so short
that there is no time for interest rate changes to affect the value of the asset. This type of investment
can be held continuously despite its short term nature. For example, some money market funds hold
and continually roll over extremely short-term debt. The result is that capital value remains constant,
and the investor's return fluctuates with the short-term interest rate. Unanticipated changes in infla-
tion, however, affect the real value of the capital so that short-term lending with low default risk is
not a riskless investment. See supra note 78.
Some long-term assets such as U.S. Treasury bonds have very low default risk and almost certain
cash flows. But these bonds are still risky because future interest rates for riskless borrowing and
lending are uncertain. The asset value will fluctuate with changes in interest rates.
For example, suppose a U.S. Treasury bond returns $110 for certain at the end of year one and
costs $100 at the beginning of the year. The value of the bond in the middle of the year will depend
on how the market at that time values riskless returns to be received in six months. Generally, the six-
month riskless rate at mid-year is uncertain at the beginning of the year.
The uncertainty of interest rates over time means that the path of the bond's value must be ob-
set',ed to implement a continuous tax precisely. The value of a $100 bond at the end of the year may
be $110. But, at the end of the year, only observation will reveal the bond's value at the middle of the
year. One must either directly observe the bond's value at that time or estimate that value by observ-
ing interest rates in the middle of the year.
138. See bifra text accompanying notes 146-47 (statistical information about actual path follows
from knowing initial and final value).
139. Suppose that an asset has value X(0) at time 0. This value is known with certainty. From
the perspective of time 0, there will be an expected path of asset values for all later times. But the
actual path is not known with certainty. That the variance of asset value grows with time means that
the variance of the value X(t) at time t knowing only X(0) is an increasing function of t. This means
that knowing X(0) provides fairly good information about what the value will be shortly after time 0.
But knowing X(0) does not provide as much information about the value long in the future. Frequent
observation of the value X(t) therefore provides much more information about the location of each
piece of the path since each unknown value X(t) will be "near" an observed value.
The assumption that the variance of asset values increases with time is standard and has considera-
ble empirical justification. For example, geometric Brownian motion is often used to model the move-
ment of common stock prices. See infra note 149. The variance of the cumulative rate of return grows
linearly with time for assets exhibiting geometric Brownian motion. See J. INGERSOLL, JR., THEORY
OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING 348, 351 (1988) (equations (6b) and (22)).
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investments and borrowings. The administrative costs of frequent observa-
tion must be weighed against the normative cost, if any, of deviating from
continuous taxation.
2. Administrative Costs
A threshold question is whether there are cases in which the cost of
observing asset paths is so high that the trade-off between administrative
costs and obtaining a close approximation to continuous taxation is of se-
rious concern. If all asset paths are observable at very low cost, then there
is not much more to say. A continuous tax could be implemented easily.
In fact, the costs of observing the value paths of different assets vary
widely. Publicly traded stocks are amenable to inexpensive observation of
value paths. Price data is available at least on a daily basis. Using this
data, it would be simple to construct a computer program that would com-
pute an approximate continuous tax based on a very short assessment pe-
riod for any publicly traded asset. The taxpayer or the government would
simply enter the purchase price, sale price, date of purchase and date of
sale into the computer.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are cases where it would be
very difficult to assign gains and losses to a series of short assessment
periods. Consider an engineer who over a period of many years develops
ideas that lead to a series of projects much like the example in Part I
above.14 The projects yield pure profits by earning a return that is
greater than the market rate of return. Pure profits are earned because the
engineer is bringing a new, more cost-effective technology to the market.
The difficulty in this case is that human capital is involved. The costs of
the project include the value of the time that the engineer spends thinking
up new ideas. These costs are hard to observe, and the appropriate tax
treatment for the costs is unclear. 41
The timing issues connected with the benefit side of the projects are as
difficult as those connected with the cost side. In particular, it is not clear
when the earnings that flow from developing the ideas accrue to the engi-
neer. The human capital value of the engineer clearly increases before the
physical capital investment, such as the $100 cost in the example, is made
to implement the idea. In fact, some of the human capital value increase
may occur many years before any observable outcomes are apparent. Un-
dergraduate or graduate training may make profitable invention much
140. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
141. The standard analysis assumes that the engineer reduces work time and thus wages in order
to think up the ideas. Since the forgone wages are not taxed, the engineer in effect gets an immediate
deduction for the costs of developing the ideas. See Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 461 (1977). However, the engineer might also reduce leisure time instead of work time. The
value of this leisure time is already excluded from the tax base. The engineer in effect receives no
deduction for forgoing leisure time.
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more likely even though the actual inventions may not become physical
capital or generate cash flows until two or three decades later.142
In between the easy case of publicly traded assets and the hard case of
pure human capital investment'4" there are intermediate cases. For exam-
ple, many closely-held corporations and small unincorporated businesses
are similar in operation and line of business to publicly traded corpora-
tions. Valuing these closely-held corporations and unincorporated busi-
nesses is certainly theoretically possible since the market provides a valua-
tion for comparable publicly traded entities. The catch is that the tax
authorities cannot rely on freely available market data for corporations
and businesses that are not publicly traded. Frequent valuation of these
entities in the absence of market data might be very expensive.
It is clear that for some assets the costs of observing the exact path of
value are significant. Frequent taxation will be administratively difficult
142. Returns to human capital generally are given cash flow treatment under U.S. tax law.
Wages, for example, are taxed when earned. Some accretion tax advocates argue that taxation of
human capital returns on a cash flow basis is acceptable as an exception because of the liberty interest
in not being forced to work to pay taxes or because taxing human capacity "commoditizes" human
beings. See Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax
and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831, 841-44 (1979); Warren
1980, supra note 2, at 1113-17. Other scholars have argued that it is unfair to impose a heavier tax
burden on those who depend on physical capital rather than human capital. See Klein, supra note
141.
This latter position can be supported by appeal to the norms used to justify the first position. In
particular, taxing human capital returns on a cash flow basis while taxing physical capital returns
more heavily by using an accretion tax may reduce the physical capital stock. This would tend to
reduce liberty and increase commoditization for two groups of workers: present workers with low
human capital endowments who work in industries that are physical-capital intensive and all future
workers. In theory, with a smaller capital stock, the marginal product and wages of future workers
will be lower. See, e.g., Feldstein, Tax Incidence in a Growing Economy with Variable Factor Sup-
ply, 88 Q.J. ECON. 551 (1974) (The exact impact of accretion taxation on the capital stock is contro-
versial. But some work suggests that the tax induces a substantial reduction in total capital. See Ful-
lerton, Shoven & Whalley, supra note 44.) Present workers with a low human capital endowment
whose labor is complementary to heavy use of physical capital also might suffer since production
methods using their labor would be taxed more heavily.
Both classes of laborers might have to work longer and harder to achieve the same standard of
living (including leisure). This involves more commoditization and less liberty for them. It is unclear
why lowering the return to labor time is any more pernicious in the case of those gifted with a large
natural endowment of human capital than in the case of future laborers or of present laborers with a
small endowment who work in physical-capital intensive industries.
Finally, even if one is not persuaded by these arguments, human capital is often so intertwined with
physical capital that it is difficult to treat them separately. See infra note 143. As a result, accretion
tax designers will be faced with important cases where the difficulties raised by the value of human
capital cannot be easily avoided. It is unlikely, for example, that most accretion tax advocates would
be willing to subject the entire category of family or individual businesses to cash flow treatment
simply because significant parts of the profits of many of these businesses are returns to human
capital.
143. Unfortunately, human capital investment is often inextricably intertwined with other kinds
of investment, even investment of the sort that we have classified as an easy case for accretion taxation.
This point is made lucidly by Professor Andrews. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 953-54. Consider
stock market investments. These investments seem impersonal and far away from human capital. The
costs and cash flows of each investment seem clear, and there is a clear starting date for each invest-
ment. Nonetheless, people spend time deciding whether to invest in the stock market and deciding
which investment vehicles are appropriate. The expertise developed through making these decisions is
a human capital investment that parallels the investment in financial capital inherent in buying stock.
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for these assets. It is important to identify how harmful infrequent taxa-
tion will be in such cases. Otherwise, it will be hard to decide how much
administrative effort to devote to approximating continuous taxation accu-
rately in these cases.
B. Asset Riskiness, Strategic Trading, and Transaction Costs
The previous Section of this Part indicates that there is a trade-off be-
tween saving administrative costs by assessing infrequently and approxi-
mating a continuous tax accurately by assessing frequently. As pointed out
in Part II, analyzing this trade-off is made much more difficult by the fact
that it is not clear exactly how much any given deviation from exact con-
tinuous taxation matters. 144 Nonetheless, some interesting, policy-relevant
results are obtainable by comparing the deviations that would result from
various periodicities. Larger deviations presumably are worse than smaller
ones, and it is possible to identify the dependence of the amount of devia-
tion on certain asset characteristics and on the assessment period.
Two results stand out. First, the deviation from continuous taxation is
greater for riskier investments. Second, the degree of deviation for risky
assets increases sharply if transaction costs are low and the taxpayer can
trade strategically.
The rest of this Section demonstrates these results through a series of
examples. Before presenting this series of examples in Subsection 2, Sub-
section 1 describes the "bridge process" technology used to generate the
examples. This technology is designed to compare continuous taxation to
periodic taxation from a tax administrator's viewpoint. Thus, the technol-
ogy compares the two tax approaches for any given transaction based on
the data an administrator will normally have concerning that
transaction.
1 45
1. Bridge Process Technology
Consider the problem faced by administrators of a periodic accretion
tax. At the end of each assessment period there are assets with unrealized
gains and losses. These assets fall into two classes. The first class have
been held during the entire assessment period. This class consists of "old
assets." The second class consists of "new assets" that were purchased
144. See supra text accompanying notes 83-96.
145. Since designing rules for administering the tax laws is the ultimate goal of policy studies, it
is useful to study examples from an administrative perspective. But the bridge process technology
introduced here may serve more important purposes than providing heuristic examples. The transac-
tional orientation of the technology makes it potentially useful in the actual administration of an
accretion tax. See infra text accompanying notes 230-45 (potential use of bridge process approach to
approximate continuous taxation or to test other methods of approximation).
Despite its potential as an administrative tool, the bridge process approach is not adequate by itself
for studying the overall impact of various accretion tax approaches. A different technology is used for
that purpose in Section D of this Part. See infra text accompanying notes 187-94.
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during the period and were still held by the taxpayer at the end of the
period.
For both classes of assets, assume that tax administrators have three
pieces of data: initial value, final value and holding period. For old assets,
the initial value is the value at the beginning of the assessment period, the
final value is the value of the asset at the end of the assessment period,
and the holding period is equal in length to the assessment period. For
new assets, the final value is the same as for old assets: the value at the
end of the assessment period. However, new assets have a different initial
value and holding period than old assets. For these assets, the initial value
is the purchase price, and the holding period is the length of time between
purchase and the end of the assessment period.
Given that an assessment period has been chosen, the periodic accretion
tax is simple to compute. One subtracts initial value from final value and
multiplies the difference by the tax rate. The holding period does not af-
fect the tax. In this Section the goal is to compare this periodic tax to
continuous taxation. There is an immediate problem in attempting this
comparison. For a given initial value, final value and holding period,
there is no single value for the continuous tax on the asset. There are
many possible paths between the starting and ending value, and for each
possible path there is a different continuous tax. In place of using a single
determinate tax figure, all that is available is statistical information about
what the path might have been. This information is summarized by "tax
statistics" such as the mean and variance of the continuous tax over all the
possible paths.146
In order to calculate the mean and variance, it is necessary to know the
146. A continuous tax can be calculated for each possible price path. The mean is the average tax
over all possible paths. The variance measures how much the continuous taxes for the various paths
tend to deviate from the average tax. If there are very high and very low continuous tax values
associated with many paths, then the variance will be large.
The mean and the variance are highly significant for comparing any proposed tax treatment to the
continuous tax ideal under either of the wealth-related norms. A proposed tax treatment will specify a
single "proposed tax" based on three asset traits: the initial value, the final value and the holding
period. If this proposed tax is less than the average continuous tax, then the proposed tax system on
average will undertax intangible benefits and on average will do worse than continuous taxation at
reducing disparities in wealth.
Even if the proposed tax is equal to the average continuous tax, the variance of the continuous tax
is of concern. This variance measures the tendency of the proposed tax to deviate from the actual
continuous tax that would be due. The actual continuous tax is unknown because the asset price path
between the initial and final path is not observed. If the variance is high, then the proposed tax will
tend to deviate sharply from what the continuous tax would have been. As a result, the proposed tax
will often seriously undertax or overtax intangible benefits from wealth even though the proposed tax
will correctly tax intangible benefits on average. If the variance is large enough, it will be worth
expending considerable resources to observe asset paths and to impose the actual continuous tax rather
than to use a surrogate tax that is equivalent to the average continuous tax.
This discussion of the normative importance of the variance points to another motivation for com-
puting the average continuous tax. If a surrogate tax is designed to tax at that average level, that
surrogate tax will minimize the variance between the actual continuous tax and the tax that is paid.
Choosing the average of a random variable to estimate the actual value of the random variable mini-
mizes the variance of the estimate. See infra note 231.
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probability that any particular path was the actual path. Probabilities for
various paths follow from the study of a "bridge process." A "bridge pro-
cess" is the probability-weighted collection of all possible paths that occur
when an asset goes from a fixed initial value to a fixed final value over a
given time period.14
The examples in the next Section apply a bridge process approach to a
"typical" stock market asset. The asset is typical in the sense that its ex-
pected return and the standard deviation of that return reflect average
performance for traded stocks during the period 1926-81.48 This asset is
chosen for the examples because traded stocks are a familiar and impor-
tant class of risky assets. 49 In addition, some of the other important clas-
ses of assets studied in the Article will have similar risk and path charac-
teristics.'" The rest of this Section details alternative assumptions about
the availability of strategic trading and shows qualitatively how those as-
sumptions affect the bridge process for the asset.
The potential use of strategic trading will emerge as an important fac-
tor in the size of deviations from continuous taxation. The possibility of
effective strategic trading under a periodic accretion tax depends on how
sales in between assessment times are treated. If the assessment period is
five years for a particular kind of asset and the taxpayer sells the asset
147. This process is derived mathematically from an "unconstrained process," where an asset
starts at a given initial value and moves for a fixed amount of time to some final value that is not
constrained to be one particular value. For the actual mathematical derivation, see J. Strnad, supra
note 14, at 184-87, 191-98.
148. During this period the average annual nominal riskless interest rate was 3.1% while the
average annual rate of return on traded stocks was 11.4%. The standard deviation of that average
annual rate of return on traded stocks was 21.9%. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 16, at
118, 123. The examples assume that riskless borrowing and lending at the pre-tax rate of 3.1% is
possible.
149. The examples in this Article are based on the assumption that asset prices exhibit geometric
Brownian motion. Geometric Brownian motion means that the rate of return is a constant plus a
Brownian motion term. See J. INrGERSOLL, JR., supra note 139, at 351 (equation (22)). A constant
rate of return would imply a smooth, geometrically increasing asset value path. This path would look
like the path in Figure 1. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. The Brownian motion term adds
a rapidly fluctuating deviation with mean zero to the constant rate of return. Brownian motion is
named after Robert Brown who observed and described the jerky and random motion of pollen parti-
cles suspended in liquid in 1827-28. See T. HIDA, BROWNIAN MOTION viii (1980).
Geometric Brownian motion is the usual assumption in theoretical finance models of common stock
prices. See, e.g., Merton, Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model, 3
J. ECON. THEORY 373, 377 (1971). Recent empirical evidence casts some doubt on the accuracy of
the geometric Brownian motion assumption, but it is hard to come up with an obvious alternative
candidate for theoretical work. See Lo & MacKinlay, Stock Market Prices Do Not Follow Random
Walks: Evidence from a Simple Specification Test, 1 J. FIN. STUD. 41 (1988).
150. Publicly traded stocks can be bought and sold at low cost, have easily observable price paths,
and are volatile compared to investments such as government bonds or bank certificates of deposit.
Later parts of the Article will be concerned with the taxation of volatile assets that can be traded only
at high cost and that do not have readily observable price paths. See infra text accompanying notes
237-45. Closely held corporations are an example. These corporations almost surely are similar in
volatility to publicly traded corporations in the same business.
The use of the average publicly traded stock in the text examples is not meant to diminish the
significance of high transaction cost assets with price paths that are hard to observe. Such assets are
common, and it is important to develop a policy for taxing them.
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during the first year, how will that sale be treated? If the taxpayer is
taxed on the sale before the five year assessment point arrives, then tax-
payer strategy with respect to when to sell the asset must be taken into
account. In particular, the taxpayer may attempt to realize losses as they
occur in order to accelerate the tax benefits associated with the losses.
Consider a tax system with five-year assessment for unrealized gains
but where sales in any given single year are taxed at the end of that year.
Suppose a taxpayer buys an asset for $100, the asset hits a low of $80
during the first year, and the asset reaches $125 at the end of the five-year
assessment period. If tax rates remain constant, the taxpayer would be
better off selling the asset at its low point and simultaneously buying back
the asset (or an asset with similar expected returns) for $80.' This strat-
egy results in $20 tax loss at the end of year one followed by a tax gain
that is $20 higher ($45 instead of $25) at the end of five years. The tax-
payer obtains the deferral or "interest free loan" advantage of delaying
the tax on the $20 for four years.
Whether and to what extent a taxpayer can implement this strategy
depends on transaction costs. If it is costless to buy and sell the asset and
costless to monitor prices,'52 the taxpayer will sell the asset and repur-
chase a substitute whenever there is a slight decrease in value. This will
guarantee that the taxpayer will sell at the lowest price reached by the
asset and obtain the greatest possible deferral advantage as in the example
above. 53 On the other hand, transaction costs may be so high that it is not
worthwhile to exploit even large decreases in value.'"
151. Buying exactly the same asset back simultaneously may create a "wash sale" problem under
§ 1091. That section disallows tax losses where purchase occurs within 30 days of sale. See I.R.C. §
1091 (1989). The provision is easily evaded, however, if assets available in the marketplace can serve
as good substitutes. For most assets good substitutes are readily available. See infra text accompanying
notes 216-17.
152. There is a large class of assets with trading and monitoring costs that are very low but not
zero. This class includes stocks and bonds that are listed on a public exchange.
153. To see this point, consider the "epsilon-strategy" of trading whenever the asset falls some
amount epsilon below the basis where epsilon is very small. The investor takes tax losses in units of
epsilon. After each loss is taken the basis will be reduced by epsilon. This strategy will involve trading
very frequently if the asset falls significantly below the original basis.
The epsilon-strategy does not allow full exploitation of early loss taking. Sometimes the asset will
decline less than epsilon below the basis but will then rebound. This leaves a small, unexploited loss
that is less than epsilon. Similarly, the decline to the level epsilon below the basis may take some time.
Part of the total loss of epsilon dollars will have occurred earlier than the taxpayer's trade.
These small deviations from full exploitation of the opportunity to take tax losses early disappear in
the limit of "continuous trading." This limit arises as epsilon is reduced gradually to zero. Continuous
trading involves an infinite number of trades. The investor trades along the price curve whenever it
declines below the basis. The basis itself continuously decreases as these trades are executed.
Continuous trading is a viable strategy when transaction costs are zero. Suppose instead that each
transaction involves a fixed cost of SX. No matter how small $X is, continuous trading would be
infinitely costly because continuous trading requires an infinite number of transactions.
154. Family-held close corporations come to mind. The stock of such corporations generally is not
traded on a market, and evaluation of the worth of the corporation may be difficult. Furthermore, the
value of the company may derive largely from experienced operation by the family owners. Part of the
value is therefore human capital of the family owners. This makes it difficult to transfer the company
to anyone else for its full value. See infra text accompanying notes 218-22. Selling to take a tax loss
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The value of strategic trading therefore depends on both the level of
transaction costs and the legal availability of tax advantages from early
loss-taking. Two cases are considered in the rest of the Article in order to
gauge the influence of these two factors. In the first case, either the law
postpones losses for tax purposes until the assessment period ends, or
transaction costs are so high that it is not worthwhile for taxpayers to take
losses early. In the second case, the law permits losses to be taken earlier
than the end of the assessment period, thereby allowing taxpayers to ac-
celerate the tax benefits associated with losses, and transaction costs are
zero. Since transaction costs are zero, rational investors will take all losses
at the earliest possible moment.'55 This second case will be called the
"strategic trading case" while the first case is one with "no strategic
trading."
Which of the two cases applies affects the probabilities of asset paths
and therefore alters the bridge process that will be used to compute tax
statistics. This point is best explained by an example. Suppose that an
asset is worth $100 and has a basis of $99 at the beginning of a five-year
assessment period. The asset is held during the entire five years, and at
the end of the five years it is worth $200. In the strategic trading case we
have even more information about the asset: Its value never fell below $99
during the entire five-year period. The $99 basis acts as an "absorbing
barrier." All asset paths that hit and go below the barrier end there with
the sale of the asset since the rational investor sells as soon as the asset
crosses the barrier. 5 ' These asset paths can be eliminated as possibilities
since the taxpayer held the asset during the entire period.
The distinction between the two cases is important because eliminating
all paths that cross below $99 means that the average path that the asset
took from $100 to $200 is liable to be substantially different. Risky assets
such as the average common stock tend to move erratically up and down.
would be accompanied by the additional real loss of having to sell at a price that is substantially below
value.
155. See sup ra note 153. A "rational investor" is one who will make all trades that increase net
worth. This includes selling to take tax losses whenever that results in higher after-tax wealth.
It is assumed that the tax benefit from losses is immediate. This assumption makes mathematical
analysis much easier. Generally, however, there will be some delay before the losses yield benefits.
Assuming no delay gives an upper bound for the potential benefits from early loss taking. This upper
bound may not be too far from the actual value of the benefits in some cases. If the taxpayer can
adjust wage withholding or estimated tax payments to reflect a loss, for example, then the delay would
probably be a maximum of a few weeks. See supra text accompanying note 20 and infra note 156.
156. There is a slight problem with the fifth year in reaching this conclusion. If the asset remains
above $100 for the first four years and then falls below S100 in the fifth year, the investor may not
have any tax reason to sell. The realized loss may have no tax effect until assessment occurs at the end
of the fifth year. On the other hand, it may be possible to reduce taxes if there is a withholding or
estimated tax system that is responsive to losses from sales but ignores unrealized gains and losses.
It would not be surprising if an estimated tax and withholding system under a periodic accretion
tax did ignore unrealized losses and gains. The whole reason to tax unrealized gains and losses peri-
odically at long intervals, rather than at short intervals or continuously, is that computing unrealized
gains and losses more frequently is too costly.
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If they are only a small amount above a particular level, they are likely to
cross it. Consider the example of the typical stock market asset set out
above.157 If the stock is currently at $100, the probability that it will cross
below $99 at least once during the following year is 93.3%.158 Paths that
do not strike the $99 level sometime during the year will tend to be those
characterized by large early increases from the initial $100 level. These
early increases pull the asset price far enough away from the absorbing
barrier at $99 that the asset is unlikely to fluctuate down and strike that
barrier later in the year.
The following figure illustrates this phenomenon for a one-year invest-
ment in the typical stock market asset. Take the initial value to be $100,
the final value to be $105, and the basis to be $99. In the figure, path 1 is
composed of dots while path 2 is composed of boxes connected by lines.
Path 1 is the average path with no strategic trading and path 2 is the
average path with strategic trading. Path 1 is nearly exponential, 159 and is
similar to the riskless asset paths examined in Part 1.160 Path 2 is
humped. Initially, the average asset price increases sharply as is typical of
the paths that are not absorbed at the $99 barrier sometime during the
year. Thus the average asset path reaches a maximum just past mid-year.
Finally, it declines sharply to reach the $105 final value.
157. See supra text accompanying note 148.
The stock market asset examined here is typical in the sense that it mimics average stock market
performance. See supra text accompanying note 148. It is important to note that examining this one
asset understates the effects from strategic trading for individuals who hold portfolios of stocks. In any
large portfolio, some losses and gains offset each other. One would want to sell the loss stocks so as to
realize the tax benefits from the losses early. However, if the portfolio is traded as a single asset, only
the aggregate losses on the portfolio are realized early. But it would be optimal to realize all the
losses early.
158. This probability can be computed from the bridge process that describes the motion of the
asset price. See J. Strnad, supra note 14, at 196 (Corollary 1).
159. It is hard to detect from the diagram that it is not exponential. Nonetheless, this path rises
slightly more steeply initially than the exponential path between $100 and $105. It is slightly hump-
shaped compared to that exponential path. This can be seen from the following table:
time value on expected value on expected value on
exponential path with no path with
path strategic trading strategic trading
0.0 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.2 100.98 101.29 112.34
0.4 101.97 102.44 115.71
0.6 102.97 103.44 115.94
0.8 103.98 104.30 113.12
1.0 105.00 105.00 105.00
Use of the exponential path as an approximation to the path with no strategic trading is discussed
infra, text accompanying notes 239-45.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.











The implications of this phenomenon are clear under a continuous tax-
ation standard. The fact that asset gains are likely to be clumped in the
beginning of the asset's life suggests a larger tax on average than if the
asset rises exponentially to its final resting point. Examples in the next
Subsection verify this intuition. The average continuous tax is much
higher in the strategic trading case.
2. Riskiness and Strategic Trading
To explore the importance of asset riskiness and strategic trading, it is
instructive to compare three taxes for a typical stock market asset that
begins at $100 and increases to $105 after one year. 6 ' The basis of the
asset is assumed to be $100 instead of the $99 used in the previous
Subsection.'62
161. The nominal riskless interest rate is assumed to be 3.1% as in the earlier examples. It is not
clear what riskless interest rate would result in the most meaningful simulations. The choice of rate
depends on which wealth-related norm is being examined. Under the intangible benefits justification,
the riskless rate is a proxy for the proportional component of the intangible benefits from wealth that
goes untaxed due to delaying taxation of gains in wealth. It is unclear how good a proxy any particu-
lar value for the riskless rate is because it is hard to observe how large that proportional component is.
See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
Under the second best justification, the accretion tax substitutes for an absent wealth tax by reduc-
ing the after-tax rate of wealth accumulation. As mentioned above, see supra text at notes 76-78, it
may be reasonable to tax the nominal riskless return under this justification. The 3.1% is the average
nominal Treasury bill rate over a large number of years. See supra note 148. Using that value for
measuring deviations from continuous taxation indicates how far short the tax system falls from the
reduction in the after-tax rate of wealth accumulation that would result from taxing all nominal gains
the moment they occur.
162. Assuming a basis equal to the asset's fair market value is appropriate for studying periodic
accretion taxation. Assets held during an entire assessment period will have a basis equal to their
value at the beginning of that period. This basis reflects the fact that asset value is observed and gains
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The first tax is an accretion tax with a one year period that coincides
with the one year life of the asset studied. The second is the average tax
under continuous taxation with no strategic trading. The third is the aver-
age tax under continuous taxation with strategic trading. The results for a
40% bracket taxpayer are set out in Table VII. 63 In the case with no
strategic trading, a standard deviation for the tax is stated.' In the case




type of tax tax or standard deviation
average tax or upper bound on
standard deviation
one year accretion tax 2.000 0.000
continuous tax - no strategic trading 2.021 0.043
continuous tax - strategic trading 2.101 0.054
With no strategic trading, the one year accretion tax will be about 1.0%
lower than the average continuous tax. This error is only slightly larger
than the error that would result from taxing a riskless asset costing $100
and yielding $103.10 after one year. In that case, the one year accretion
tax would be $1.24 while the continuous tax would be $1.25, about 0.9%
more."6' Although the error is similar for a riskless asset and a risky asset
with no strategic trading, the average error increases dramatically for
risky assets when strategic trading is possible. This can be seen from Ta-
ble VII. In the strategic trading case, the error caused by using a one year
period instead of taxing continuously is about 5% on average. That aver-
age error is about five times larger than either the error in the case with
no strategic trading or the error for a riskless asset.' 6 '
and losses are assessed and taxed right before the beginning of each new assessment period.
163. For a description of the method for computing the values in this table as well as in Tables
VIII-IX, the tables in notes 174 & 176, and the third column in Table XIII, see J. Strnad, supra
note 14, at 182-210.
164. The standard deviation is the square root of the variance. For a discussion of the normative
significance of the variance, see supra note 146.
165. In the strategic trading case, computing the standard deviation involves doing a difficult mul-
tiple integration numerically. Even with the use of advanced techniques, the computation would take
four days on an IBM XT with an 8087 math coprocessor. In contrast, it takes only a few minutes to
compute an upper bound. See J. Strnad, supra note 14, at 199-200.
166. It is the type of path and not the lower endpoint of $103.10 that causes this result. The
riskless asset increases exponentially from $100 to $103.10. The continuous tax for an asset increasing
exponentially from $100 to $105 would be 2.018 rounded to three decimal places. This makes the
annually assessed tax of 2.0 about .9% too small. This percentage deviation is about the same as in the
case of the riskless asset that increases exponentially from $100 to $103.10.
Part II of the Appendix infra details the construction of exponential paths. The use of exponential
paths as approximations to the average continuous tax in the case of no strategic trading is explored
infra text accompanying notes 239-45.
167. A 5% error may strike the reader as being rather small. However, the degree of error is a
function of the pre-tax riskless interest rate and of the length of the assessment period. The degree of
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The results depend on several factors including the exact outcome at the
end of the assessment period, the riskiness of the asset, the riskless interest
rate and the length of the assessment period. The dependence on two of
the factors, asset riskiness and asset outcome, is particularly relevant here.
When strategic trading is feasible, the degree of deviation from continuous
taxation increases greatly with asset riskiness. The sensitivity of the de-
gree of deviation to asset outcome demonstrates that no simple adjustment,
such as a change in the tax rate, will achieve equivalence to continuous
taxation. The effect of these two factors is illustrated by extending the
example.
Consider first the riskiness factor. Suppose that an individual funds half
of the purchase of the typical stock market asset above by borrowing at
the typical riskless rate of 3.1%. An outcome of $106.90 on a $100 net
investment of this sort corresponds to the $105.00 outcome above.16 8 As
Table VIII indicates, the result is that the deviation of the average tax in
the strategic trading case is now seven times rather than five times as
large as in the case with no strategic trading. When the asset is riskier,169
the effects of allowing early loss-taking are magnified.
error increases roughly in proportion to these two factors. See infra text accompanying notes 174-76.
Nominal interest rates are currently much higher than the 3.1% used to generate the example. In
addition, assets are not assessed annually under current law. Instead assessment is usually not trig-
gered until sale. Assets are often held for a much longer period than one year. A later Section shows
that under the structure of current law, the potential impact of strategic trading is quantitatively quite
significant. See infra text accompanying notes 187-94.
Finally, the absolute size of the effects is not relevant to one of the major points in this Article:
Asset riskiness and strategic trading strongly affect the degree of deviation from continuous taxation.
In the example, these factors increase the degree of deviation by a factor of five. This makes these
factors much more significant in this case than the mere delay in taxation that is the motivation in
most of the literature for a frequently applied accretion tax. See infra text accompanying note 223.
168. The individual borrows $100 and pays that $100 plus $3.10 in interest at the end of the
year. The individual invests $200 in the typical stock market asset. Each $100 of that investment
yields $105.00 at the end of the year for a total of $210. The net return at the end of the year is S210
- $103.10 = $106.90. The net investment at the beginning of the year is $100. The expected rate of
return on the net investment is 19.7% and the standard deviation of the rate of return is 43.8%. This
compares to an expected rate of return of 11.4% and a standard deviation of the rate of return of
21.9% for an unleveraged investment in the typical stock market asset. See supra note 148.
169. The leveraged investment in $200 of stock here is twice as risky as an unleveraged invest-
ment in $100 of stock. Both of these investments amount to $100 of net investment, since half of the
leveraged investment of $200 in stock is offset by borrowing of $100 so that only $100 of the investor's
money is at risk.
The gains and losses from the $200 of stock are twice as large as the gains and losses from $100 of
stock. As a result, the rate of return fluctuates twice as much for the leveraged investment. Gains and
losses are twice as large, but the net investment is the same.
The fact that the leveraged investment is twice as risky can be seen quantitatively from the fact that
the standard deviation of the rate of return for that investment is 43.8%, twice as large as the standard




type of tax tax or standard deviation
average tax or upper bound on
standard deviation
one year accretion tax 2.760 0.000
continuous tax - no strategic trading 2.793 0.080
continuous tax - strategic trading 2.954 0.112
This result is easy to understand. A riskier investment has more ex-
treme fluctuations. The path must move up even more quickly in the be-
ginning to make tax losses unlikely. As a consequence, the asset path is a
much taller hump than it was previously. 7" This results in a higher aver-
age continuous tax.
The dependence of the results on asset outcome is illustrated in Table
IX. In each case the asset begins year 1 at $100. For each outcome, the
one year accretion tax, and the average continuous tax, both with and
without strategic trading, are computed."' 1 In parentheses following each
average tax is the percentage deviation from the one year accretion tax.
Table IX
average average
outcome at one year continuous tax continuous tax
end of year accretion tax (no strategic (strategic
trading) trading)
105.00 2.000 2.021 (1.03) 2.101 (5.02)
111.40 4.560 4.604 (0.95) 4.670 (2.41)
134.44 13.778 13.901 (0.89) 13.943 (1.20)
170.00 28.000 28.238 (0.85) 28.268 (0.95)
Table IX indicates that as the outcome gets higher and higher, the gap
between the continuous tax with no strategic trading and the continuous
tax with strategic trading narrows. This is easy to explain. In the strategic
trading case, all the paths that cross below basis and produce losses any-
time during the assessment period are excluded. The remaining paths are
likely to be paths with big gains in the beginning of the time period.,' 2
When the outcome is low, this results in a sharply peaked hump. But a
high outcome with no strategic trading also will tend to be associated with
big gains in the beginning of the time period. Given that the outcome at
the end of the year will be higher, fewer of the paths will ever cross into
170. See Figure 2 supra text accompanying notes 160-61 (plot of previous hump).
171. The outcome $111.40 is the average outcome assuming no strategic trading. The outcome
$134.44 is the average outcome with strategic trading. This outcome is higher than the $111.40 aver-
age outcome with no strategic trading because the paths that strike the $100 basis have been excluded.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 156-60.
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the loss zone. Thus, the process with strategic trading will look more like
the process without strategic trading, and they will have more similar con-
tinuous tax statistics.' 73
The figures in parentheses in the last column of Table IX indicate that
the percentage deviation of the average continuous tax from the one year
accretion tax varies greatly with the exact asset outcome. Increasing the
tax rate of the one year accretion tax would not result in a successful
simulation of continuous taxation for all outcomes.
Other factors besides asset riskiness and asset outcome influence the size
of the deviations from continuous taxation inherent in a periodic accretion
tax. Some of these factors are policy relevant. For example, using a 10%
annual riskless interest rate instead of a 3.1% rate would increase the
percentage errors from 1% and 5% in the no strategic trading and strategic
trading cases to 3% and 15% respectively. 74 Higher interest rates mean
that infrequent assessment has higher costs when continuous taxation is
the norm.'"5 Similarly, the percentage errors increase greatly with the
length of the assessment period. Substituting a ten-year assessment period,
for example, would increase the percentage errors by a factor of about five
to ten.1 76 This increase indicates that a significant reduction in the degree
173. Numerical simulations based on J. Strnad, supra note 14, at 191-98, indicate that after the
final outcome increases enough, in this case above $120 or so, the average path with strategic trading
no longer displays a hump. However, that path still increases faster initially and is more concave than
the average path without strategic trading. This results in a larger value for the average continuous
tax when strategic trading is possible.
174. Replacing the 3.1% rate in Table VII with a 10% annual riskless interest rate would alter
that table to read as follows:
type of tax tax or standard deviation
average tax or upper bound on
standard deviation
one year accretion tax 2.000 0.000
continuous tax - no strategic trading 2.065 0.128
continuous tax - strategic trading 2.301 0.162
175. For a discussion of the proper riskless rate for use in simulations, see supra note 161.
176. Consider an example using a 10 year assessment period for the typical stock market asset. In
this case, the asset begins at S100, and, with no strategic trading, the expected outcome after 10 years
is $411.77. Assume that the actual outcome after 10 years turns out to be $145.00, much lower than
the expected outcome. A table similar to Table VII follows. After each average tax figure the percent-
age deviation from the periodic accretion tax is in parentheses.
type of tax tax or standard deviation
average tax or upper bound on
standard deviation
ten year periodic accretion tax 18.000 0.000
continuous tax - no strategic trading 19.954 (10.86) 1.810
continuous tax - strategic trading 22.676 (25.98) 2.848
The results here are qualitatively similar to the results in Table VII for a one year time period. The
periodic accretion tax in each instance deviates much more substantially from the average continuous
tax in the case of strategic trading than in the case of no strategic trading. The difference is that the
absolute size of the percentage errors here is much larger.
The examples are not exactly comparable. The "low" outcomes of $105 in the one year case and
$145.00 in the 10 year case are both about one-seventh as large as the mean gain of all possible paths
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of deviation from continuous taxation is possible through use of more fre-
quent assessment.
It is clear that factors like interest rate levels and assessment length are
policy relevant. However, they do not affect the qualitative result that the
impact of strategic trading depends heavily on asset riskiness, and they do
not reduce the complexity introduced by the dependence of this effect on
asset outcome.
177
There is an important general lesson in this Section for would-be de-
signers of an accretion tax. The conventional concern about deferral is
that taxation of gains will be delayed with a resulting unjustified benefit
for the taxpayer. A longer accounting period under a periodic accretion
tax will increase the unjustified benefits from delayed taxation. But the
errors inherent in periodic rather than continuous taxation depend impor-
tantly on three factors other than the length of the period. These factors
are the riskiness of the asset, the ability under the law to realize the tax
benefit of loss deductions before the end of the assessment period, and the
degree to which transaction costs allow or prohibit exploitation of this
ability. It is clear from the examples above that in some cases these factors
induce a larger error than the delayed taxation of gains.'17  Section B of
Part IV discusses at length the implications of considering these factors for
the design of an accretion tax.
C. Samuelson Neutrality and the Timing Option
The examples in the preceding Section indicate that the ability to take
losses early combined with low transaction costs significantly increases the
errors caused by taxing periodically instead of continuously. In the finance
literature, the ability to take losses early and defer any later matching
gains is called the "timing option.' 9 The value of a risky asset to the
taxpayer holding it will depend on the value of the timing option associ-
ated with the asset, and the value of the timing option will depend on the
for the case of no strategic trading. But these outcomes may not represent the same percentile in
probability distributions for those paths. The goal is to argue that the results will be qualitatively
similar over different assessment periods. No attempt is made here to establish the similarity more
systematically or quantitatively.
177. This is clear from the numbers for the asset riskiness effect. Increasing the interest rate from
3.1% to 10% increases the absolute size of the percentage errors, but the average percentage error for
the strategic trading case is still five times as large (15% versus 3%) as the average percentage error
for the case of no strategic trading. See supra note 174. Similarly, the average percentage error in the
strategic trading case remains several times larger than in the case with no strategic trading when a
longer assessment period is used and "low" outcomes result. See supra note 176.
178. Tables VII-IX each contain examples where the average error from choosing periodic rather
than continuous taxation is at least twice as large in the strategic trading case as in the case with no
strategic trading. See supra text accompanying notes 165-72. This means that allowing losses to be
taken early in a low transaction cost environment more than doubles the error that arises from delay
alone.
179. The phrase originates from a 1983 article by Professor Constantinides. See Constantinides,
Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51 ECONOMErscA 611, 611 (1983).
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taxpayer's marginal tax rate. As a result, the Samuelson principle will be
violated under periodic taxation of risky assets even though it would hold
if these assets were taxed continuously. 180
The following example illustrates this point. An investment is made at
time 0 and lasts until time 2, two years later. All the returns on the in-
vestment will be received by the taxpayer at the end of the two years. The
investment consists of two lotteries. At the end of the first year, the first
lottery takes place. Winning this lottery will result in receiving $500 at
the end of the two year period. Losing means having to pay $100 at that
time. These two outcomes are equally likely. The second lottery is the
same except that it takes place at the end of the second year. If the inves-
tor wins both lotteries, the return is $1000 at the end of the second year.
If the investor wins one and loses the other, the return is $400 at the end
of the second year. If the investor loses both lotteries, the investor must
pay $200 at the end of the second year.
Suppose that the pre-tax interest rate is 10% per year and that investors
are risk-neutral. Then the pre-tax value of the investment along the four
possible paths of asset value will be as follows:18
Table X
lottery value at beginning value at end value at end
outcomes of year 1 of year I of year 2
win-win $330.58 $636.36 $1000.00
win-lose $330.58 $636.36 $400.00
lose-win $330.58 $90.91 $400.00
lose-lose $330.58 $90.91 -$200.00
Now consider three possible tax systems: an accretion tax with a period
of one year, an accretion tax with a period of two years, and biannual
assessment with the results of any sales during the first year taxed at the
end of that year. Under the third tax the end of the first year is in the
middle of the biannual assessment period and will be called an "interme-
diate assessment point." The taxpayer may trigger taxation of first year
gains and losses at this intermediate assessment point by selling and re-
purchasing the asset before this point in time arrives. In contrast, unreal-
ized gains and losses will not be taxed until the end of the biannual as-
sessment period.
Consider three taxpayers: one in the 0% bracket, one in the 20%
180. Professor Fane claims that Samuelson's theorem applies to risky assets. His proof on this
point is set in a discrete time framework that would seem to apply to a periodic income tax. See Fane,
supra note 109, at 101-03. In his model, however, there is no opportunity to accelerate tax benefits
by early realization of losses. His result only applies where such opportunities are not available.
181. The computation of the values in this table and in Table XI are explained infra Part V of
the Appendix.
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bracket and one in the 50% bracket. Table XI indicates the after-tax
value perceived by each taxpayer at time 0.182 There are only two col-
umns for tax treatments. One column is labelled "value under pure peri-
odic accretion tax." This column covers both the case of a one year and a
two year periodic accretion tax. Only one column is needed since the re-
sults are the same for both of these taxes.""3 The other column is labelled
"value under accretion tax with timing option." This column is for the
two year assessment period tax with an intermediate assessment point at
the end of the first year.
Table XI
taxpayer's value under value under
marginal pure periodic accretion tax




It is clear from the third column that the Samuelson result does not
obtain for the accretion tax with a timing option. The value of the invest-
ment at the beginning of the first year depends on the marginal tax rate of
the investor." 4 The reason for this outcome is straightforward. If the in-
vestor loses the lottery the first year, the asset declines in value from its
starting point. The investor will sell the asset and buy it back immediately
before the end of the first year in order to realize this loss and obtain the
associated tax benefit one year early. The benefit from doing this is larger
the higher the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.
The outcome is also easily explained using the analysis from Section C
of Part II concerning the Samuelson result. The central conclusion of that
Section was that the Samuelson result, the independence of value from the
investor's marginal tax rate, will hold for a periodic accretion tax if and
only if all assets are taxed with the same frequency. The computations in
the third column of Table XI are based on the assumption that. riskless
assets will be taxed annually under an accretion tax.'85 In contrast, the
risky asset is taxed with a "mixed" frequency. The tax on the asset's
unrealized gains and losses is biannual, but the taxpayer may accelerate
182. The computations required to generate this table are detailed infra Part V of the Appendix.
183. This is not surprising. Part II showed that any pure accretion tax will produce the Samuel-
son result of constant value across taxpayers with different marginal rates. It does not matter how
frequently assessment is made under the accretion tax. As long as all assets are assessed with the same
frequency, the Samuelson result will hold. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
184. "Value" here is the price at which the investor would buy or sell the investment. It is also
the after-tax value of the investment.
185. The after-tax discount rate used to compute value in Table XI is the after-tax rate of return
on riskless assets. The details of the computation are set out infra Part V of the Appendix.
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taxation of first year losses and gains to the end of the first year. The
rational taxpayer will accelerate taxation of the losses but not the gains.
This behavior will result in assets with first year losses being taxed annu-
ally while other assets are taxed biannually. Thus, the Samuelson result
fails to hold when there is a timing option because different assets will be
taxed with differing frequencies."8 6
D. The Normative Costs of the Timing Option
Sections B and C strongly suggest that strategic trading in the form of
the timing option has significant normative costs. Both of these Sections,
however, consist of examples constructed from a tax administrator's per-
spective. The organizing event is a data set facing a tax administrator: An
asset moves from $X to $Y during a time period of length T. Continuous
taxation and periodic taxation are compared for various data sets.
Examples of this type do not suffice to indicate the magnitude of the
normative costs induced by the timing option. For instance, in the case of
strategic trading studied in Section B, loss paths are simply ignored under
the bridge process approach. 8 But these paths and their tax treatment
affect the value of investments and should be taken into account in gaug-
ing the overall impact of the timing option on investment transactions.
This Section studies the potential total impact of the timing option. The
focus is on the situation under current law except that restrictions in cur-
rent law aimed at controlling the timing option are ignored. These restric-
tions are studied in Part IV. 88 Before assessing their effectiveness, it
makes sense to see what the cost will be if the timing option is left totally
uncontrolled. Current law is not a periodic accretion tax. For many assets,
gains and losses accumulate until the taxpayer dies. At that point, the
basis in the hands of the heirs is increased or decreased to fair market
value.'89 Death forces realization of losses and gains, but they have no tax
effect. The consequence of the potentially long delay before realization
combined with the step-up in basis at death is that the timing option has
considerable value to high bracket taxpayers.
The following example based on work by Professor Constantinides il-
lustrates this point. 9 Consider taxpayers who expect to live for twenty-
186. In the example, this failure is caused by the mixed frequency taxation of the risky asset and
not by the choice of the one year period for taxation of riskless assets. For example, if riskless assets
were taxed biannually rather than annually, the numbers in the third column of Table XI would be
330.58, 335.98 and 339.41 from top to bottom instead of 330.58, 332.68 and 334.05 as in the table.
The risky asset would still be taxed under a mixed frequency, and Samuelson neutrality would still
fail to hold.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 155-67.
188. The restrictions are the limitation on capital losses and the wash sales rules. See infra text
accompanying notes 195-222.
189. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1989).
190. See Constantinides, supra note 179, at 622-23. His estimates are not in the context of a
periodic accretion tax. Instead, he assumes that assets with gains are only assessed stochastically, when
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five years and hold the typical stock market asset. Assume that this asset
can be traded with zero transaction costs, that marginal tax rates are fixed
over the foreseeable future, and that there is a step-up in basis at death.
The following table presents the proportion of asset value attributable to
the timing option for taxpayers subject to different marginal rates.' 91
Table XII
marginal proportion of asset value





The table indicates that high bracket taxpayers will find the asset much
more valuable than the 0% bracket taxpayer.
To the extent that the tax benefit from the timing option is not capital-
ized into asset prices, high bracket taxpayers will receive a benefit that is
inappropriate under either of the wealth-related norms.' 92 On the other
hand, if the tax benefits are capitalized to a large degree into asset prices,
then investment incentives will be distorted significantly in favor of risky
unusual circumstances prompt the investor to sell. His model permits choice of a different tax rate at
this time of assessment from the rate that applies to capital gains and losses under normal circum-
stances. A useful interpretation of his model for the study of current law is that the unusual circum-
stances are the death of the taxpayer. In order to model the step-up in basis at death under current
law, the tax upon occurrence of this unusual event may be set at zero. During life, however, the
taxpayer may be assumed to deduct capital losses against a non-zero rate.
191. The table is generated using equation (21) in Professor Constantinides' article. See id. at
623. The proportions in the second column of the table would be about one-third as large if unreal-
ized gains were taxed at death. The second column would be 0.0%, 1.3%, 3.5% and 5.0% from top to
bottom instead of 0.0%, 3.2%, 11.0% and 21.1%. In addition, if taxing unrealized gains at death
produced additional revenues and if these revenues were used to reduce tax rates, a greater reduction
than two-thirds in the value of timing options would be possible.
When Constantinides computes the value of the timing option he compares the strategy of taking
losses whenever possible to the strategy of holding the asset until realization is forced by death or
other circumstances. This means that delaying gains that have already accrued in the form of value
exceeding basis does not contribute to the value of the timing option in his calculations. *
Suppose, for example, that at the beginning of year one an asset is worth $110 and has a basis of
S100. The taxpayer dies at the end of year five, and the asset is worth $110 at that time. Assume that
the lowest value of the asset was $80 during year two. The value of the timing option as calculated by
Constantinides arises from the ability to take S20 of loss in the first two years as the asset falls to $20
below the original basis of $100. This $20 of loss is matched by $20 of additional gain at the end of
year five. But the value of the timing option does not include the value of deferring the tax on the $10
gain existing on the asset at the beginning of year one until the end of year five. The step-up in basis
at death enhances the value of the timing option because it matches $20 of losses that reduce the
investor's tax liability in early years with a later gain of $20 that is not taxed.
Tax policy analysts have focused on the deferral of gains, such as the S10 gain in the example just
presented, as the principal drawback of the realization doctrine. The examples in this Article suggest
that the timing option is a problem of the same order of magnitude. See, e.g., supra note 11 and
accompanying text; supra note 178.
192. See infra note 213 (equity and efficiency results under alternative assumptions about capital-
ization of tax benefits).
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investments. The size of this distortion would clearly be worrisome. For
taxpayers in the 28% bracket, the value of an unconstrained timing option
would be close to that of the old 10% investment tax credit. Repeal of this
investment tax credit was a key feature of the attempt in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 to make taxation of capital investments neutral between in-
vestments.' 93 Ineffective limitation of the timing option would result in
projects as risky as the typical corporate stock receiving a benefit similar
to the old investment tax credit. Less risky enterprises would receive no
corresponding tax benefit. 19 4 This might cause nonneutralities that exceed
those brought about by inconsistent investment tax credit and depreciation
treatment of different assets under pre-1986 law.
It seems clear that an unconstrained timing option would result in large
normative costs. The next Part studies current law and the general ques-
tion of designing an accretion tax with those potentially large costs in
mind.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Parts II and III suggest that continuous taxation is ideal and demon-
strate that the seriousness of deviations from this ideal depends heavily on
the riskiness of various assets and on the ability to exercise a timing op-
tion by taking losses early and delaying gains. These results have impor-
tant implications for two levels of tax policy analysis: small scale reform
of current law that keeps the current structure more or less intact, and
large scale reform consisting of moving closer to continuous taxation by
taxing unrealized gains and losses frequently for a wide array of assets.
Section A considers small scale reform of current law. Current law at-
tempts to limit exploitation of the timing option through the limitation on
capital losses and through wash sale provisions. Subsection 1 of Section A
discusses the role of the capital gains and capital loss provisions in limit-
ing the timing option, considers reform of the capital gains provisions as a
control device, and points out the weaknesses that would remain after re-
form. Subsection 2 discusses and critiques the use of wash sale provisions
to prevent or to hinder exercise of the timing option.
Section B considers large scale reform of the tax code to bring it closer
to the norm of continuous taxation of gains and losses. Unlike the current
law reforms examined in Section A, this type of reform would address the
conventional concern about deferral, that the taxation of gains can be
delayed, as well as concern about the timing option. Section B examines
two major approaches: approximation and frequent assessment. Approxi-
193. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 313, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1986); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REFORM AcT OF 1985, H.R.
REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1985).
194. The timing option has a value of zero for assets that increase risklessly because strategic
trading is impossible if an asset cannot produce losses. See supra note 191; infra note 201.
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mation involves using a best estimate of continuous taxation based on the
initial value, final value and holding period of the asset. Subsection 1
studies various approximation techniques. Subsection 2 explores frequent
assessment. These Subsections detail asset categories for which one of the
two approaches appears to be superior to the other. Finally, Subsection 3
proposes directions for future research.
A. Timing Option Distortions: Attempts at Control Under Current Law
1. The Limitation on Capital Losses
a. Timing Option Distortions and the Capital Gains Provisions
The lower rates on capital gains income provided under U.S. tax law
prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were a continuing problem for tax
policy analysts. Lower rates were rationalized on four grounds: correcting
for inflation, stimulating investment, alleviating the "lock-in" problem
and alleviating higher tax rates under a progressive system when income
is "bunched." As commentators have noted,19 three of these problems
have more effective and simpler remedies. Inflation problems can be fixed
by indexing the basis of assets and debt. Bunching of income can be ad-
dressed more easily and more effectively through income averaging provi-
sions. Stimulation of investment is not accomplished very efficiently by
capital gains treatment. More direct and more finely targeted methods are
available.
"Lock in" describes the fact that a taxpayer will be unwilling to sell an
asset that has unrealized gains on it. Sale accelerates taxation of the gain
while holding the asset results in additional deferral. It is unclear whether
the lock-in problem has any serious consequences. Professor Wetzler, for
example, is skeptical about whether lock-in has significant efficiency ef-
fects.1" 8 His skepticism seems justified. Individuals holding a locked-in as-
set usually can rebalance their portfolios without selling the asset, 197 and
there is probably enough liquidity in stock markets that lock-in has little
effect on market prices."'
195. See M. GRAETZ, supra note 100, at 599-605; Wetzler, Capital Gains and Losses, in COM-
PREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 115 (J. Pechman ed. 1977).
196. See Wetzler, supra note 195, at 138-140.
197. The cleanest way to rebalance is by selling the locked-in asset short. If a taxpayer holds an
asset and simultaneously sells it short, the short sale is treated as a separate transaction and does not
trigger taxation of the gain on the long position. See I.R.C. § 1233(a) (1989). At the same time,
selling short cancels out the risk and return of the long position exactly. The proceeds from the short
sale can be reinvested in any way desired. Short sales therefore provide a means of "selling" appreci-
ated assets without realizing gains on the sales.
Even if short sales are not available because an asset is not publicly traded, portfolio rebalancing
may be possible without selling the asset. In particular, the taxpayer may be able to borrow using the
asset as collateral and then invest the proceeds to balance his or her portfolio.
198. The price elasticity of stocks is estimated to be very high, perhaps as high as -3000. See R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 77, at 297. It appears that big buyers and sellers will make the
market efficient in the face of a great deal of passive holding of locked-in securities.
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Lowering the capital gains tax rate decreases the tax penalty for early
sales, and thus alleviates the lock-in problem. Lowering tax rates, how-
ever, means sacrificing the goals under wealth-related norms that justify
accretion taxation. Increases in accumulated wealth will be taxed at lower
rates than other income. There is another approach. A high frequency
accretion tax will alleviate the lock-in problem. Whenever the end of an
assessment period is reached, any unrealized gains are taxed, and the ba-
sis of the asset moves up to the market value. At that moment there are no
assets that are locked-in.1"9 This approach will be examined in Section
B.
20 0
The four traditional rationales for establishing a separate capital gains
category and subjecting this category to a lower tax rate are shaky at best.
The next Subsection considers use of the capital gain category for a fifth
purpose: controlling the timing option. The timing option problem is dis-
tinct from the lock-in problem because the value of the timing option
arises from being able to take losses early.201 The timing option effect
would be reduced by lower tax rates,20 2 but, as in the case of the lock-in
problem, lowering tax rates sacrifices the goals of the wealth-related
norms that justify accretion taxation in the first place.
Current law uses the capital gains category to address the timing option
problem through the limitation on capital losses rather than through
lower tax rates. The limitation operates by blocking the deduction of real-
ized capital losses unless these losses are used to offset realized capital
gains.203 The next Subsection explores the design of capital gains law as-
suming that control of the timing option is its primary purpose.
199. In a very clever article, Professor Alan Auerbach has devised a system of taxation that avoids
the lock-in problem without requiring frequent assessment. The tax under this scheme depends only
on the holding period and the final value of the asset. When the investor sells an asset for $X after
holding it for a time t, the gains are presumed to be equal to the gains on a riskless asset that ends up
at $X after that length of time. Under this scheme investors have no incentive to retain assets merely
to reduce the tax on past gains. See A. AUERBACH, RETROSPECTIVE CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION,
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2792, 1988).
The problem with this scheme is that it ignores the wealth-related norms that justify choosing
accretion taxation in the first place. Suppose, for example, that an investor holds risky assets and
makes huge returns that far exceed the return that would have resulted from an equal investment in
riskless assets. These gains will not be taxed very heavily since they will be presumed to be equal to
the gains from riskless assets that would have yielded the same final value. Conversely, suppose the
investor suffers large losses. This investor will be taxed as if he or she had experienced gains. In both
cases, the tax system deviates very far from taxing the intangible benefits from wealth properly and
from adjusting the distribution of wealth effectively. As a result, the tax scheme will not be very good
at satisfying either of the two wealth-related norms.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 246-53.
201. See supra note 191. Lock-in effects would occur even for assets that increase risklessly. The
taxpayer would want to defer taxes on the riskless gains by holding the assets rather than liquidating
them. But for these assets the timing option has no value. There is no possibility of taking losses early
because there is no possibility of ever having losses.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84 and text accompanying notes 191-92 (examples
in Tables XI and XII show greater distortion due to exercise of the timing option under higher tax
rates).
203. Use of capital losses against ordinary income is only blocked completely for corporations.
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b. Reforming the Limitation on Capital Losses and the Efficacy of the
Limitation as Reformed
If attacking the use of the timing option is the principal purpose behind
the capital gain provisions, then considerable simplification of the law is
possible. One difficult legal problem has been to define a "capital asset"
for the purpose of determining whether particular transactions will be
treated as generating capital gains or ordinary income. Since the capital
gains provisions did not have a clear underlying policy rationale to sup-
port them, courts and tax administrators were faced with the task of
drawing distinctions without much guidance. This often resulted in confu-
sion if not disaster.
For example, the Supreme Court in the Corn Products case2 4 required
a taxpayer to treat transactions in corn futures as ordinary rather than
capital transactions. This decision arguably had little grounding in the
statute.2"' The Court's rationale for the decision was that the profits from
hedging in corn futures arose from everyday business operations rather
than from an investment.206 Corn Products led taxpayers to claim that
loss transactions were business-connected but that gain transactions were
for investment purposes. If successful, the taxpayer would get the best of
all possible combinations: capital treatment of gains and ordinary treat-
ment of losses. Some courts responded by attempting to limit the scope of
the Corn Products doctrine.20 7 The ensuing confusion led the Supreme
Court to go along with the most severe limitation proposed in the lower
Individuals may use up to $3000 of capital losses against ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1211 (1989).
204. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
205. See I.R.C. § 117 (1939) (now I.R.C. § 1221 (1989)). The Court itself was concerned about
this. In response to the taxpayer's claim that the hedging was not within the statutory exceptions to
capital gain treatment, the Court relied on its reading of legislative purpose:
Admittedly, petitioner's corn futures do not come within the literal language of the exclusions
[from capital gain treatment] set out in that section [defining capital assets]. They were not
stock in trade, actual inventory, property held for sale to customers or depreciable property
used in a trade or business. But the capital-asset provision. . . must not be so broadly applied
as to defeat rather than further the purpose of Congress . ... Congress intended that profits
and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary income
or loss rather than capital gain or loss. The preferential treatment provided by [the'capital
gains provisions] applies to transactions in property which are not the normal source of busi-
ness income. It was intended 'to relieve the taxpayer . . .,from excessive tax burdens on gains
resulting from a conversion of capital investments . ... '
350 U.S. at 51-52 (citations omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 108 (1932)).
206. See supra note 205.
That a court would depend heavily on the rather hazy distinction between "business" and "invest-
ment" transactions to determine whether an asset is a capital asset is not surprising. Courts know that
investments like bonds and stocks are capital assets while business inventories (including bonds and
stocks held by brokers or dealers) are not. This provides an analogy that can be used to decide cases.
In the absence of a clear policy basis for the capital gains provisions, this analogy may be all that
courts can rely on.
207. See, e.g., W. W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed 550
F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977). The Windle court took explicit notice of this
"heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" strategy in denying ordinary loss treatment where there is a mixture of
business and investment motives.
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courts: Corn Products applies only to hedging transactions connected with
business inventory.2""
If the principal purpose of the capital gains provisions is to devalue the
timing option by allowing losses only when offsetting gains are realized,
then it is conceptually easy to define a category of "capital assets." This
category should include all assets that may be held for long periods of
time and that are risky. These are the assets that generate substantial
timing option value for the taxpayer. 0 9
Despite the conceptual ease that this definition provides, there are sub-
stantial problems with attacking the timing option problem in this way.
First, taxpayers who are unlucky enough to generate net losses over long
periods of time will not be able to deduct these losses until offsetting gains
are secured. 210 This is a more serious problem if the definition of capital
assets is narrower. Suppose, for example, that the category is limited to
assets that are very risky and very long-lived. It may be that a particular
investor suffered large losses on these assets but has substantial gains on
other assets.
Second, if the capital asset category is defined broadly to prevent harsh-
ness in net loss situations, this will make the category less effective at
reducing the value of the timing option. Investors who were holding low-
risk assets outside of the capital asset category could shift to low-risk as-
sets inside the category. The low-risk assets will produce capital gain in-
come that will tend to free the investor from the limitation on capital
losses.21
208. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). Arkansas Best Corporation was
a diversified holding company. It held stock in a Dallas bank. The stock was sold for a loss. The Tax
Court found that there was no substantial investment purpose and therefore held that the sale should
result in an ordinary loss under the Corn Products doctrine. The Eighth Circuit reversed and rejected
both the customary business versus investment test from the Corn Products case and the strategic
analysis approach of the Tax Court in the Windle case discussed supra note 207. Arkansas Best
Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986).
The Eighth Circuit based its holding on the fact that stock does not fall under any of the exceptions
to § 1221 and therefore is a capital asset. 800 F.2d at 218. The Supreme Court agreed and specifi-
cally limited the Corn Products holding to hedging transactions connected to business inventory. The
Court based its result firmly on statutory language: Hedging transactions to lock in inventory
purchase prices fall under the exclusion in § 1221 of business inventories from the category of capital
assets. See 485 U.S. at 220-22.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70 and text accompanying notes 187-94.
210. Unused capital losses can be carried forward indefinitely for individuals. The potential
harshness of the limitation on capital losses in the case of the investor who has large net losses has
been noted in the literature. See Wetzler, supra note 195, at 132-34. Henry Simons himself opposed
a limitation on capital losses for this very reason despite being aware of the need to control strategic
early loss taking. See H. SIMONS, supra note 34, at 157, 159-60, 212.
The potential harshness of the limitation has led a recent commentator to propose revising it. See
Baker, Capital Loss Deduction Limits After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 66 TEx. L. REV. 159,
171-76, 183-87 (1987) (capital loss limitation should be applied only within a category of assets
consisting of marketable securities and real estate other than the taxpayer's residences).
211. If the category demarcation is effective, then there will be either portfolio distortions or in-
vestment distortions or both. Investors will strongly prefer to invest in low risk assets that fall just
barely into the capital asset category. These low risk assets have the same financial characteristics as
other low risk assets but will provide a source of capital gains that alleviate the limitation on capital
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There is also another problem that would exist even under a narrow
definition of the category. Investors can combine risky assets with offset-
ting risk characteristics in order to construct a portfolio with very little
risk.2"2 This may be done by purchasing many individual assets so that,
short of the I.R.S. hiring a slew of finance experts, it would be difficult to
determine that the investor was holding a relatively riskless portfolio.
Sophisticated taxpayers with large asset portfolios could evade the limita-
tion of the capital asset category to risky assets.
Finally, the attempt to reduce the value of the timing option for high
income taxpayers by limiting capital losses will fail if it is easy to convert
ordinary income into capital gain income. In that case, the capital loss
limitations will bind only when the taxpayer runs out of ordinary income
to convert to capital gains. A taxpayer who has aggregate capital losses $Y
where SY is less than $X, the taxpayer's ordinary income, would simply
convert $Y of ordinary income to capital gain. Thus, for taxpayers with
ample ordinary income, the full potential value of timing options could be
achieved on a large portfolio of investments regardless of the breadth of
the "capital asset" definition.21 3 This final point has serious implications
for current law. The effort to control conversion of ordinary income to
capital gains is still very important despite the fact that capital gains rates
were increased to the level of ordinary income rates by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.214 Equalization of ordinary income rates and capital gains
rates means that conversion no longer directly lowers the applicable tax
rate. But easy conversion would allow many taxpayers to evade the limi-
tation on capital losses. This would leave the ability to profit from the
timing option almost entirely uncontrolled under current law.
losses. That will either artificially inflate the prices of those assets, thereby distorting investment in-
centives, or cause investors to hold more of those assets in their portfolio than would be optimal in the
absence of taxes.
212. A simple example is purchase of stock combined with sale of a call on the stock and purchase
of a put against the stock. The exercise price of the put and call need to be chosen at whatever
premium over the stock price generates an adequate "riskless" rate. The sale proceeds from the call
and the purchase price of the put may roughly cancel each other.
213. The ineffectiveness of the capital loss limitation may result in two different polar phenomena
or in a mixture of the two. First, the value of the timing option may be capitalized into asset prices.
The resulting increase in these prices would distort investment. Firms would provide more of these
assets than if the timing option were strictly controlled. Second, investors may gain the entire value of
the timing option if asset prices remain unaffected. The precise mixture of these two phenomena that
occur can only be determined by careful economic analysis. That determination is important because
the distortion of investment and the inequities that arise from high income individuals being able to
keep the value of the timing option may be weighted differently by policymakers. See Auerbach,
Should Interest Deductions Be Limited?, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID IN-
COME-CONSUMPTION TAX 195 (1988); Bittker, Equity, Efficiency and Income Tax Theory: Do Mis-
allocations Drive Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMsICS OF TAXATION 19 (J. Pechman ed. 1980).
214. For a summary of the changes to the capital gains provisions in the Tax Reform Act of
1986, see N1. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 667-68 (2d ed. 1988).
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2. Restrictions on Losses from Wash Sales
There is one other major provision in the law besides the limitation on
deduction of capital losses that attempts to limit exercise of the timing
option: the wash sale rule of section 1091.21 This rule blocks the deduc-
tion of losses when the sale of an asset is accompanied by purchase of the
same asset within 30 days before or after the sale. The principal problem
with this provision is that it is ineffective whenever substitute assets are
readily available. This seems to be true for most publicly traded assets
such as common stocks or bonds. Theoretical and empirical work in mod-
ern finance indicates that a diversified portfolio eliminates all risk except
for a few common risk factors. 216 This makes it easy to duplicate the un-
diversifiable risk in any given asset by another asset or group of assets.
Furthermore, the number of assets that are necessary to obtain most of the
benefits of diversification is low, typically believed to be about fifteen.217
Therefore, diversifiable risk is not a serious concern. It would seem that
taxpayers would suffer little or no loss in terms of holding an optimal
portfolio from selling an asset with a tax loss and substituting a different
asset.
The cases where wash sale provisions are likely to be effective are the
very cases where the timing option is less important. These are cases
where transaction costs of sale are high or where an asset has higher value
in the taxpayer's hands than in the hands of any other owner. For exam-
ple, a family-owned corporation may be difficult to sell to outsiders for its
full value without a costly search for buyers and a costly investigation by
the potential buyers into the business. The business may also be tied up
with the human capital of the family. A local restaurant or store may
derive a large part of its profitability from the reputation of the owner-
operators. It is unclear whether the owners would perform as well if they
earned only salary with the profits flowing to someone else.218 Thus, sale
of a closely held corporation may involve both high transaction costs and a
real reduction in value due to the fact that the business cannot be operated
as profitably by new owners.
Successfully realizing tax losses from such a business would be difficult.
Since the business is more valuable in the hands of the original owners,
there are no good substitute assets as in the case of marketed securities.
Sale and repurchase of the business itself would probably not succeed.
Even if the purchase was more than thirty days from the sale so that
215. See I.R.C. § 1091 (1989).
216. See supra note 135.
217. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 77, at 132.
218. This is the classic agency problem discussed in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Finn:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Owner-
ship of all the residual profits spurs efficient operation. Managers who own only part or none of the
residual have an incentive to extract benefits from employment that reduce the residual.
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section 1091 did not apply, it is likely that the government would success-
fully claim that the sale-repurchase was a sham transaction.219 Further-
more, "sale" of the business within the family would fail. The law not
only denies the tax loss to the seller in such a case,220 but also ensures that
the buyer can only take the loss in the future to the extent that the appre-
ciation of the asset during ownership by the buyer covers the loss. If no
such appreciation occurs, the loss can never be taken.22 In contrast, the
wash sale provisions simply ignore the sale and purchase so that the basis
of the asset is the same as it was before the two transactions.222
3. Conclusions
Limiting the deduction of capital losses and disallowing losses from
wash sales each have significant weaknesses as methods for controlling
exercise of the timing option. The problems with these methods of control
suggest that to the extent that any proposed accretion tax scheme fails to
control timing option value by frequent assessment, it may be difficult for
the law to control it independently. Accordingly, in discussing alternative
ways to implement accretion taxation, the next Section carefully considers
the impact of each design on the timing option.
B. Designing an Accretion Tax
Two major themes have been developed so far. First, accretion tax
norms point to continuous taxation as ideal. In contrast, an annual peri-
odic tax is often implicitly assumed to be ideal in the literature. A year
may be a good period to use, but that choice must be justified in light of
the ideal of continuous taxation.
Second, the riskiness of various assets and the ability to exercise a tim-
ing option by taking losses early and delaying gains are important consid-
erations in accretion tax design. In contrast, the literature tends to focus
exclusively or primarily on the length of the assessment period in consid-
ering design of a comprehensive accretion tax.223
These deficiencies in the literature are reflected in existing U.S. tax
policy. In particular, current law ignores riskiness and timing option as-
219, A court can invoke the sham transaction doctrine to ignore the form of a transaction with
"no economic substance" and treat it as something else for tax purposes. See Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960).
220. See I.R.C. § 267(a)-(c) (1989).
221. The buyer's basis in the asset is cost, the amount paid to the seller. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1989).
The seller had a higher basis. The buyer will be unable to use this higher basis to compute loss.
However, the buyer can use the seller's loss to offset future gains on the asset. See I.R.C. § 267(d)
(1989). If there are no such gains, then no one will benefit from the seller's loss.
222. See I.R.G. § 1091(d) (1989). It is possible for the wash sale rules and the rules barring losses
in transactions between family members to apply simultaneously. In that case, the basis provisions in
§ 1091(d) override the basis rules discussed in note 221 and accompanying text for sales between
family members. See I.R.C. § 267(d) (1989).
223. See supra note 5 (citing sources).
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pects in choosing the assets to tax most frequently. The greatest effort to
implement accretion taxation by frequent assessment of unrealized gains
typically involves assets that are not particularly risky. Consider the case
where a bond is issued for less than its face value, the value that it will
yield when it matures. In this case the increase in value represented by
the difference between the face value and the issue price is economically
equivalent to interest. The tax code is careful to tax this increase in value
as it occurs annually.12 4 These bonds, however, are typically significantly
less risky than other assets such as publicly traded common stocks where
data is available that would make frequent taxation of unrealized gains
very easy.225 Common stocks are taxed only when gains and losses are
realized by sale or other disposition.226
This Section discusses design of an accretion tax in light of the continu-
ous taxation ideal and the importance of strategic trading of risky as-
sets.227 In the riskless environment of the example in Part I, it was poss-
ible to tax an asset only once and yet achieve a tax result equivalent to
continuous taxation. No sacrifice of the goals specified by accretion tax
norms was necessary in order to minimize the number of assessment and
collection times for any asset. Part III, however, made clear that risky
assets cannot be treated this way.228 In particular, there is not a one-to-
one correspondence between the asset paths and the "endpoint data" sets
consisting of initial price, final price and holding period. Endpoint data
conveys only partial information about the path.229
In the face of incomplete information about the path, there are two
224. The code accomplishes this under I.R.C. § 1272 (1989). The difference between issue price
and face value is called "original issue discount." See I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1) (1989).
225. Several legal commentators have noted the ease with which unrealized losses and gains from
such common stocks could be taxed on an annual basis and have advocated that approach. See supra
note 5 (citing sources).
226. Although Congress has moved the treatment of some assets closer to a pure accretion tax, it
has done so in a piecemeal fashion. The treatment of bonds issued at less than face value was arrived
at in several installments in response to potential abuse by taxpayers. See Halperin, supra note 5, at
509-12. If accretion taxation is to be the standard treatment, Congress should think more comprehen-
sively about which assets to target for frequent taxation.
227. Perhaps the most extensive and thoughtful attempt to grapple with the problems of imple-
menting accretion taxation widely is Professor Shakow's recent article. See generally Shakow, supra
note 5. He catalogs the financial assets and liabilities currently extant in the United States and consid-
ers how each type of asset or liability might be taxed under accretion taxation. His goal generally is to
assess and tax annually. Where this cannot be done, he proposes a tax at the time of sale that is
equivalent to annual taxation and that is based on a linear approximation of the asset path. See infra
Part II of Appendix (discussing construction of linear approximation).
The goal here is to supplement work such as Professor Shakow's by showing how asset riskiness
might play an important role in the design of an accretion tax. In particular, risky assets that can be
traded at low cost should be the focus of attempts to assess and tax frequently. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 248-50. For other classes of assets it may be easy to mimic a continuous tax by periodic
assessment so that infrequent assessment may not be very harmful. See infra text accompanying notes
237-45.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 132-39.




basic policy approaches: approximation and frequent assessment. Approx-
imation consists of choosing the best possible tax based on the partial in-
formation inherent in the endpoint data. Frequent assessment addresses
the incomplete information problem by observing more of the path.
This Section shows that which of these two approaches is best depends
on the type of asset being taxed. The crucial asset trait is the level of
trading costs. Frequent assessment works well for low transaction cost as-
sets while approximation is an attractive approach for high transaction
cost assets. The reason for the difference is that strategic trading is avail-
able for low transaction cost assets, and strategic trading makes approxi-
mation less accurate and more difficult.
The Section proceeds in three steps. Subsection 1 discusses approxima-
tion techniques and their limitations. Subsection 2 details the alternative
approach of frequent assessment. Subsection 3 specifies some directions
for future research concerning design of accretion taxation.
1. Approximation Techniques and Their Limitations
The challenge of approximating continuous taxation consists of using
endpoint data about the asset path in the most effective possible way. An
obvious candidate for use in approximation is the average continuous tax
based on the bridge process approach discussed in Part 111.230 Using only,
endpoint data and the statistical characteristics of the asset under consid-
eration, a bridge process is constructed: the set of all possible paths and
their probabilities. Knowing this process, the approach yields a figure for
the average tax over these possible paths.
The bridge process approach is attractive because it produces a best
estimate of the average tax given the endpoint data that is available. But
imposing an average tax in place of observing the actual asset path and
imposing the corresponding continuous tax has two drawbacks. First, even
using a perfect estimate of the average tax will not eliminate all of the
normative costs inherent in approximation. In particular, even though us-
ing the average tax as an estimate minimizes the variance of the esti-
mate,23 the remaining variance may be high. In this case, the average
continuous tax will tend to deviate substantially from what would have
been the actual continuous tax. As a result, there may be value in assess-
ing frequently despite the fact that good estimates of the average tax are
available.2 32 The use of frequent assessment is discussed in Subsection 2.
230. See supra note 146; text accompanying notes 144-47.
231. This point is easy to demonstrate using a little calculus. Suppose that one wants to know the
true value of some random variable X. There are n possible values, each of which is equally likely.
Denote these values xi where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The variance of X from some estimate b is simply
V = (1/n) 2 (xi - b)2 where the sum is from i = 1 to i = n. The second derivative of V with respect
to b is I, which is positive, and the first derivative is zero when b = (1/n) 2 xi, the average value of
X. This average value is the minimum variance estimate of X.
232. See supra note 146.
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A second drawback of using the average tax as a surrogate for the ac-
tual continuous tax due is that this approach will only succeed when stra-
tegic trading is not possible or is prohibitively expensive. To see why this
is true, consider the following example of a risk-neutral investor investing
in a risky project.233
The project is a two-year investment with returns consisting of the pro-
ceeds from two lotteries. One lottery is at the end of the first year, and the
second lottery is at the end of the second year. The lottery at the end of
the first year yields either $320 or $120 with equal probability. The out-
come is announced publicly. No one has any information about which
outcome will occur until the lottery itself is conducted. These two cash
payments will be paid with interest at the annual market rate of 10% at
the end of the two years. Therefore, the project will receive either $352 or
$132 at the end of its two year life as a result of the first lottery. The
lottery at the end of the second year yields either $110 or -$110 with
equal probability. The outcome of the second lottery is independent of the
outcome for the first lottery.
At the end of the two years, there are three possible cash outcomes from
the project. With probability 25% the project will yield $22, with
probability 50% it will yield $242, and with probability 25% it will yield
$462. The two extreme outcomes are each associated with a unique path.
But the middle outcome may be reached by two different paths. These
two different paths are associated with the two different possible orderings
of the high and low outcomes in the lotteries, "lose-win" and "win-lose."
On the lose-win path the first lottery results in a low outcome and the
second in a high outcome. On the win-lose path the high outcome occurs
in the first lottery and the low outcome in the second.
The lose-win path begins at $200, increases exponentially to $220 dur-
ing the first year, drops by $100 to $120 after the first lottery, increases
exponentially to $132 from $120 during the second year and finally jumps
to $242 after the second lottery.2"4 The continuous tax on this path
brought forward to the end of the second year is $15.30. The win-lose
path begins at $200 and increases exponentially to $220 during the first
year, increases by $100 to $320 after the first lottery, increases exponen-
tially from $320 to $352 during the second year and then drops to $242
after the second lottery. The continuous tax on this path brought forward
233. The Appendix infra details the methods used to derive the paths and numerical results in
this example. Parts I and V of the Appendix are particularly relevant to the path computation and the
valuation of risky investments by a risk-neutral investor.
234. The $200 figure is the discounted present value of the $242 average return to be received in
two years. This discounted present value increases to $220 during the first year since the riskless
interest rate is 10%. Investors are assumed to be risk-neutral. These investors value risky returns by
discounting the average value of the risky returns at the riskless discount rate. See infra Part V of the
Appendix. Thus, the $200 figure is the initial value of the investment.
The jumps and drops in value occur as the lottery results become known and risk is resolved.
Between jumps and drops, the investment's value increases at the riskless annual rate of 10%.
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to the end of the second year is $20.23. The tax is higher on the win-lose
path because it involves earlier gains and later losses than the lose-win
path.
The two paths are plotted against time in Figure 3. The win-lose path
consists of empty boxes connected by lines, and the lose-win path consists
of pluses connected by lines. The paths coincide where there are solid
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Suppose that the tax rule is to impose the average tax for any given
ending value at time 2. Then the tax for the outcome of $242 will be
$17.77, the average of $20.23 and $15.30. But the taxpayer can now use
an asset sale and purchase strategy to obtain a tax of $17.77 in the win-
lose situation and a tax of $15.30 in the lose-win situation. The strategy is
to sell the project right after the first lottery if the low outcome occurs in
that lottery and simultaneously buy an equivalent project. If the outcome
of the second lottery is the high one, this strategy will reduce taxes from
the $17.77 average tax to the $15.30 for the lose-win path. This result
occurs because the taxpayer has replicated the lose-win path by asset sales
and purchases. If the second lottery has a low outcome, the taxpayer sim-
ply pays the tax based on the final outcome of $22 corresponding to the
lose-lose path. The total tax for this path is unaffected by the sale and
purchase after the first lottery. Therefore selling and repurchasing after
the low outcome in the first lottery strictly dominates simply holding the
project in that situation. The taxpayer will pay lower taxes in some future
states of the world but will never pay a higher tax in any future state of
the world.
This strategy generalizes to more complex situations. Sale combined
with simultaneous repurchase splits the asset path into two pieces. The
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first piece runs from the initial time to the time of sale. The second piece
runs from repurchase forward. Whenever the sum of the expected taxes
from these two pieces is lower than the expected tax if the asset is simply
held, the taxpayer should sell and repurchase. In essence, taxpayers will
establish the actual occurrence of all paths with below average taxes but
will hold the asset if the path would result in an above average tax. The
result will be that the maximum tax will be the average tax over all paths,
but the taxpayer will often pay less. The problem is that the average tax
was computed assuming that taxpayers would not behave strategically in
response to the average tax rule. The actual average tax given this behav-
ior will differ from the average tax assumed to apply in its absence.
This problem suggests that using an average tax rule will not work
well for low transaction cost assets when strategic trading is legally feasi-
ble. There are other approximation techniques that may work with these
assets. Consider a "high tax approach." Under this approach an approxi-
mate tax is imposed that is much too high on average. This tax by itself
would be a poor approximation of continuous taxation. However, the
hope is that the taxpayer will trade to establish all the paths with lower
taxes. The actual trading path then can be used instead of the high tax
approximation.
In the example just presented, a perfect high tax approach would be to
assume that any final outcome was reached by the path resulting in the
highest tax. When $242 is observed as the final outcome of the project in
the example above, the tax would be $20.30, the highest tax for any path
leading to that outcome. With this rule, the government can rest assured
that the taxpayer will establish the actual contours of any lower path by
asset sales and repurchases. The tax result will always be correct.235 If the
lose-win path occurs, the taxpayer will have sold the asset after the first
lottery to secure this path on the tax accounts. The tax will be $15.23. If
the win-lose path occurs, the taxpayer will have held the project through-
out the two years, and the tax will be the correct amount: $20.30.
The real world implementation of this approach is more difficult than
this example suggests. For many assets it is hard to establish an upper
bound for the tax due on the basis of endpoint data.236 Some arbitrarily
235. There is a problem with this approach if not all taxpayers trade their assets to minimize
taxes. In that case, taxpayers who do not so trade will be overtaxed. Not trading may be optimal
behavior on the part of these taxpayers if they face higher transaction or planning costs than other
taxpayers. Higher planning costs may arise where a taxpayer is ignorant of the proper trading strate-
gies. Learning these strategies or discovering trustworthy agents who can do them on behalf of the
taxpayer may be very costly. Furthermore, taxpayers with small portfolios may pay higher transaction
costs per dollar invested.
Legal commentators have been concerned in the past about whether a taxpayer's failure to hold a
portfolio that maximizes tax benefits should be an equity concern. See Bittker, supra note 213, at
22-23.
236. Consider a humped path where value starts at $X, increases to some point above SX, and
then declines back down to $X. If interest rates are positive, this generates positive tax liability. Early
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high tax could be imposed for each outcome unless the taxpayer sold and
repurchased the asset with some given frequency. This approach would
induce the taxpayer to produce path data for the tax authorities. That is
certainly good policy if the taxpayer can plan sales and repurchases
costlessly and incurs no transaction costs on those sales and repurchases.
Otherwise, the planning costs and transaction costs are social costs that
may make this approach undesirable.237 In that case, frequent assessment
may be a better solution. This possibility is discussed in Subsection 2.
The strategic trading problems with the average tax rule that arise for
low transaction cost assets are absent if transaction costs are very high. In
this case, the timing option problem is not a concern. The taxpayer will
not sell to take tax losses early if selling is extremely costly. This fact
makes taxing on the basis of an average path feasible. Taxpayers cannot
profitably subvert the average by selling to establish below average paths
for tax purposes.2 3
8
The average tax rule based on the bridge process is an attractive alter-
native for high transaction cost assets. But there are other approximation
techniques based on endpoint data that might be used for these assets.
Tax policy scholars have put forward two other techniques as possibilities.
One technique is to assume an exponential path between endpoints.239
This approach envisions the asset increasing in value at a constant rate of
return like the riskless assets discussed in Part I. The other technique is to
assume that the path between endpoints is linear.240 Because exponential
and linear path approximations fail to use all of the information on the
statistical properties of asset paths inherent in the endpoint data, they may
deviate significantly from the average tax indicated by bridge process
analysis.24' However, using the bridge process approach requires more
information than the other two approaches. It is necessary to know the
pre-tax statistical properties of the assets being taxed.242 In addition, the
gains are matched with later losses to create net interest due on the taxes corresponding to each dollar
of matching gain and loss. As the hump becomes infinitely high, the interest charge increases toward
infinity.
237. Additional problems arise if taxpayers differ in the level of their planning or transaction
costs.. See %upra note 235.
238. Cj. supra text accompanying notes 232-35 (ability of taxpayer to exploit and subvert aver-
age tax rule by strategic trading when transaction costs are low).
239. See, e.g., Balcer, supra note 1, at 3; Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88
MICH. L. REv. 722, 742-44 (1990).
240. See, e.g., Shakow, supra note 5, at 1122-24; Wetzler, supra note 195, at 121-22 & 152-53.
241. An example is a humped asset value path starting at $100 and ending at $100. Since gains
precede equal amounts of losses on this path, a positive amount of tax usually would be due. See
supra text accompanying note 29. But both the exponential and linear path approximations would
indicate a path that was flat at $100. No tax would be due under either of those approximations.
242. This information is necessary because the bridge process approach operates by assigning
probabilities to various paths. These probabilities are based on the statistical properties of the asset
under study. See supra note 149; text accompanying notes 146-50.
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exponential and linear approximations are conceptually and computation-
ally simple compared to the bridge process approach." 3
It is clear that the linear and exponential approximations have some
advantages over the bridge process approach. 2" This raises a key ques-
tion: How much is lost by the fact that these approximations do not use
all the information inherent in the endpoint data? A concrete way to ad-
dress that question is to examine how much these approximations would
deviate from the average continuous tax computed under the bridge pro-
cess for the typical stock market asset.
Consider the following table. It consists of four taxes for a typical stock
market asset purchased for $100 and held for ten years. The taxes are
presented for various final outcomes at the end of the ten years. The tax
rate is assumed to be .40. The "standard tax" is simply the tax rate ap-
plied to the final value minus the initial value. The "exponential approxi-
mation" is the continuous tax that would have been due if the asset had
followed an exponential path between the initial and final value. The
"linear approximation" does the same assuming a linear path. The third
column contains the bridge process computation of the average continuous
tax as a benchmark.2 45 The outcome $294.34 is the expected outcome as
of the beginning of the investment.
Table XIII
outcome standard continuous exponential linear
tax tax (average) approximation approximation
110.00 4.00 4.65 4.38 4.87
150.00 20.00 22.13 21.81 24.35
294.34 77.74 84.39 83.93 94.63
500.00 160.00 172.08 171.48 194.78
1000.00 360.00 384.99 382.38 438.24
243. Part II of the Appendix details the mathematical construction of linear and exponential ap-
proximations based on endpoint data for asset paths. Parts III and IV of the Appendix explain how to
compute the continuous tax due on an exponential path. A similar and equally elementary explana-
tion could be given for computing the tax on a linear path. The mathematics required is high school
algebra and some elementary calculus. After deriving the appropriate formulae, approximating the tax
for given endpoint data involves only a few simple calculator operations. For most tax professionals
these computations and the concepts that underlie them would be elementary.
In contrast, deriving the average tax due under the bridge process approach requires advanced
mathematics. See generally J. Strnad, supra note 14, at 182-210 (derivation of the mean and variance
continuous tax using the bridge process approach). In addition, computation of the average tax for a
given set of endpoint data is difficult and must be done by computer. The bridge process approach
lacks the conceptual and computational simplicity of the linear and exponential approximations.
244. Another approximation approach would be to assume that the asset fluctuated in the same
way as similar assets with observable paths. This can be done systematically using modern finance
theory, but that approach is most difficult precisely for the class of high transaction cost assets consid-
ered here. See supra note 135.
245. Since there is no possibility of early loss-taking in this case, the bridge process is computed
for the case with no strategic trading. See supra text accompanying notes 150-60.
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The linear approximation performs poorly. It results in substantial
overtaxation in every one of the five examples in the table. The picture is
much brighter for the exponential approximation. Except in the case of
very low outcomes, this approximation closes most of the gap between the
standard tax and the average tax under continuous taxation. It seems clear
that the exponential approximation method is worth considering as an
alternative to computing average taxes using bridge process analysis.
2. Frequent Assessment
A major alternative to the approximation techniques discussed in the
previous Subsection is frequent assessment. Under this approach both re-
alized and unrealized gains and losses occurring during each assessment
period would be summed and taxed at the end of the period. No attention
would be paid to the timing of the gains and losses within the period. The
assessment period would be chosen to be very short so that gains and
losses would be assessed frequently.
This approach makes the value of the timing option zero. There is no
advantage to realizing losses that occur early in an assessment period. No
matter what trading an investor does during the period, only total gain or
loss over the period will be taxed at the end of the period.246 Furthermore,
there is no way to accelerate losses to an earlier assessment period. Losses
will be taxed at the end of the period in which they occur regardless of
when they are realized.
The disadvantage of this approach is the inaccuracy due to not drawing
temporal distinctions within assessment periods. This inaccuracy may be
minimized, however, if the assessment period is chosen to be very short.247
Since frequent assessment is likely to be costly, it would be valuable to
know the gains from choosing progressively shorter assessment periods.
To get an idea of the magnitudes involved, consider the following example
of an asset with a riskless exponential path. The asset increases exponen-
tially at a 10% annual rate from $100.00 at the beginning of year one to
$459.50 at the end of sixteen years. A constant tax rate of .40 is assumed.
The asset is assessed at equal intervals, and the sixteen-year period con-
sists of an integral number of these intervals. The first column of the table
specifies the number of assessments during the sixteen-year period. The
246. This approach has two other advantages. First, it eliminates the danger of overtaxing tax-
payers who are unaware of how to trade their assets to minimize their taxes or taxpayers with small
portfolios whose trading is circumscribed by high transaction costs per dollar invested. See supra note
235. The danger is eliminated because there is no trading strategy that will reduce taxes for anyone.
A second advantage is that the approach eliminates the need to know the statistical properties of the
asset. This is true because no attempt would be made to estimate the path that the asset took during
each assessment period.
247. This inaccuracy could also be alleviated by applying one of the approximation methods dis-
cussed in the previous Subsection to intraperiod fluctuations. See supra text accompanying notes
230-45.
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second column states how long the assessment period is. The third column
lists the resulting tax expressed in terms of collection at the end of the
sixteen years.
Table XIV
number of assessment equivalent tax
assessments period end of 16 years
1 16 years $143.80
2 8 years $175.19
4 4 years $192.35
8 2 years $201.09
16 1 year $205.46
32 6 months $207.65
64 3 months $208.74
192 1 month $209.46
832 1 week $209.74
infinity zero $209.83
The tax of $143.80 would be the tax under the current system if none
of the gains were realized until the end of the sixteen years. The tax of
$209.83 represents the "correct" result that follows from continuous taxa-
tion. A system of weekly assessment would come within 0.04% of the cor-
rect result. Annual assessment results in an error of about 2.1%. Although
this example was constructed for a riskless asset path, a similar qualitative
result would probably apply for typical risky assets such as common
stocks, given that the possibility of profiting from early loss taking has
been eliminated by denying any tax effect to early realization of losses.2"'
Frequent assessment is an especially promising approach for low trans-
action cost assets. The class of assets that may be sold and purchased at
low cost primarily consists of assets with well developed public markets.
Daily price series are available for most of these assets. It would be possi-
ble to construct a computer program that would begin with endpoint data
(date and price of purchase; date and price of assessment or sale), would
construct a value path based on daily price series, and would compute tax
due, with interest, for that path. It is plausible that a program of this sort
could cover all publicly traded assets at a very low cost per use.
For low transaction cost assets, it is likely that frequent assessment will
approximate continuous taxation more accurately and will be less costly
than the approximation methods discussed in the previous Subsection. For
this class of assets, approximation techniques such as the average tax rule
248. The riskless asset path used in the example is exponential. Except in the case of very low
final outcomes, the tax due assuming an exponential path is a good approximation of the average
continuous tax over all possible paths for a risky asset with no strategic trading. See supra text
accompanying notes 244-46.
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can be defeated by strategic trading.2 49 A "high tax approach" of impos-
ing an arbitrarily high tax so that the taxpayer will establish a lower path
by trading avoids the strategic trading problem. But even with low costs
per trade, this approach may result in total trading costs that are much
higher than the administrative costs of frequent assessment. 50
Two advantages of frequent assessment over approximation techniques
exist independent of the level of transaction costs for the assets being
taxed. First, if assessment periods are short enough, tax rates will be con-
stant during each period. In contrast, approximation techniques will be
applied to some transactions that span many years, and the taxpayer may
have been subject to many different tax rates during those years. Costly
distortions will result if these different tax rates are not applied to the
approximated path.25' But applying changing tax rates to the approxi-
mated path increases the complexity of using approximation methods. 52
A second general advantage of frequent assessment over approximation
techniques arises because of the residual variance inherent in any approx-
imation. Even if an approximation technique accurately estimates the av-
erage tax for the set of possible asset paths, the tax for many of these
paths may be substantially different from the average tax.253 Frequent
assessment eliminates this problem by setting the tax due in close accord
with the actual path. In effect, frequent assessment involves taking many
more observations of asset values at different times so that much more
information is available about the actual path.
3. Directions for Future Research
The previous two Subsections set out some basic trade-offs. Approxima-
tion methods allow assessment to be infrequent, thereby saving adminis-
trative costs. On the other hand, the estimates that are the heart of these
methods are only estimates, and the variance of these estimates may be
249. See supra text accompanying notes 232-35.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 235-37. The high tax approach also may be inequitable
if taxpayers vary significantly in transaction and planning costs. See supra note 235.
251. If tax rate changes occur during assessment periods, taxpayers will shift the timing of invest-
ment to minimize taxes. This will make the tax system nonneutral. See supra note 118. Continuous
taxation avoids this result because the assessment period becomes infinitesimal in length. To achieve
this result when continuous taxation is being approximated, the tax rate that would have applied at
each instant should be applied along the approximated path of the asset. Furthermore, the tax adjust-
ment necessary to convert interest rates to after-tax values will also vary as tax rates change. This will
have to be taken into account in carrying the continuous tax on the approximated path forward to the
time of collection.
252. Even more complexity arises if the gains or losses along the approximated path change taxa-
ble income enough in earlier periods to affect the applicable marginal tax rates during those periods.
Each taxpayer would have to keep track of the impact of each gain or loss realization on earlier
periods. Even if a single realization did not shift the taxpayer to a different bracket in earlier periods,
a group of realizations might cause such a shift.
253. This residual variance phenomenon is detailed in the previous Subsection. See supra text
accompanying notes 231-32.
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high. In addition, some of the strongest approximation methods such as
the average tax rule are not viable if strategic trading is easy.
Frequent assessment results in higher accuracy than even the best ap-
proximation methods. On the other hand, for assets that are not publicly
traded, frequent assessment may be very costly.
The nature of these trade-offs suggests that approximation methods
would be best for high transaction cost assets while frequent assessment
would be best for low transaction cost assets. These two cases cover broad
sectors of current wealth holding such as publicly marketed securities and
closely held corporations.254 Clearly, however, there are "hard cases" in-
volving assets that do not fall into either of these two categories. There is
a real need to clarify the trade-offs between administrative costs, private
transaction costs, and the normative costs of failing to approximate contin-
uous taxation well. Accomplishing this task is necessary both to propose
solutions in hard cases, and also to adopt with confidence the solutions
that currently seem qualitatively attractive in the easy cases.
There are many possible policy approaches to the conflict between fre-
quent taxation and minimizing the sum of private and government costs.
Choosing an approach involves several tasks of a technical nature. First, it
is important to know the compliance costs of each system. Assessment and
collection of taxes involve both government and taxpayer resources. Sec-
ond, and more difficult, it is necessary to measure the impact of market
transaction costs on how closely a tax approximates continuous taxation.
Transaction costs may deter taxpayers from strategic buying and selling
that would tend to make taxes deviate from any particular desired ap-
proximation of a continuous tax. Since market transaction costs are a so-
cial cost, it is also important to know how much extra market transaction
costs a given tax system induces as taxpayers attempt to respond optimally
to the tax rules. Finally, there is the most difficult technical issue: What is
the best method of taxation? It may end up being a "surrogate" tax such
as a wealth tax on all assets not traded during the assessment period.
Developing technical models that include market transaction costs or
analyze surrogate taxes is a difficult task. For example, it is no longer
optimal for the taxpayer to realize all losses as soon as possible if there
are transaction costs. The costs associated with sale and repurchase may
exceed the expected tax benefits from realizing a particular loss early.
Some scholars have succeeded in modeling this trade-off, but doing so is
not particularly easy.255
Adding in complex surrogate taxes may be even harder. For risky as-
254. See Shakow, supra note 5, at 1124-26, 1185-96, for a breakdown of assets and liabilities
into categories and estimates of the size of each category.
255. Models with a considerable degree of mathematical sophistication are required. See, e.g.,
Magill & Constantinides, Portfolio Selection with Transactions Costs, 13 J. EcON. THEORY 245
(1976); Williams, Trading and Valuing Depreciable Assets, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1985).
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sets, it is difficult enough to model simple taxes such as a tax on net gains
and losses over a particular period or a tax that only is imposed on reali-
zation.25 Modeling more complex taxes probably would be much harder,
and the problem of choosing an optimal tax treatment from the space of
all possible tax treatments would be harder still.
Solving these technical problems would be an important step forward,
but the most pressing need is to determine the normative costs associated
with deviations from continuous taxation. In the absence of knowledge
concerning the seriousness of any given deviation, it is hard to know how
much to sacrifice in terms of compliance costs and market transaction costs
to achieve any given degree of conformity with continuous taxation. This
leaves tax policymakers without guidance even on such fundamental ques-
tions as whether or not annual assessment provides an adequate approxi-
mation to continuous taxation.
2 57
V. CONCLUSIONS
Many accretion tax advocates prefer that method of taxation over a
cash flow tax because of the impact of accretion taxation on the distribu-
tion of wealth and because the accretion tax reaches the intangible benefits
derived from wealth more effectively. These wealth-related justifications
suggest that the optimal assessment period under an accretion tax is zero.
Taxes should be assessed continuously.
Principles of tax neutrality such as the one derived by Paul Samuelson
do not imply. an optimal assessment period, but they do imply that
whatever period is chosen should be applied to all assets. Statutory specifi-
cation of different periods for different assets is not the only way this
consistency requirement can be violated. It will also be violated if taxpay-
ers can artificially shorten the assessment period by selling assets in order
to realize losses early.
Much work needs to be done on specifying the implications of the
wealth-related norms for the comparative degree of harm caused by vari-
ous deviations from continuous taxation. Despite the current inability to
compare the costs of various departures from continuous taxation pre-
cisely, much can be said about the optimal design of an accretion tax.
Scholars have tended to focus on the length of the assessment period
rather than on the riskiness of assets and on whether or not taxpayers
may trade the assets strategically to accelerate tax losses. But riskiness
combined with strategic trading often induce deviations from continuous
256. See, e.g., Constantinides, supra note 179.
257. In the example associated with Table XIV, see supra text accompanying notes 247-48, an-
nual and biannual assessment result in deviations of 2.1% and 4.2% respectively from continuous
taxation. To know whether the increase in administrative cost inherent in annual rather than bian-
nual assessment is worth spending, it is necessary to know the monetary value of reducing the devia-
tion from continuous taxation from 4.2% to 2.1%.
1990] 1903
The Yale Law Journal
taxation that are as large or larger than the deviations arising from
delayed assessment by itself.
There are two asset categories for which there are viable approaches to
implementing or approximating continuous taxation. The first category
consists of assets that are rarely traded because of high transaction costs.
For these assets, a continuous tax approximation may be based on
"endpoint data" alone: the initial value, final value and holding period of
a given asset. Given that a continuous tax may be approximated fairly
well for these assets, frequent assessment may not be necessary. A second
category consists of assets that can be bought and sold with low transac-
tion costs because the assets are traded in public markets. Frequent assess-
ment is a good approach for these assets. This minimizes the ability of
taxpayers to accelerate losses through strategic trading. The same strategic
trading possibility makes it difficult to save administrative costs for these
assets by assessing less frequently and using approximations based on
endpoint data.
When transaction costs are a barrier but not a total bar to strategic
trading and when there is no readily available price series for an asset,
approximating continuous taxation is more difficult. It is technically hard
to determine the best (or even a good) "surrogate tax" to use as an ap-
proximation. There is a more fundamental problem. Making the proper
trade-offs between the administrative costs of frequent assessment and the
normative costs of deviating from continuous taxation requires a much
better idea of the structure of the normative costs. Being able to specify
normative costs more clearly not only would aid in addressing difficult
cases but also would provide assurance that the solutions arrived at for the
easy cases are in fact good solutions.
APPENDIX: PERIODIC AND CONTINUOUS TAXATION IN A RISKLESS OR
RISK-NEUTRAL SETTING
This Appendix provides additional detail concerning the mathematical
basis for the numerical examples and figures in the text that involve a
riskless or risk-neutral setting. In particular, this Appendix describes the
derivation of the curves and numerical results in Figures 1 and 3, Tables
I-VI, Tables X-XI, part of Table XIII and Table XIV of the text.2"'
Part I of this Appendix describes the pre-tax asset paths that are used
in many of the numerical examples. Part II shows how linear and expo-
nential approximations for pre-tax paths are derived. Part III describes
the derivation of after-tax interest rates. Parts IV and V show how these
258. The working paper version of this Article describes the derivation of numerical results that
involve the statistical properties of a continuous tax on risky assets. See J. Strnad, supra note 14, at
182-210 (Appendix B). Figure 2, Tables VII-IX, Table XII, the third column of Table XIII in the
text, and the tables in footnotes 159, 174, and 176 include numbers or curves that exemplify these
statistical properties.
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after-tax interest rates are used to compute "equivalent taxes" and after-
tax present value. Each Part specifies the tables and figures to which it
applies.
I. THE PRE-TAX ASSET PATHS
Tables I-VI, X-XI and XIV are set in a world where the annualized
pre-tax riskless interest rate is 10%. It is assumed that all economic actors
know that this rate will prevail over all future time. A riskless asset in
this world will increase exponentially at a 10% annual rate.
The mathematical formula for value of an asset that grows exponen-
tially at a constant rate is straightforward. If one dollar is invested at time
0, this dollar will grow to ert dollars after t years elapse. The rate "r is
the instantaneous rate of growth. In Tables I-VI, X-XI, and XIV this
rate must be set so that the annual riskless interest rate is 10%. A 10%
annual rate means that after one year an asset purchased for a dollar
must be worth $1.10. Thus, the appropriate r solves the equation er =
1.1 so that r = ln(1.1) = 0.09531. This value of r is denoted by r(10%).
This value of r was used to calculate the two exponential paths in Fig-
ure 1. The lower path in that figure is generated by the equation $100 x
er00%)t where t is the time in years. Except for an initial jump from $100
to $119, the upper path in the same figure is generated by the equation
$119 x er(10%)t. The upper path is the pre-tax asset path that serves as a
basis for the simulations in Tables I-V in the text. Figure 3 involves simi-
lar exponential increases (at a 10% annual rate) punctuated by jumps
when risk is resolved. Finally, the simulations in Table XIV are based on
a pre-tax asset path that obeys the equation $100 x er(10 %)t.
II. LINEAR AND EXPONENTIAL APPROXIMATIONS FOR PRE-TAX
PATHS
Part IV of the text explores the situation where a continuous tax should
be applied but all that is known is the initial value of the asset, the final
value of the asset and the holding period. Let the initial value be $X, let
the final value be $Y and let the holding period be T years. Part IV of the
text, particularly the numerical simulation contained in Table XIII, con-
siders the possibility of basing the continuous tax on either a "linear ap-
proximation" or an "exponential approximation" of the actual pre-tax
path of asset value.
These approximations are derived as follows. For the linear approxi-
mation the path will be $X + bt where t is time and b is a constant equal
to ($Y - $X)/T. The constant b is the linear rate of change that would
describe a straight line asset path between $X at time 0 and $Y at time T.
For the exponential approximation the path will be $X x ea where c is a
constant equal to (1/T) x ln(Y/X). The number c is the constant expo-
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nential rate of change that yields $Y starting from $X after T years
elapses. The last two columns of Table XIII contain the continuous taxes
that would result from these approximate paths. These taxes (as well as
the approximate paths) are a function of the "outcome" in the first col-
umn of the table. This outcome is the final value of the asset, denoted here
as $Y.
III. AFTER-TAX INTEREST RATES
The numerical simulations in the text list or employ two kinds of after-
tax interest rates: rates that apply for a continuous tax and rates that
apply for a periodic tax. The after-tax interest rate for a given taxpayer is
also called the "after-tax discount rate" for that taxpayer since this is the
rate that the taxpayer will use to discount riskless investments to present
value. Tables I-III and V have a column consisting of the after-tax dis-
count rate for various taxpayers under a continuous tax regime. The next
Part describes how after-tax discount rates are used to compute the
"equivalent tax" as of a certain time which occurs in many of the text
tables. This Part focuses on how the after-tax discount rates themselves
are derived.
The annualized after-tax discount rate is the annual after-tax rate of
return that would be earned on a riskless investment. As discussed in the
previous Part, the text examples envision that a one dollar investment in a
riskless asset will grow to er(10%)t after time t where r(10%) = 0.9531 is
the instantaneous rate of return that results in a 10% pre-tax annual rate
of return on the riskless asset.
Now suppose that the tax rate is 0 and that a periodic tax is imposed
every n years. One dollar invested at the beginning of year one will grow
to er(10%)n dollars after n years. The gain at the end of the n years on the
dollar investment is simply [erG °%)n - 1] and the tax on that gain is
0[er (0G%)n - 11. The after-tax return on the one dollar investment is er(l ° )n
- 0[erG0%)n - 1]. Raising this to the power (1/n) annualizes the after-tax
rate of return and subtracting one from this annualized return gives the
annual rate of return. So the annualized rate of return under a tax with
period n is
ATDR(n) = [er(10%)n - 0[er (10%)n - 1] ](1/n) - 1 (Al)
where ATDR(n) stands for the after-tax discount rate under a tax of pe-
riod n and (Al) labels the equation for future reference. ATDR(n) can be
converted to a percentage by multiplying by 100.
As an example, consider the first number in the final column of Table
I. This is the annualized after-tax discount rate for a taxpayer in the 40%
bracket when the period for taxation is two years. The 6.11% figure is
computed by first computing ATDR(2) using (Al) with n = 2, r(10%)
= 0.09531 and 0 = .40. This yields .061132. This number is multiplied
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by 100 and rounded to two decimal places to obtain the 6.11% figure in
Table I.
Computing the after-tax discount rate under a continuous tax regime is
similar conceptually, but computing the tax due requires the use of
calculus. Suppose that at time 0 one dollar is invested risklessly at a 10%
annual rate as in the text examples. As shown in the previous Part, at
time t the dollar will have grown to V(t) = erG0°)t in value. During each
instantaneous interval dt, the asset increases in value by r(10%) x er(10%)t
x dt using the fact that the time derivative of the asset value is dV/dt =
r(10%) x er(10%)t. Under a continuous tax, the proportion 0 of this instan-
taneous gain is taxed away leaving (1 - 0) x r(10%) x er10°%)t x dt as the
amount kept by the taxpayer. A continuous tax therefore reduces the in-
stantaneous rate of return from a constant rate of r(10%) to a constant
rate of (1 - 0) x r(10%). Thus, the after-tax return from a one dollar
riskless investment under a continuous tax is eG - O)r(10%)t, and the annual
after-tax interest rate is
ATDR(O) = eG - O)r10%)_ 1. (A2)
The notation "ATDR(0)" signifies the after-tax discount rate for a tax
with a period of zero, that is, for a continuous tax.
As an example, consider the case of a 20% taxpayer. Setting 0 = .20
and r(10%) = 0.09531 in (A2) yields ATDR(0) = 0.0792. This is the
number that appears in the second column of Tables II, III and V as the
after-tax discount rate for the taxpayer.
IV. COMPUTING THE EQUIVALENT TAX AT A GIVEN TIME
The central results in Tables l-III, VI and XIV are equivalent taxes at
a given time. The concept of the "equivalent tax at time t" is used to
compare taxes of different periodicities. Thus, in Table 1, the equivalent
tax at time 2 is computed for a continuous tax, for a tax of period one,
and for a tax of period two. To obtain these equivalent taxes, taxes at
times other than time 2 are translated to taxes at time 2 using the after-
tax interest rates calculated in the previous Part. These taxes are then
added to the actual tax at time 2 (if any) to yield "the equivalent tax at
time 2." Since the taxpayer's after-tax interest rate has been used to de-
rive the equivalent tax, the taxpayer will be indifferent between paying
this tax at time 2 and paying the stream of taxes used to calculate the
equivalent tax.
As an example, consider the equivalent tax at time 2 for annual assess-
ment in Table I. This tax is $18.34. Annual assessment will occur twice
during the two years between time 0 and time 2. The asset studied in
Table I exhibits a gain of $30.91 between time 0 and time 1 and a gain of
$13.09 between times 1 and 2. The tax rate is taken to be 0 .40 in
computing Table I. The tax at time 1 would be 0.4 x $30.91 - $12.36.
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Using (Al) with n = 1 and r(10%) = 0.09531, the after-tax discount
rate is ATDR(1) = 0.06. The time 1 tax of $12.36 therefore translates to
a tax of $12.36 x (1.06) = $13.10 at time 2. There is also an actual tax
at time 2 on the gain of $13.09 that occurs between times 1 and 2. This
tax is 0.4 x $13.09 = $5.24. The sum of $13.10 and $5.24 is the $18.34
"equivalent tax at time 2" presented in Table I.
For continuous taxation, the computation is similar. The asset repre-
sented in Table I jumps from $100 to $119 at time 0 and then increases at
the constant instantaneous rate of r(10%) for two years. Translating the
continuous increase from $119 to $144 over the two years to an equivalent
tax at the end of year two is particularly easy: This tax is equal to the
pre-tax gain of $25 (= $144 - $119) minus the after-tax gain during the
two-year period. This after-tax gain occurs at the constant instantaneous
rate of (1 - 0) x r(10%) and is therefore equal to [$119 x e(1 - O)r(10%)2] _
$119. The table is based on 0 = .40. Using this value along with the fact
that r(10%) = 0.9531 yields $14.42 for the after-tax gain. Subtracting
this from $25 yields $10.58 as the time 2 equivalent of the tax on the
constant exponential growth from $119 to $144 during the two years. The
instantaneous gain of $19 at time 0 will be taxed at that time by a contin-
uous tax. Using ATDR(0) = 0.0589 based on a tax rate of 0 = .40 the
tax of 0.4 x $19 at time 0 translates to a tax of 0.4 x $19 x (1.0589)2 =
$8.52 at time 2. The total equivalent tax at time 2 is therefore $10.58 +
$8.52 = $19.10, as appears in column two of Table I.
The equivalent taxes in Tables II, III, VI and XIV are calculated us-
ing the same approach as in these examples.2"9
259. Calculating the first entry in the second column of Table VI is a bit tricky. This entry is the
tax at time 1 that is equivalent to taxation with a period of two years on the one year gain of $10
from an asset that starts at $100 and grows at a constant 10% annual rate. The $10 gain will result in
$4.00 of tax at the end of year two. The after-tax discount rate for a tax with period two is ATDR(2)
= 0.0611 so that the $4.00 tax at time 2 is equivalent to a tax of $4.00/ (1.0611) = $3.77 at time 1.
This $3.77 is the figure that appears in Table VI as the first entry in the second column.
Table XIV involves some computations that are so lengthy that use of a computer is advisable.
That table studies taxation of an asset that grows risklessly for 16 years at a constant annual rate of
10%. The table computes an equivalent tax at the end of the 16 years for accretion taxes with 10
different periodicities. The ten tax periods include one week, one month, three months, six months,
one year, two years, four years, eight years, and sixteen years as well as continuous taxation.
To see why it is desirable to use a computer to do some of the computations, consider the case of a
weekly period. A "week" is taken to be exactly 1/52 years. There are exactly 832 ( = 16 x 52) of
these weeks in 16 years. During each week, the asset will increase in value a certain amount. The tax
on this amount is computed by multiplying by .4, the tax rate used in the example. This tax must be
brought forward with interest to the end of the 16 years. The proper interest rate is the after-tax
discount rate for a tax with a weekly period. Using equation (Al), this rate is 0.058875 on an annual-
ized basis. (The corresponding rate for continuous taxation is only slightly lower: 0.058853.) The tax
due at the end of week n must be multiplied by 1.058875 raised to the power (832 - n)/52 to
translate that tax with interest to the end of the 16 year period. The sum of all 832 translated taxes is
the equivalent tax that is desired.
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V. COMPUTING AFTER-TAX PRESENT VALUE
Column four of Table III, column five of Table IV, column three of
Table V, columns two and three of Table X and columns two and three
of Table XI consist of after-tax present values. The method for computing
after-tax present value is closely related to the method for calculating
equivalent taxes detailed in the previous Part. In particular, choosing the
appropriate after-tax discount rate is the crucial step in computing both
after-tax present value and equivalent taxes.
Consider, for example, the results in column three of Table V. The
algebra used to reach these results is set out in footnote 117. As indicated
in that footnote, the values $X in column three are computed according to
the formula:
$X = [144 x (1 - 0)]/[(1 + d)2 - 0] (A3)
where d is the after-tax discount rate. The setting for the computations in
this table is a world where all transactions are subject to continuous taxa-
tion except the one analyzed in the table. Since the taxpayer can borrow
and lend only at the after-tax rate that applies under a continuous tax, $X
should be computed using ATDR(O), the after-tax discount rate for a con-
tinuous tax. The value of d used in equation (A3) should therefore be
ATDR(0) computed according to equation (A2) for each particular value
of 0.
There are two examples that involve a slightly different kind of present
value computation. The first of these examples is expressed in Tables X
and XI. The second includes the asset path plots in Figure 3 and the
surrounding discussion. These examples are different because the invest-
ment being valued is risky. In both examples, investors are assumed to be
risk-neutral.
A risk-neutral investor does not care about risk and therefore does not
require any risk premium in excess of the riskless rate to invest in risky
assets. If there is a risky cash flow that will be paid at some future time,
the risk-neutral investor values this cash flow by computing the average
cash payment at that time and by discounting this average payment to
present value using the riskless rate. An average payment is computed by
multiplying each possible payment outcome by its probability and adding
up all the resulting numbers.
To show how the computations work for a risk neutral investor invest-
ing in a risky asset, the following discussion focuses on the example set
out in Tables X and XI. The computations for the other example, the one
that is expressed in Figure 3 and the surrounding discussion, are similar.
The only significant difference is that the Figure 3 example requires com-
putation of a continuous tax rather than a periodic tax. The methods for
computing a continuous tax have already been detailed in Part III of this
Appendix.
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In the example that generates Tables X and XI, one lottery will occur
after one year and another after two years. Each lottery has two possible
equally likely outcomes of 500 or -100, and both lotteries pay off at the
end of year two even though the outcome of lottery one is revealed at the
end of year one. Thus, the sequences win-win, win-lose, lose-win and
lose-lose result in payoffs of $1000, $400, $400 and -$200 respectively at
the end of year two.
Table X lists the pre-tax values of the asset at times 0, 1, and 2 under
each of the paths. These pre-tax values are calculated using the pre-tax
interest rate of 10%. Thus, the value of the asset at time 0 is the dis-
counted value of each of the four outcomes multiplied by and summed.
This is .25 x ($1000 + $400 + $400 - $200) / (1.1)2 = $330.58. This
number fills the second column of Table X.
If the investor learns at the end of the first year that $500 is the out-
come of the first lottery, then the investor faces an equal probability of
ending up with $400 or $1000 at the end of year two. These two pos-
sibilities are simply the sum of the $500 result of the first lottery and the
equally likely outcomes of -$100 and $500 in the second lottery. The pre-
sent value of the investment (at the end of year one) is therefore x
($1000 + $400) / (1.1) = $636.36. This is the result in the first two
entries in column three of Table X. The remaining entries in that column
are calculated similarly. These entries stem from the situation where the
first lottery results in the low outcome of -$100. The present value of the
investment is then $90.91. This represents a loss of $239.67 from the ini-
tial value of $330.58.
Table XI calculates the after-tax value of the investment at time 0
under different tax rates. The second column assumes annual assessment
for the investment. The third column assumes that there is no tax until
the cash out at the end of year two but that the taxpayer can exercise a
timing option by selling and realizing any loss that occurs at the end of
year one. A loss of $239.67 will occur at time 1 if the first lottery results
in the low outcome of -$100. This loss will have a value at time 1 equal
to the tax rate times the $239.67 loss. The taxpayer then repurchases the
asset at the $90.91 price.
For a risk-neutral individual, the after-tax value of the investment at
time 0 is times the after-tax present value of each of the four equally
likely outcomes. It is assumed that riskless assets are taxed annually so
that the appropriate discount rate is ATDR(1) from equation (Al) in the
previous Part. This discount rate depends on the tax rate that applies.
As an example, consider the case of a 20% bracket taxpayer under the
timing option case in the third column of Table XI. For this tax rate,
ATDR(1) = .08. Let ATDF = 1 / (1.08) be the discount factor. The
after-tax values of the four outcomes are computed as follows:
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win-win: There are no cash flows or taxes after the first year. At
the end of the second year, the taxpayer receives $1000 in cash and
has taxable income of ($1000 - $330.58) = $669.42. Twenty per-
cent of this $669.42, or $133.88, is paid in tax. The after-tax cash
flow at the end of the second year is ($1000 - $133.88) = $866.12.
The time 0 present value of this outcome is $866.12 x ATDF 2
$742.56.
win-lose: The present value of this outcome is computed in exactly
the same way as the win-win outcome. The only difference is that
$400 is substituted for $1000 as the terminal cash flow. The present
value of this outcome is $331.03.
lose-win: This outcome involves a tax benefit at the end of year
one. The asset falls from $330.58 in value to $90.91 at the end of
year one. The asset is sold at that time, and the loss of $239.67
results in a tax benefit worth $239.67 x .2 = $47.93. The time 0
present value of this tax benefit is $44.38. The asset is repurchased
for $90.91, and at the end of year two yields $400 in cash less the
tax liability of .2 x ($400 - $90.91) = $61.82. The time 0 present
value of this ($400 - $61.82) = $338.18 is $338.18 x ATDF 2 =
$289.94. Adding $289.94 and $44.38 yields the total time 0 present
value of $334.32.
lose-lose: The time 0 present value of this outcome is computed in
exactly the same way as the lose-win outcome except that the final
cash flow is -$200 instead of $400. The time 0 present value of this
outcome is -$77.21.
The four outcomes have time 0 present values of $742.56, $331.03,
$334.32 and -$77.21. Since these outcomes are equally likely, a risk-neu-
tral individual will add them up and divide by four to obtain the overall
value of the investment. The result is $332.68. This is the value reported
as the second number in the third column of Table XI. The other values
reported in columns two and three of that table are computed in a similar
fashion.
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